

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 052 116

SO 001 552

TITLE Drugs, Race, The Counter Culture and the Soldier.
INSTITUTION Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo.
PUB DATE 21 Sep 70
NOTE 237p.

EDRS PRICE MF-\$0.65 HC-\$9.87
DESCRIPTORS *Drug Abuse, *Drug Therapy, Military Organizations,
*Military Training, *Race Relations, Racial
Attitudes, Racial Discrimination, Racial Factors,
Racial Integration, Racial Segregation, *Social
Work, Sociology

IDENTIFIERS Counter Culture, *Medical Corps, United States Army

ABSTRACT


This week long conference of senior and junior ranking military officers along with civilians dealt with military social work in the content areas of drugs and race. Theodore Roszak's concept of Counter Culture provided the unifying theme. The following papers were presented: 1) The Theme of the Counter-Culture; 2) Drugs, Race and the Counter Culture-A Perspective from Vietnam; 3) The Future Soldier: A Profile of Today's Youth; 4) Report on the Making of a Counter Culture; 5) Perspectives on Drugs: A Psychological View; 6) The Street System, Drugs, and the Military Service; 7) A Drug Program-Its Successes and Failures; 8) The Fort Bragg Drug Program; 9) Army Social Work and the Black Experience; 10) An Overview of Race Relations in the Army; 11) Views of the Army System and the Counter Culture; 12) Army Research System; 13) Army Social Work in the Field of Corrections; 14) The Influence of The Counter Culture on AWOL Behavior; and, 15) Army Mental Health Services and Race-Relations Programs. (AWW)

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ARMY SOCIAL WORK CURRENT TRENDS
DRUGS, RACE, THE COUNTER CULTURE AND THE SOLDIER



21 - 25 September 1970

FITZSIMONS GENERAL HOSPITAL
Denver, Colorado 80240

ED052116

FITZSIMONS GENERAL HOSPITAL

Major General James A. Wier, MC
Commanding

OFFICERS OPEN MESS

PROGRAM CHAIRMAN

Major Joseph J. Bevilacqua, MSC

COURSE DIRECTOR

Lieutenant Colonel Harold D. Rundle, MSC

MONDAY - 21 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 0800-0830 REGISTRATION
- 0830-0900 WELCOME
MG James A. Wier, MC
Commanding General
Fitzsimons General Hospital
- 0900-0945 SETTING THE THEME OF THE COUNTER CULTURE
COL Ralph W. Morgan, MSC
Social Service Consultant
Office of The Surgeon General, Department of the Army
- 0945-1030 A PERSPECTIVE FROM VIETNAM
LTC Edward L. Maillet, MSC
Social Service Consultant
Vietnam August 1969 - August 1970
- 1030-1100 COFFEE
- 1100-1230 FILM: "YOUTH IN TRANSITION"
Moderator: MAJ Donald R. Bardill, MSC
Walter Reed General Hospital
Washington, D. C.
- 1230-1330 LUNCH
- 1330-1500 THE FUTURE SOLDIER: ATTITUDES OF YOUNG
MEN TOWARD MILITARY SERVICE TODAY
Speaker: Mr. Jerome Johnston
Institute for Social Research
University of Michigan
Respondents: LTC Frank F. Montalvo, GS
Social Work Consultant
ACS Program, DA-ODCSPER
MAJ Thomas L. Millard, USAR
Assistant Professor of Education
Montclair State College, New Jersey
- 1500-1530 COFFEE

MONDAY - 21 SEPTEMBER 1970

1530-1630 DISCUSSION OF THE DAY'S PROCEEDINGS

LTC Roy E. Baxter, MSC
Medical Field Service School
Fort Sam Houston, Texas

CPT James E. Lasater, MSC
Army Community Service
Fort Riley, Kansas

1630-1800 ASSOCIATION OF MILITARY SOCIAL WORKERS
BUSINESS MEETING

TUESDAY - 22 SEPTEMBER 1970

0800-1030 PERSPECTIVE ON DRUGS

Psychological View: Dr. Stephen M. Pittel
Mt. Zion Medical Center
Haight-Ashbury Research Project
San Francisco, California

Sociological View: Dr. Harvey W. Feldman
Brandeis University
Waltham, Massachusetts

Respondent: Mrs. Janet Frank
Community Relations Specialist
Office of Communications
National Institute of Mental Health
Chevy Chase, Maryland

1030-1100 COFFEE

1100-1230 THE DRUG EXPERIENCE IN THE ARMY

Fort Bliss: CPT James P. Gilchrist, MSC
Fort Bragg: LTC Raymond M. Marsh, MSC
Vietnam: LTC Edward L. Maillet, MSC

1230-1330 LUNCH

1330-1430 CURRENT TRENDS IN THE CHARACTER GUIDANCE PROGRAM

MAJ Roland F. Day
Office of Chief of Chaplains

1430-1630 FUNCTIONAL AREA SEMINARS (I)

MEDDAC: LTC John K. Miller, MSC
Wm Beaumont General Hospital
El Paso, Texas

Corrections: LTC Joseph Reeves, MSC
Correctional Training Facility
Fort Riley, Kansas

Army Com Svc: LTC Vern M. Williams, GS
ACS, HQ, CONARC

TUESDAY - 22 SEPTEMBER 1970

1800-1900 COCKTAILS

1900 DINNER

Master of Ceremonies: COL Ralph W. Morgan, MSC

**Principal Speaker: BG Manley G. Morrison, MSC
Chief, Medical Service Corps
Office of The Surgeon General**

WEDNESDAY - 23 SEPTEMBER 1970

0800-0815 ARMY SOCIAL WORK AND THE BLACK EXPERIENCE

Introduction: COL Albert B. Kilby, MSC
Letterman General Hospital
San Francisco, California

0815-0900 HOW ARMY SOCIAL WORK CAN BECOME MORE
RELEVANT TO THE BLACK EXPERIENCE

Mr. Lanny Berry, MSW
Administrative Assistant, Tamalpais High School
District, Marin County School System, California
"Project Breakthrough"

0900-1015 SMALL GROUP WORKSHOPS

Moderator: Mr. Lanny Berry

1015-1030 COFFEE

1130-1230 AN OVERVIEW OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE ARMY

LTC James S. white, GS and
LTC Frank F. Montalvo, SG
Department of the Army, ODCSPER

1230-1330 LUNCH

1330-1430 CAREER CONCERNS IN THE MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

LTC J. Van Stratten, MSC
MSW-WO Career Planning, OTSG

1430-1630 CAREER PLANNING CONFERENCES

1930-2130 ARMY SOCIAL WORK COMMITMENT AND ITS
RELEVANCE TO THE BLACK EXPERIENCE

COL Albert B. Kilby, MSC

Plays for Living: "The Man Nobody Saw"

(Half-hour play written by Elizabeth Blake for
Plays for Living, a division of Family Service
Association of America)

Workshop Reports

THURSDAY - 24 SEPTEMBER 1970

0800-1030 VIEWS OF THE ARMY SYSTEM AND THE
COUNTER CULTURE

Psychiatry Consultant: COL Stewart Baker, MC
Office of The Surgeon General

Psychology Consultant: LTC Charles A. Thomas, MSC
Office of The Surgeon General

Army Research: MAJ Paul F. Darnauer, MSC
Office, Asst Secy of Defense

Respondent: COL Edward F. Krise, MSC
Office of The Surgeon General

1030-1230 FUNCTIONAL AREA SEMINARS (II)

MEDDAC: LTC John K. Miller, MSC

Corrections: LTC Joseph Reeves, MSC

Army Com Svc: LTC Vern M. Williams, GS

1230-1330 LUNCH

1330-1515 THE MILITARY OFFENDER: A REFLECTION OF
THE COUNTER CULTURE?

Army Social Work in
the Field of Corrections: LTC Joseph Reeves, MSC

Research Look at the
Military Offender: CPT Hamilton McCubbin, MSC
Research Branch, CTF

Respondent: CPT Timothy Hartnagle, MSC
Walter Reed Army Institute of
Research

1515-1530 COFFEE

1530-1630 PANEL DISCUSSION ON THE MILITARY PRISON
SYSTEM AND THE COUNTER CULTURE

Moderator: MAJ Joseph Bevilacqua, MSC

LTC Joseph Reeves, MSC
CPT Hamilton McCubbin, MSC
CPT Timothy Hartnagle, MSC
CPT Paul Raffoul, MSC

FRIDAY - 25 SEPTEMBER 1970

ACTION LABORATORY

0800-0845 THE RACIAL SEMINAR PROGRAM
MAJ A. C. Segal, MC

0845-0930 DRUG PROGRAMS
MAJ Raymond M. Marsh, MSC

0930-1000 COFFEE

1000-1045 ORGANIZING THE MILITARY COMMUNITY
LTC Frank F. Montalvo, GS

1045-1115 CONFERENCE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
MAJ Joseph J. Bevilacqua, MSC
1970 Program Chairman

COL Ralph W. Morgan, MSC

1115-1215 LUNCH

1215-1630 CONSULTANT INTERVIEWS BY APPOINTMENT

WELCOME

Major General James A. Wier, M.D.

Commanding

It is a pleasure to welcome you to Fitzsimons General Hospital. I am particularly delighted with the theme of your conference because it is not only interesting, but clearly relevant to our Army institution today. Indeed, the military is one of the major American institutions that is undergoing change, and as Von Clausewitz, the classic writer about the military, suggested: "War belongs not to the province of arts, or sciences, but to the province of social life." And it is, of course, in the province of social life that drugs and race and poverty, among other problems you are dealing with this week, have their genesis.

We have been satisfied, for example, for perhaps too long with the rapid and fairly easy racial integration of the military that took place before the 1954 Supreme Court Decision. We, of course, are proud of that accomplishment and in no small measure served as examples to other segments of our society.

We recognize now, however, that the racial issue is more complicated than simple, formal integration. In a certain sense the racial problem has presented us with an opportunity to look at a whole host of problems and their relationship to our value systems. These include the problems of poverty within the military to the definition of comprehensive health care; from the individual rights of the soldier to the whole concept of authority within the proper balance of individual and system needs.

Your proceedings are extremely valuable because most of you are in uniform and represent operators of programs which deal day-to-day with these problems. Your interest is not just academic and I can see from your program that your major concern is with applied procedures.

I am pleased, too, that your participants include civilians as well as senior and junior ranking officers. This strikes me as a working group and therefore a group concerned with solutions as well as questions.

It is encouraging to see military personnel critically examine their own system--not in a hostile, destructive manner but rather in a way that looks to what can we do about these problems. That kind of openness and honesty is certainly the first step to creating change.

I wish you well in the week ahead.

THE THEME OF THE COUNTER-CULTURE*

Colonel Ralph W. Morgan, MSC**

"And What Rough Beast, its hour come at last, slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?" W.B. Yeats.

There can be little doubt that in all industrial nations today a cultural revolution is taking place which cannot but change drastically the central values of all of modern man. The theme of this conference "Drugs, Race, the Counter-Culture and the Soldier" was devised to allow us in the Army social work program to enter into relevant dialogue concerning the various manifestations of this cultural revolution that have been reflected in the military community. Problems of drug-abuse, inter-racial conflict, political dissent, HAIR (its length, cleanliness, and style worn on face and head), nudity, clothing fashions, music, use of four letter words, attitudes toward legal authority, toward adults over 30, towards violence, towards sex, towards vandalism, toward rationalism, toward formal education, toward objectivism, toward science, toward technology, and, God save the mark, toward God, the Flag, and the Family. There seems to be no values of the past that are not under attack by the counter-culture.

The term "Counter Culture" itself was coined by the historian Theodore Roszak and his thesis is set forth in his book. The Making of a Counter Culture.¹ Roszak begins by stating:

"For better or worse, most of what is presently happening that is new, provocative, and engaging in politics, education, the arts, social relations (love, courtship, family, community), is the creation either of youth who are profoundly, even fanatically, alienated from the parental generation, or of those who address themselves primarily to the young. It is at the level of youth that significant social criticism now looks for a responsive hearing as, more and more, it grows to be the common expectation that the young should be those who act, who make things happen, who take the risks, who generally provide the ginger. It would be of interest in its own right that the age-old process of generational

*Presented at the Army Social Work Current Trends - Drugs, Race, the Counter Culture and the Soldier, 21 September 1970.

**Social Service Consultant, Professional Directorate, Office of The Surgeon General, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20314.

¹Doubleday Anchor, Garden City, New York, 1968.

disaffiliation should now be transformed from a peripheral experience in the life of the individual and the family into a major lever of radical social change. But if one believes, as I do, that the alienated young are giving shape to something that looks like the saving vision our endangered civilization requires, then there is no avoiding the need to understand and to educate them in what they are about."

Roszak as an academician identified with and engaged in educating the children of affluence sees in the Counter-Culture the last best hope for earth prior to the development of a technological, Orwellian Future. He is willing to concede that, should this future come, it "will be equipped with techniques of inner-manipulation as unobtrusively fine as gossamer." Roszak seems thus, willing to admit that while the technological future may indeed provide a level of affluence for all never attainable previously in human history, that the price of this mess of technology pottage is the artistic soul of all of us.

The term Counter-Culture in its basic sense means that the heart of the youth revolution, its value system, is arrived at by a simplistic reversal of all of the older values of the main culture: My parents are clean, therefore I will be dirty. I was taught to be objective, therefore I will be subjective. My parents put Blacks down, but I will exalt Black music, language and norms of behavior. I was taught to be future oriented, therefore I will become Now oriented. My father drank whiskey, therefore I will smoke pot. My parents believed in monogamy, therefore I will believe in polygamy and join a commune. My parents were liberals, therefore I will be a nihilist revolutionary. My parents disdained religion, therefore I will be a Zen Buddhist nihilist revolutionary who digs astrology.

It seems to me that the very term "Counter-Culture" should wave a warning flag to all serious students of human behavior. Those of us who have worked with problems of parent-child conflict are all too aware of the concept of "hostile virtue". The child of loose living, disorganized, promiscuous parents who in adolescence through casework or psychotherapy is converted into an uptight, highly organized, and moralistic little prig is not a therapeutic triumph, but simply an example of "hostile virtue". The child's behavior is still being controlled by his parents, but of course he tries to be the opposite of everything they are. He is thus still bound to them in his immaturity and lack of autonomy.

I do not know what the future will bring or should bring, but I do know that it cannot be simply the opposite of what we have now. At the heart of the Counter-Culture stands a number of basic "counter-values" to the values of the main culture. These are:

1. An ostensible hatred of technology and its products.

2. The pleasure principle orientation rather than a reality principle orientation.

3. Ascendency of the subjective mode of thought over the objective.

4. A primary group orientation rather than the secondary group orientation.

5. The intolerant moral self righteousness of totalitarianism.

First of these counter-values is "anti-technology." Manifestations of this value are many. They range from the recent great increase in demand for "organic foods," to hippy urban communes that spurn overconsumption and reject chairs, bedsteads, TV sets, and radios to actual rural communes that seek to raise their own food organically and without power equipment.

The kind of simple, rural economy these romantic retreatists are trying to establish in modern times existed not too long ago in our history. You can visit Jefferson's home at Monticello if you are in Virginia and see its beauty. As a way of life, however, it was short, brutish and nasty by modern standards. Jefferson, by the time he was my age had lost his wife and five of his children to disease.

Moreover, while the counter-culture rejects our "plastic culture" it usually does so quite selectively. Extremely expensive stereo-equipment, cameras, sports cars, and psychedelic drugs seem to be as de rigueur as fake poor boy Levis, barefeet, and absence of hair grooming.

I do not suppose that by any stretch of the imagination can I be called a counter-culture Buff, but I do enjoy watching counter-culture demonstrations and do so when there is little likelihood of being tear-gassed or clubbed by the minions of the law. For example, I attended the Counter-inauguration parade held in Washington just the day before the inauguration parade in January 1969. Some 10,000 adherents of the counter-culture marched counter to the direction the actual inauguration would take next day.

All of the uniformities of the New Left were there; the once discarded pieces of uniforms; the long dirty hair, the obscene signs, the ugly girls, and the defaced symbols of the establishment.

I did notice three things that were of interest.

First, there were very few black faces in this parade -- perhaps not one in 50. In spite of the over identification the counter-culture has with the Black Power movement, it is clear that most Blacks seem to find the fake - poor boy clothing of the New Left not in its style or taste. More appropriately, I think Blacks want a fair share of the benefits of technology rather than to try to destroy it.

Another observation of interest was that in spite of their really wretched clothing an astounding number of the marchers were carrying really expensive cameras. There were Hasalblads and Leicas with huge telescopic lenses. Had this demonstration become violent, which it did not thanks to the forbearance and professionalism of the Washington police, I am certain that the police would have quickly quelled this disturbance simply by cracking a few lenses rather than many heads.

My third observation of this parade, which is one that has been made by others, is that the youth that constitute the counter-culture seem to cry out for the strong, overwhelming father. The Maoists in the line of march held up to bug eyed tourists their little red scriptures of Mao's sayings. There were pictures of Fidel Castro and Che Guevarra, and finally there were the chants of "Ho, Ho, Ho, Chi Minh, National Front is going to Win!" These hero surrogate fathers all come from authoritarian, underdeveloped countries most of which have real trouble feeding themselves, but it is they whom the counter culture believes is the wave of the future.

The second great counter-culture value is the "Now" orientation rather than the future orientation that characterizes the mainstream of our society. The future orientation with its dependence upon planning ahead, teamwork, practice, study, and above all postponing present pleasure for future gain is scorned by the counter-culture.

In discussing this aspect of the counter-culture, Roszak confesses to find himself disheartened by such aspects of the "now" orientation as the following rave review of an acid-rock group called "The Doors."

"The Doors. Their style is early cunnilingual with overtones of the Massacre of the Innocents. An electrified sex slaughter. A musical blood bath The Doors are carnivores in a land of musical vegetarians their talons, fangs, and folded wings are seldom out of view, but if they leave us crotch-raw and exhausted, at least they leave us aware of our aliveness. And of our destiny. The Doors scream into the darkened auditorium what all of us in the underground are whispering more softly in our hearts: we want the world and we want it NOW!"

It is no accident that the single institution most vulnerable at this time in history is the university. It is not simply that this is where the kids are, but because it is the university by its very nature, that requires a strong future orientation from the young. In answer, the Free Universities are arising that do not make such demands -- but neither is there much demand for graduates of Free Universities. And somehow it remains for the leaders of the counter-culture who actually do understand for the necessity of prior planning to make literally millions of dollars exploiting the "Now" generation at Woodstock and similar rock festivals and manifestations of

various kinds. The recent foundation that Jerry Rubin set up to reduce his income tax liability by the foundation gimmick is a case in point. Jerry Rubin's most recent book "Do It" it seems is very profitable.

It was Jerry Rubin's observation that drugs were the cement that held the whole movement together. The hedonism implicit in the "Now" orientation thus leads to the enormous profits available to illegal Drug dealers and manufacturers.

The third canon of the counter-culture is the primacy of the subjective over objective modes of thought. Roszak and his academic cohorts to the contrary the counter-cultural revolution is actively anti-intellectual.

The youthful revolutionaries point to the supreme technical achievement of Nuclear Science and ask if that is the fruit of rationality. Toynbee flatly states that "Bitter, disillusioning experience has taught the victims of it that rationality is not enough. The fruits of rationality can be misused for the pursuit of wicked and disastrous objectives. This is one of the reasons for the violent revulsion against rationality in our day, and it was one of the reasons for it in the last chapter of the history of the Greco-Roman World."¹

Toynbee goes on to observe that:

"here the Rebels have made the tragic mistake of seeking an antidote to the failure of rationality by cultivating irrationality for its own sake. They have tended to cultivate it in the form of gross and sterile superstition."²

Here again we see that a simplistic search for opposites is not the path to the future.

The fourth counter-culture value to be discussed is the attempt to reject all secondary group loyalties in favor of only primary group loyalties. Primary groups like the family and the peer group are "good". While secondary groups like the State, the university, the corporation, one's profession are to be destroyed or at least disrupted. This disruption takes the form of flag burning, destruction of public records in symbolic ways, and generally exploitative behavior towards corporations and institutions ranging from shoplifting to destruction of pay telephones and burning down university buildings.

It has been noted that it is exactly at our "best" universities that this romantic assault on institutions is at its height.

¹Toynbee, Arnold J. "The Desert Hermits", Horizon Spring 1970, Volume XII, No. 2, page 27.

²Ibid.

But again, we have been through all of this before.
Robert Gorham Davis, a professor of English at Columbia, points out one predecessor:

"The distinctively modern in American and British poetry derives from France, and there it was created, according to French critics, by Arthur Rimbaud in an incredible outburst of inspiration between the ages of 16 and 20. At 16, seeing some favorite lime trees felled in the Franco-Prussian War, Rimbaud declared, "On the root of society itself must the ax now be laid." Traveling to Paris that year, 1871, to fight in the Commune, he underwent some sort of homosexual brutalization (the facts are obscure), which made his social alienation also deeply psychic.

Returned home, Rimbaud stopped washing, let his hair grow to his shoulders, and dropped out of school but mocked his former teachers through the open windows. He assailed public authority with the obscene excremental imagery now de rigueur in our own confrontational politics. Threats of death were included. "I would take the acutest delight in watching the agony of my victims." At the same time he plunged into the study of magic, alchemy and astrology. Drawing his cue from Baudelaire, who in turn was influenced by De Quincey, Rimbaud used hashish and other drugs in the attempt to turn himself into a seer by "a long, vast, reasoned derangement of all the senses." This also involved homosexual experiments with the poet Verlaine, whom Rimbaud stabbed for sport on several occasions."¹

As Louis Feuer pointed out in his Conflict of Generations, all previous youth movements in modern times have in the end become totalitarian and retrogressive insofar as human development is concerned. This is true whether it was the German youth movement of the 1830's, the French Commune, the Russian Youth movement of the late 19th century, the Nazi movement of the 1920's, or the late cultural revolution in China.

While Kent State and Jackson State were widely denounced by counter-culture spokesmen of all shades, no such denunciation rings forth against the bombers at the University of Wisconsin who recently killed a graduate student as a by-product of their moral outrage at the existence of the Army mathematics laboratory on the campus.

Herbert Marcuse, until late the chief intellectual spokesman of the counter-culture, has set forth the thesis that tolerance ought to be withdrawn from repressive, right wing spokesmen and extended to progressive

¹Davis, Robert Gorham, Rimbaud and Stavrogin in the Harvard Yard, page 2, The New York Times Book Review, June 28, 1970.

left wing spokesmen invoking the "natural right" of oppressed and over-powered minorities to use extra-legal means. Theodore Roszak in drawing back from this stance cites Tolstoy, "who when asked if he did not see the difference between reactionary repression and revolutionary repression, replied that there was, of course, a difference: 'the difference between cat feces and dog feces'."¹

The Role of Social Work in the Counter Cultural Revolution

Social Work with its traditional identification with the rejected of society and its commitment to individual self determination and non-coercion as a treatment stance has many practitioners within its ranks who sympathize and identify with the counter-culture and its values. A distinguished social work educator can ask the question "Are the hippies perhaps on the right road to building a better social order?"² He asked this question sometime prior to the Manson Case and while Haight-Ashbury was in flower prior to its demise to muggers, drug pushers and other Rip-off artists. And yet the central values of social work remain implacably those of the democratic, technological society from which social work arose. The possible elimination of poverty is of course contingent upon the affluence of our society. Penicillin to cure the rapidly rising tide of gonorrhea in counter-culture buffs is not produced by primary groups but by efficient impersonal secondary groups called Drug manufacturers. Counter-culture parents who do their own thing with their children some times addict them prior to birth, starve them, beat them to death or have sexual intercourse with them. Young people who leave college, make the drug scene and join a commune destroy what they could have become, and wind up with infectious hepatitis and chancroids to boot. Life in the counter-culture promises thus again to become nasty, short and brutish.

The Social Work mind and the Military mind to the surprise of both of them all too frequently go together.

The social worker and the soldier both are problem oriented and when they see a problem they tend to do something about it. The Welfare State and the Garrison State have long lived along side each other starting with that Great Social Welfare Statesman Bismark of Prussia.

If the problem of racial conflict is at all solvable then it will probably first be solved in the context of the Army Setting. Again it is the imperatives of a technological society that requires efficient performance by people of whatever race in the jobs they do. If any substantial number of people are ruled off the track by irrelevant criteria such as color of skin then that society will go down the drain of history. In integrated social structures I believe the Army contains more leadership roles for Blacks than

¹Roszak, Op. Cit., p. 296.

²Witte, Ernest F., A World We Never Made, in Social Work: Promises and Pressures. Edited by Sue W. Spencer, University of Tennessee School of Social Work, Nashville, 1968, p. 31.

any other organization I know of -- and this certainly includes social agencies. That we have great problems to overcome is true -- but again the military mind and the social work mind coincide and we are here at this time to do something about the problems which have arisen out of the counter-culture revolution.

The role of social work at this time in history remains what it has always been. It is our function to build the bridges between people in need and the resources society has provided for them to meet these needs. It is our function to create such resources when they are not already available and it is also our function to assist those in need to be able to use the resources provided. These helping functions are girded about with value assumptions that in my belief are at fundamental variance with the central values of the counter culture.

We do believe that technological society has been and can further be humanized and that its affluence stands in a fair way to lift the burden of poverty from mankind. Social welfare statesman can build the bridges necessary to enable the technological society to become the human society.

We do believe in the democratic ethic and that secondary groups are absolutely necessary to accomplish the major tasks of our society.

Mankind cannot live in primary groups alone. Technological society is only possible if we have strong, efficient secondary group structures to accomplish the major functions of modern life. It is the role of social work to interpret the large secondary organization to man and man to the large secondary organization.

While we do believe in the reality principle as an important organizing force in life, we are aware also that man is a feeling creature and that his basic emotional pleasure needs must be met in time or life is truly not worth living. This is a bridge that every social work practitioner must help his clients cross one way or the other if he is to help them become what they are capable of being.

The very heart of the social work process is the reasoned objective, problem solving effort in the basic methods of social work. It is this objective approach that is at the heart of much student unrest in Schools of Social Work. The triumph of the subjective in the Arts tries to invade the sciences, but with no practical success. The battle remains to be fought and I am sure some of it will be fought here.

"Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere,
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity."

W.B. Yeats

DRUGS, RACE AND THE COUNTER CULTURE - A PERSPECTIVE FROM VIETNAM*

Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Maillet, MSC**

My assignment this morning is to discuss the issues of drugs, race and the counterculture from a perspective gained through my recent experience in Vietnam. In this paper I will make some general observations about the drug and race situations as they appeared to me in my work there during the period August 1969 - August 1970. I will then share some impressions about some persistent problems in the mental hygiene effort and some reflections on approaches we used in an attempt to cope with some of those problems. Lastly I will make some general comments upon what we are here calling the "counterculture." More specifically I will discuss certain elements of what I perceive to be at the core of the counterculture critique of our sociocultural system and briefly examine the relationship of that aspect of the counterculture critique to the social work profession.

I should not have to remind you that this talk is necessarily entitled "A Perspective From Vietnam" and not "The Perspective From Vietnam." Like any of the blind men in the poem, I can only report that aspect of the elephant to which I had access, and then only within the limitations of my observational and reportorial abilities. I am certain that others who were in Vietnam, even during the same period, would report on these matters in other ways,--for much the same reasons.

The Drug Scene in Vietnam

Almost for certain, my perception of and reaction to the drug scene in Vietnam was influenced by the fact that I had been, for the most part, separated from clinical work for about seven years before arriving there. The last time I had dealt with a drug problem of any size had been during my experience as a social worker in New York City in 1952 and 1953 in the very impoverished areas of Black and Spanish Harlems. For sure there were a few

*Presented at the Army Social Work Current Trends - Drugs, Race, the Counter Culture and the Soldier, 21 September 1970.

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cases involving drug abuse which came to my attention in subsequent Army mental hygiene work during the 1950's, especially at the basic training centers at Fort Dix and Fort Carson. These cases usually involved young recruits from several of the large metropolitan areas who came to the Army with already well established patterns of drug use. But such cases were quite infrequent. The only drug cases I can recall during four years of busy clinical practice in the Army in Germany during 1958-1962 involved three members of the medical department,--a physician, a nurse and an enlisted medic. There may have been others I dealt with; but if there were, they made no lasting impression on me.

It is doubtful that anybody knows how much drug use existed in the Army during the 1950's and early 1960's; but certainly nobody regarded it as a matter for serious concern. There was, of course, an exception to this. The abuse of a drug called alcohol was regarded as a rather serious problem; and, of course, many cases involving abuse of that drug were brought to our clinical attention.

We cannot correctly assume, however, that because we did not see many users of the non-alcoholic drugs, that abuse of such drugs was therefore almost unknown in the Army before now. Indeed, there are a number of papers in the World War II literature which discuss drug use as a problem. For example, Marcovitz and Meyers, two Army psychiatrists, reported on their experience with Marijuana users in 1944 in a paper with the interesting title "The Marijuana Addict in the Army."¹ I think the paper has historical value and I will summarize it for you.

The authors reported on thirty-five cases of what they called "marijuana addiction," which came to their clinical attention during a seven month period at March Field, California. Interestingly, they found it unnecessary to describe the physiologic and psychologic effects of Marijuana out of assurance that these effects were well known and well reported. This is, in itself, curious because a 1943 issue of Military Surgeon contained an editorial entitled "The Marijuana Bugaboo," which argued that there was generally too much unnecessary concern in the Army about marijuana which was, after all, a relatively benign and innocuous drug. This editorial position was directly opposed to the position of Marcovitz and Meyers, as we shall see.

¹Marcovitz, Eli and Meyers, Henry J., The Marijuana Addict in the Army, War Medicine, Volume 6, #6, December 1944, pages 382-391.

Instead of discussing the effects of marijuana use, they focused their attention on what they called "the personality picture of the addict;" "the functions of addiction in the user's personal economy;" "the socioeconomic factors in the background of the addict;" "the difficulties presented by the marijuana addict in the military milieu;" and, lastly, "the means chosen by military authorities to deal with the marijuana addict."

In all but one instance, the users discussed in that paper were Black; and almost all came from "low socioeconomic" circumstances. Only five of the soldiers had completed high school and most had been employed only very irregularly. Most were reported as coming from broken or otherwise disturbed homes.

In terms of personality characteristics, the authors observed a marked sense of alienation, a tendency toward paranoid orientation manifested by feelings that they were being "watched" and "messed with," and an image of themselves as superior persons with a greater appreciation of life and all of its "sensual experiences." This self-image was commonly expressed in terms of an ability to "transcend the limitations experienced by squares." The authors further reported that the users commonly expressed remarkable hostility toward women and frequently made homosexual allusions in their written and spoken discourse. Psychological testing seemed to often reveal psychosexual confusion. The interpersonal relationships of the marijuana users, especially those with non-users or "squares," seemed to be largely superficial. The authors were especially struck by an inclination toward violent behavior directed both toward others and toward themselves. The marijuana users were described also as having very low tolerance for frustration.

Marcovitz and Meyers noted that these confirmed marijuana users presented a serious problem to the military in their failure to perform useful duties, in breaches of discipline, in their constant need for medical attention, and in their disruptive effect on unit morale.

Interestingly the authors unhesitatingly labeled their subjects "sick;" but they were sufficiently aware of sociocultural dimensions to their "sickness" to recommend for their treatment a center in which they would receive something called "psychosociotherapy." The recommended therapeutic "system" or "community" would provide the "marijuana addicts" with opportunity to learn how to "take their place" as "productive," "normal" "members of society."

In the absence of provision for such long term treatment centers, the authors envisioned separation of the marijuana users from the Army under provisions of Section VIII, AR 615-360 as inevitably necessary.

I describe the Marcovitz and Meyers paper at some length, not only because of its historical interest, but because it also provides a useful frame of reference for discussion of the drug phenomenon as I experienced it in Vietnam during the period August 1969 - August 1970.

Had Captains Marcovitz and Meyers been doing their work in Vietnam in 1969 and 1970 rather than at March Field, California in 1944, they would have labored under some of the same constraints. That is, they would now also be dealing with a presumably very select sample of a larger population of drug users. I want to emphasize this point strongly, because I think it is quite commonly forgotten. Many generalizations about drug users are based on experience with those drug users who come to psychiatric or other official attention. Drug users, it should be recalled, come to medical or other official attention precisely because they or others about them define their situation as in some sense "troublesome" or problematic. It should then be quite unremarkable if indeed evidence can be gathered which suggests that these drug users are having problems. We can almost certainly safely assume that there exists in the community a wider population of drug users who never come to psychiatric or other official attention presumably because neither they themselves nor those about them have yet found sufficient reason to identify their situations as troublesome or problematic. It is not wild speculation to assume that such a wider population of drug users exists in the community. We need only talk with our clients and with other soldiers we meet. They tell us that many of their associates are using drugs. Survey data with which you are well familiar suggests that drug use is quite prevalent. But we do not know much about this wider population of drug users. We do not know how big it is, and we do not know much about how frequently they use what kinds of drugs. More importantly, perhaps, we know even less about how drug use fits into the larger scheme of things, what it means, how it fits into the broader sociocultural picture. The hard facts are that, while our knowledge in these areas can almost certainly be improved, it will always be incomplete and uncertain, largely because of the rather severe legal and administrative penalties associated with drug use. Given this relative poverty of information, the temptation to generalize from what we can observe is understandably seductive.

But we must be very cautious about generalizing from the drug users who come to official attention. They are by definition those drug users who in some way get "into trouble." I should caution you, therefore, that in this presentation I am discussing drug users who came to official attention. We simply do not know if my observations would be accurate for other drug users who never came to official attention.

To return to Doctors Marcovitz and Meyers, I suspect that if they were now working in Vietnam they probably would not for long limit their interest to marijuana. This is not because they would now find less use of marijuana among troops. Quite the contrary. Indeed there is a quality of quaintness in their reporting on an experience with only thirty-five cases during a seven month period! Now, in Vietnam they would find all indications pointing to an extremely widespread use of marijuana. Nor do I mean to suggest that mental hygiene workers are by any means generally impressed that marijuana can be justifiably regarded as a benign or innocuous substance. Use of it is often enough associated with serious problems to lead to a widespread suspicion among mental hygiene workers that it can at times be quite dangerous at least for some users. But precisely how use of marijuana is implicated in such problems is seldom very clear. By and large, marijuana users seldom refer themselves out of any felt need for help on that basis. I probably talked to more users of tobacco who felt need for assistance with their habit. Most marijuana users we saw in our mental hygiene activities came to our attention because of some other problem. These were many. Indeed most of the clients we saw were then or had previously been users of marijuana to some extent. They came to our attention for the range of reasons people are referred to mental hygiene facilities. Referring persons commonly made reference to the use of marijuana as directly relevant to the problem, but marijuana users more typically saw use of marijuana as only indirectly relevant. That is, for example, they often felt that they were targets of unfair harassment because they were suspected of being "heads." On some occasions we saw a soldier in trouble for some other reason who attributed his lapse in judgment and self control to use of marijuana, "Like, man, I was stoned." But there was seldom any remorseful inclination to define being "stoned" as itself a real problem. At best it was more usually regarded as a matter of bad timing and poor luck. The marijuana users, by and large, saw marijuana use as a problem only in the technical sense. It was a problem only because "the lifers"

defined it as a problem.¹ If the "lifers" would get off their backs about marijuana, it would not be a problem in their general view. As exception to this, some, but not many users of the "harder" drugs did offer unsolicited endorsement of the "stepping stone theory."² That is, a few volunteered the regret that they ever started with marijuana because it put them "on the path" to other drugs. This view was seldom volunteered, however.

I suspect that Marcovitz and Meyers would probably have switched their attention from marijuana use to the broader question of drug use, had they been doing their work in the current Vietnam situation. They would have found it difficult to exclude from consideration the increasing case load of users of the barbituates, the amphetamines and the opiates who now present themselves so much more dramatically than do the users of marijuana. The increasing numbers of cases involving these other drugs, and the well established dangers associated with their use, make it difficult to sustain quite as much concern about marijuana use, in spite of its apparently greater frequency. These doctors would now also find that the users of the other non-alcoholic drugs very commonly report associated use of marijuana. Many drug users seen in the mental hygiene facilities appear to be rather indiscriminate in their selection of drugs, switching from marijuana to barbiturates to amphetamines to the opiates in not very obviously patterned ways. Users of these other drugs,--especially users of the opiates and amphetamines,--do with some frequency come to define their drug use as a problem for which they need help. In this respect, at least, the clientele of the mental hygiene service seem to regard marijuana as belonging to a different category.

Doctors Marcovitz and Meyers unfortunately did not tell us if the overwhelming preponderance of Black soldiers in their group could be explained in terms of the population they served in that era of the segregated Army. They also do not tell us if the preponderantly lower class origins, the erratic employment histories, the pattern of broken homes could not be explained in terms of the characteristics of the population they served. Whatever the explanation of their observation then, however, they would now find no such one at racial or socioeconomic homogeneity in the drug users

¹"Lifer" is the name commonly applied by lower-ranking G.I.'s to career soldiers, NCO's or Commissioned Officers. Sometimes it is restricted to NCO's and Officers who are not to their liking, with "Career NCO" or "Career Officer" being used for the more acceptable authority figure.

²One drug user I saw in Vietnam who was concerned about his use of heroin, interestingly referred to this theory as the "Domino Theory." He rejected it as a useful approach to understanding either geopolitics or drug use.

who came to mental hygiene attention in Vietnam. Drug users are White as well as Black; and they come from the range of social class backgrounds. They come as high school drop-outs and college graduates.

They would find, however, that the use of drugs tends to be a rank and age related phenomenon. The drug of choice for the "lifer" tends to be alcohol, and the use of non-alcoholic drugs without medical prescription is virtually unknown among the NCO's and Officers seen at mental hygiene activities. It is commonly observed that there tends to be some considerable mutual disdain between "pot heads" and "juicers." It struck me as a curiosity that alcohol abusers and the abusers of other drugs never seemed at all ready to see any commonalities or even a basis for analogy in their behaviors.

Marcovitz and Meyers would still find on the part of some of their colleagues in mental hygiene work a considerable readiness to conceptualize drug use in terms of the personality frame of reference. I find current efforts in that direction relatively unconvincing, typically circular, and generally not very useful. For sure, one still sees some of the characteristics mentioned by those two authors. Marijuana users and users of the other non-alcoholic drugs do tend to be suspicious. Indeed it is not at all uncommon for them to describe themselves as "paranoid." They still commonly report that they are being "watched" and "messed with." They also still frequently talk of themselves as a superior breed with more highly developed sensual, esthetic and ethical sensibilities. But I do not think that these behaviors necessarily tell us very much about basic personality structure. The fact is, in using drugs, they do run the risk of rather serious punishment. They know that there is considerable likelihood that they are being watched as suspected drug users. And if they are suspected of being "pot heads", the chances are high that they are being "messed with" in the range of ways NCO's and officers who are so inclined can "mess with" their subordinates. In that sense their suspicions may simply reflect highly perceptive reality testing. Such suspiciousness, even in the absence of very telling evidence, can be termed "paranoia" only in some very extended sense. It is, for example, a phenomenon of another order altogether than the paranoia of those amphetamine users who came to our attention in frankly psychotic state.

I think that the protests of superiority which we often hear from drug users can also be best understood as a phenomenon greatly reinforced by the sociocultural context. I find this very similar to the tendency within the homosexual subculture to define homosexuals as a superior breed blessed with a higher order of esthetic and ethical

sensibility. Such behavior can probably be best understood as a socially reinforced defense against being stigmatized by the wider society as lower-order violators of the law. It is understandable, at least in part, in terms of Goffman's notion of the need to manage "a spoiled identity."¹ In making this analogy, I do not mean to suggest that my experience with marijuana users supports the notion that they have a special proclivity toward latent or manifest homosexuality, as was reported by Marcovitz and Meyers.

It is on this point that I will change the direction of these remarks somewhat to the issue of intervention in the problem. One of the most difficult problems I encountered in providing consultation to commanders, staff officers, NCO's, chaplains and physicians was their commonplace tendency to be immobilized by a conviction that in their experience with drug users they were dealing with some totally alien breed of human, and with a phenomenon totally alien to their experience and that of the Army more generally. I found it at once very necessary, very difficult and very useful to at least attempt to break through that notion.

The fact is that drug use,--the use of psychotropic chemicals to alter the way one feels,--is an integral part of our wider culture. If we were to examine the situations of many of our youthful drug offenders, the chances are high that we would frequently find that for years their fathers have been beginning each evening with several martinis to alter the way they feel; that their mothers have been regularly taking thorazine, valium or librium; and that school teacher maiden aunts alternately take "downers" and "uppers" prescribed by the family physician. If there was need for further reinforcement of drug-taking behavior, the young soldier for sure had a generous exposure to television and magazine encouragement to regard pills and potions as solutions to virtually all discomforts. The ideal of "living better through chemistry" is hardly an invention of today's youth. The biggest single difference between his behavior and that of his father, mother and maiden-aunt is that he is doing it without prescription or other legal sanction; that is, his behavior is in violation of the law and presumably with greater risks.

Once consultees could put the phenomenon into that kind of perspective and abandon the notion that the soldier who uses drugs is some kind of totally alien creature, they seemed better able to relate to the problem in more reasonable fashion. Once they came to recognize that they probably have had a fair body of experience in dealing with abusers of a drug called alcohol, they were often better able to mobilize themselves in face of the problem. It was by no means a

¹Goffman, Erving, Stigma, Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Prentice-Hall Inc., New Jersey, 1963.

magical answer to the problem. God knows that our experience with alcoholics is not in itself source for great optimism in this regard! But it did seem to get local persons to begin to think about the problem somewhat more realistically and to recognize that there may be some ways they can approach it.

For these kinds of reasons I found it quite useful to involve myself on the battalion level with groups of officers and NCO's. It was clear that we could not relate to the problem very effectively on a case by case basis in the mental hygiene facilities. Once unit officers, NCO's, Chaplains and physicians responsible for local medical care could put the problem into a more reasonable perspective, they seemed more ready and able to relate to it helpfully. You would be misled, however, if you understood from this that we were able to make a significant and widespread attitudinal dent through this approach. Our accomplishments in this regard unfortunately were modest.

The pressure to hospitalize drug users on psychiatric services was enormous. Quite apart from the fact that bed capacity in our hospitals was insufficient for this use in other than exceptional cases, there was little evidence that hospitalization was often necessary or very helpful. Withdrawal from drugs was usually accomplished without too much difficulty on an outpatient basis. The big problem was in finding ways to sustain motivation to stay off drugs once withdrawn, or in stimulating motivation to withdraw from them. It was very clear to us that local physicians, chaplains and other personnel in closer proximity to the problem would have to engage themselves energetically in both of those efforts.

We were able to help many drug users directly and indirectly through consultation to local physicians. We tried individual and group methods. But the soldiers who came off and stayed off drugs did so more because of their own initiatives than because of any "break-through" programs we generated.

The Race Situation

The observation was made several years ago that association between black and white soldiers in Vietnam appeared to be closer and more positive to the extent that their situations and activities were more precisely and peculiarly martial in character. It is my impression that this would be a generally accurate observation currently as well. Of this, however, I cannot be sure. But if true, it would be unsurprising. To the extent that one's energies and

attentions are focused upon danger from without, there might understandably be less occasion for and inclination toward looking for enemies within one's own group. And to the extent that one's own safety is to be largely contingent upon the effective and cooperative performance of those about you in situations when such danger may in some likelihood occur, one might expect a more pronounced inclination toward finding sources of solidarity rather than disagreement or tension.

My opportunities for observation of the racial situation and information about it came from a variety of sources. There were the soldiers, black and white, who came to our clinical attention at the several mental hygiene facilities operated by our KO team. These were located at the 93rd Evacuation Hospital, the USARV Stockade, and with a separate clearing company at the Southern end of the Cam Ranh peninsula. Along with such direct client contacts, there were consultation contacts with officers and NCO's with troop responsibilities, military police, medical personnel, lawyers and chaplains. These consultees were very commonly concerned about the racial situation. There were also opportunities to discuss the situation with and learn the observations of commanders and top level staff officers in most of the divisions, separate brigades and other large organizations which I visited officially as USARV Social Work Consultant. I also discussed the matter at length with almost all of the other social work officers as well as with the psychiatrists and psychologists in country. I was involved directly in setting up one Human Relations Council, and served as consultant in the establishment of two others. One of my principal sources of information on this subject, however, was a rather large scale study of the racial situation performed by our KO team in a large organization.

In our mental hygiene work, problems of racial tension were brought to our attention in a variety of ways. Perhaps most frequently the problem was brought to our attention by Black soldier-clients who were either referred to us or who came essentially as self-referrals because of some conflict in the unit. Such a client may have been referred because of drug abuse or some other form of problem behavior. He may have himself arranged the referral in the hope of getting some change in his situation, such as transfer to another unit. The complaint of prejudicial mistreatment of Black soldiers under such circumstances was almost universal. When it was not identified by the soldier as the primary problem it would very frequently be alluded to as somehow relevant to the problem.

Much less frequently, but not too uncommonly, white soldiers came to our attention expressing fear of physical abuse by Black soldiers. I saw several NCO's and officers who expressed concern about what might happen to them at the hands of Black soldiers. Threats, real or imagined, were apparently not very unusual. On several occasions Black NCO's expressed concern that they were operating under pressure from black enlisted men. Black NCO's,--perhaps the most marginal of men in Vietnam,--were not uncommonly referred to as "oreos" by more militant Black soldiers who perceived them as insufficiently identified with Black ascendance. Black officers, of course, were also labeled in this way at times. To be a "Lifer" as well as an "Oreo" in the minds of the lower ranking Blacks was not to enjoy a favored status!

What can be said of the charge of anti-Black discriminatory practice? For certain such discrimination existed. It would be unrealistic to the extreme to expect otherwise in such a large heterogenous, relatively open institution of the American society which has itself been characterized by such prejudice for so long. It was not, however, usually easy to detect such discrimination in clear, unambiguous straightforward terms. At times the utterances of Whites were so filled with patent anti-Black feeling that one could be reasonably sure that almost any accusation of discriminatory behavior made against such persons would be true. But such verbal behavior is no longer the style for Whites. Even schizophrenics were better controlled! I think I heard the epithet "Nigger" used by only two white clients during the year. But the somewhat more subtle references and allusions that reflected a condescendingly superior attitude toward Blacks was, of course, commonplace. I suspect, correspondingly, that the actual behaviors which offended Blacks were, more often than not, of similar character; that is, rather subtle, sometimes elusive, but none the less real. I am here reminded of a social encounter with an Army Medical Corps lieutenant colonel. As happens on such occasions, we each searched for a basis for conversation, using the device of identifying people we both know. Knowing me to be a social worker, he told me of his deep respect and affection for one of our number who, by the way, retired not long ago at a rank higher than the physician I am talking about. In his enthusiastic description of the Black social work officer's professional competence, he said: "Now that colored boy could really teach."

I know nothing about how that Army physician behaves toward Blacks. But almost nothing would surprise me in the light of such a stupidly insensitive characterization of somebody, I suspect, he really likes on some level. Imagine for a moment what his speech might be like if he happens not to like a Black man.

But I must say that the bulk of frankly nasty racial name calling and racial insulting that I directly observed came from young Black soldiers. This was not uncommonly coupled with angry, aggressive, demanding behavior. This, of course, was not at all the typical behavior of Black clients. But it did arise often enough to present a problem. Two otherwise very capable enlisted social work/psychology specialists reported increasing difficulty in coping with such behavior; and one finally had to be removed from patient contact toward the end of his tour and assigned to clerical duties largely for this reason.

It should not, of course, surprise us that we encounter this kind of aggressive, angry behavior in some Black soldiers who have very recently entered the Army from situations where such behavior is encouraged and rewarded. On a more basic level, it should not surprise us that Black youth should encounter the White power structure with a considerable store of rage, suspicion, distrust and aggression, given historical realities. But such understanding goes only as far in helping us to relate to such behavior effectively. In this, as in other matters, the expectation of acceptable standards of behavior, seemed the only reasonable approach.

I will later in this presentation briefly describe the conduct of a study of the racial situation as it existed in a large military organization, which study was performed by our KO Detachment.¹ At this point, however, I want to share with you and comment upon some of the observations made during the study:

(1) Lower ranking enlisted men tended to associate on the basis of race and, somewhat less, on the basis of ethnic identification. In spite of this there tended to be relatively little racial tension reported between lower-ranking Blacks and Whites. Such grouping along racial and ethnic lines was quite generally regarded by lower-ranking

¹While I participated in the planning and organization of this study, the bulk of the credit should go to Major Billy Jones, MC and Specialist/5 Louis Ortiz who did most of the hard work involved.

Blacks and Whites as "natural" and largely unproblematic. On the other hand, NCO's and officers, Black as well as White, were more often inclined to be uncomfortable with such patterns of association. They more often appealed to the value of racial integration, and were more inclined to see grouping along racial lines as a threat to true and meaningful integration, and as a danger to racial harmony. It was not clear if lower ranking enlisted men were less invested in the value of racial integration as such, or if they rather did not see racial grouping within a more general pattern of integration as a threat to that otherwise desired goal.

(2) Racial tension was reported as existing much more commonly between Black lower ranking enlisted men and White superordinates than with White peers. This observation is consistent with the one made just above. The perception of frequent tension between White authority figures and Black lower ranking enlisted men is especially interesting in light of the almost universal tendency on the part of Commanders to initially deny that racial tension exists in their units. This, I suspect, can be partially understood as an expression of the need of commanders to be regarded as effective leaders, and a concern that presence of racial tension will be regarded as a negative reflection on leadership ability. In this respect Commanders are not dissimilar from Mayors of cities! Some of the racial harmony between lower ranking soldiers may be understandable in terms of solidarity against authority figures perceived in varying degrees as oppressive. Further, some of the tension between lower-ranking Blacks and authority figures which is characterized as "racial" may be more accurately understood as tension emanating from problematic authority-subordinate relationship. Thus, other soldiers may explain tension with authority figures in terms of prejudice against "potheads," prejudice against the more highly educated or prejudice against youth. It is unfortunately very difficult to tease out the extent to which any of these factors operate.

(3) It was widely reported in the study that, in spite of longstanding and well-publicized policy direction to the contrary, racial discrimination persists in such matters as job assignment, promotion and disciplinary actions. As was also often true with White lower-ranking enlisted soldiers, there was little evidence of confidence in the official structures available for redress of grievances. The IG system, for example, was generally regarded as something of a joke. It seems clear that this system badly needs reexamination.

(4) Some considerable difficulty seems to arise around the signs and symbols used as expressions of Black identity and Black ascendancy. Black lower-ranking soldiers commonly complained that the beliefs, ideas and attitudes associated with Black pride and Black cohesiveness are misunderstood by NCO's and officers alike. This was borne out in an interesting way in one seminar meeting in which not one NCO, Black or White, could give a reasonably acceptable interpretation of the symbolism of the heavy woven black wrist-bands and crosses omnipresent among young Black soldiers. Surprisingly not one of these NCO's had taken trouble to ask about the significance of these symbols. It is equally distressing that none of the young Black soldiers had apparently troubled themselves to explain the meaning of such symbols to their NCO's. This, of course, does not speak well of the level of communication in that situation. In this connection, the Black soldier also reports difficulty in the matter of definition of what constitutes an acceptable "Afro" haircut. This is a new variation on that, by now, tired and tiresome haircut theme in the Army. It is clear that certain of the symbols of Black identity and Black ascendancy, such as the aforementioned items, or the ritual handshakes and salutes, have rather remarkable ability to trigger concern and even alarm in some officers and NCO's. Work needs to be done in putting such matters into perspective, with a view toward diluting their capacity for stimulating such strongly negative response.

(5) Black soldiers and soldiers of Spanish-speaking origins often complained that when they gather in groups they are harassed, viewed with suspicion, unfairly accused

of creating disturbance, or told to disburse by military police and other authorities. It was observed that this rarely happens with groups of White soldiers. When this occurs, it may well be related to some of the other observations made just above. If mere symbols of Black solidarity can stimulate concern in White authorities it is, I suppose, unsurprising that stronger evidence of "solidarity" achieved might stimulate more pronounced concern.

There were, of course, incidents in Vietnam not unlike those reported in CONUS and Europe, which suggest that all is not so agreeable between Black and White soldiers as observed in the above study of one large organization. These have been ugly incidents wherever they occurred; and they have unfortunately left deep and ugly scars in the minds of many. Fortunately, these incidents seem to have been relatively few, given the fact that hundreds of thousands of youths are thrown together under circumstances laden with frustrations, in an era when racial strife is a commonplace in the wider society.

It seems clear that we social workers must be considerably more energetic and creative in searching for ways to remove sources of minority group grievance in the Army, and in helping Commanders prevent and alleviate inter-racial tensions. It is not my impression, nor my experience, that we make much of an impact on the problem through the case work approach, however helpful such individualized encounters may be.

Methods of Social Work Intervention

Army social work in Vietnam is practiced almost exclusively within the mental hygiene framework. As best as I can tell, the situation I found some six years ago, while conducting research on the Mental Hygiene Command Consultation program, largely persists. In matters other than mental illness, commanders continue to generally regard the mental hygiene activity as a resource of last resort for human relations problems or other behavior problems in their units. For our part, we still tend to wait for crisis stage problems to be brought to our attention, usually on a case by case basis, using the crisis at hand as both the occasion for and object of our intervention. That is, our mental hygiene services, contrary to the rationale we espouse, tends to be largely reactive, crisis-oriented and on a case by case basis.

This approach suffers from certain fairly apparent disadvantages which have important effect on both the nature and outcome of our involvement. More often than not, by the time problem situations come to our attention they have deteriorated to the stage where almost irreparable damage has already been done to the interactive process. Options for solution tend to be very narrow and limited. Anger and despair have, by then, already fixed problem participants into rather intransigent postures from which extrication borders on the impossible. It is, then, unsurprising that "parting of the ways" is so often perceived as the only available solution. Such "parting of the ways" can take many forms. Soldier, commander or mental hygiene workers,--or any combination of the three,--so often turn to unit transfer as the answer. But, unfortunately, this approach is typically unpromising. The soldier carries to his new unit his anger, a sense of failure and rejection, and a strongly reinforced negative attitude toward the system. To compound the difficulty, the receiving unit is predictably less than happy about accepting a soldier stigmatized as a trouble-making problem carrier; and it seldom approaches the rehabilitation task with needed optimism.

The "parting of ways" may take another form. The embittered, or sometimes frightened soldier,--and so often his bravado is a thin disguise for fear,--may choose flight and take absence without official permission. He may do so at the implicit or even less subtle suggestion of authority figures. I think now of one case in which a First Sergeant literally suggested AWOL to a soldier, indicating that another offense of such magnitude would approve separation from the Army. It is difficult to determine whether the soldier or the 1st Sergeant was angrier with me when I attempted to explore approaches other than separation from the Army. I think it was unsurprising that my efforts in that direction were unsuccessful.

The soldier, especially if avenues of escape are blocked, may instead choose to fight. Given the realities of power distribution in the system, he typically does this by passively-obstructive behavior. Such behavior potentially serves at least two purposes. It serves as a way of acting out anger; and it can be rewarded with needed "brown stamps" which have trade-in value. Units tend to develop fairly well-known schedules of value for "brown stamps." So many can be traded for punishment under Article 15; so many for trial by court-martial. In sufficient accumulation they can be traded in ultimately for the grand premium,--separation from the Army.

With sufficient recurrence of such misbehavior, the Commander and his staff prepares a dossier on the miscreant, documenting his chronic misconduct. Ultimately, they ship him off, dossier in hand, to the mental hygiene service for consultation. By this point, if the commander and troublesome soldier can agree on anything at all, it is usually only that separation from the Army is the only solution. If the Commander's anger is more pronounced than his despair, however, he may still have stomach for fight; and he may still be reluctant to "reward" the troublesome soldier with the separation he wants.

It is under such unpromising circumstances that the mental hygiene unit so often swings into action. Administrative separation from the Army may or may not be explicitly part of the Commander's planned course of action. But such action is already in the back of everybody's mind.

Now, mental hygiene workers as a rule are clever enough to recognize a desperate situation when they see one. And so it is that they so often support or encourage the idea of extruding the troublesome soldier from the system.

It is interesting and very revealing that, in so doing, they very often attach to the soldier a diagnosis of what our psychiatric colleagues call "character disorder" and enter their stigmatizing notation into the soldier's growing dossier. This diagnosis serves several important functions in the soldier's dossier. It reinforces the already strongly suggested notion that the soldier is himself clearly the source of the problem; it thereby removes from the commander the risk of being accused of failure in leadership; it "explains" the inability of the mental hygiene facility to do much about the problem; it absolves the wider system of any real implication in the current deteriorated state of affairs; and, lastly, it serves the very important function of certifying that the problem is indeed hopeless and unsolvable within the system. For all the trapping of expertise that such diagnosis carry, they are, as I have called them elsewhere, little more than psychiatric "dirty names" which serve as labels of despair. They almost never provide useful handles for rehabilitative intervention.

This, of course, is a simplistic and overstated characterization of the command consultation situation. There are many cases in which mental hygiene personnel offer more helpful alternatives for the amelioration or solution of problems. But it is too seldom that we are called in early enough to do so. For sure, not all referrals involving behavior problems are already locked into the administrative separation solution before we get them. But that is too often the situation; and such cases absorb too much valuable time of mental hygiene personnel. Such personnel are, of course, involved in some preventively oriented educational and consultative efforts. But too much of their time continues to be tied up in reactive, crisis oriented work, when failure is already almost a foregone conclusion. On the whole, the situation is not very satisfactory.

What then is to be done? Clearly there is need for earlier intervention in problem cases, if we are to be of more effective help in military units. The most obvious solution is to educate commanders to refer problem soldiers earlier,--before patterns of troublesome behavior are clearly established. Then three potentially valuable services could be offered: the soldier, still more amenable to such approaches, could be offered counseling directed toward helping him find more satisfactory ways of dealing with his situation; commanders, having not yet abandoned hope, could be offered consultation on how to deal more effectively with the soldier and on how to prevent further difficulties to the extent possible; and, lastly, any soldier who is obviously already deeply committed to continued misbehavior and not motivated to change could be identified for administrative separation from the Army.

For all its obviousness, however, the early problem referral approach is not without its limitations. How early in the process should the misbehaving soldier be referred? How serious should the problem be before referral is considered? Clearly there is a dilemma. To the extent that commanders are educated to refer problems early, the more we would make them dependent, and the more quickly the mental hygiene facility would be overwhelmed with cases. It is extremely doubtful that this approach would in the long run be very helpful.

The answer to this dilemma is to be found clearly present in official doctrine. The principal approach in the mental hygiene effort should be preventively oriented consultation and education. But, if the doctrine on the subject is so uncontrovertably clear, why do presumably well motivated and professionally competent mental

hygiene personnel offer relatively so little in the way of meaningful preventive services? The answer, I suspect, lies less in the perversity or failure of purpose of such personnel than it does in a poverty of technology about how to intervene preventively.

In spite of our continued propensity to "explain" problems in terms of "bad guy" labels attached to individual actors in problem situations, we still generally agree that at least many of the problems of dysfunctional or otherwise unacceptably deviant behavior of individual soldiers are in reality best understood as expressions of wider problems in the systems in which they are involved. But we have still not advanced very far in learning how to identify early, let alone prevent, those wider system problems; nor have we learned how to conceptualize them in ways which suggest very useful handles for consultative intervention.

It is in light of that difficulty that I will briefly describe several approaches which, however improvable, seem to hold potential for further exploration as preventively oriented consultation techniques for use with commanders.

In the Spring of 1970 I was requested by the Commander of the 68th Medical Group, one of two such Groups in RVN, to conduct a seminar with representative personnel to assess the state of race relations in subordinate organizations. These included many hospitals, medical battalions, dispensaries and the like, scattered throughout IV, III and part of II Corps tactical zones. A series of such seminars was designed to be held at each of four hospitals located throughout that wide region which constituted the Medical Group's area of operation.

It was immediately clear that the kind of information obtained would in large measure be determined by the system for selecting seminar participants. The classical problem of "representativeness," well-known to social workers in community organization work, immediately presented itself. It was decided that a series of five seminars would be conducted at each of four hospitals. Participants would be randomly selected at hospitals and other neighboring medical organizations in numbers proportionate to unit size. The seminars were organized as follows:

- Seminar I: Black enlisted men grades E-1 -- E-5.
- Seminar II: Caucasian enlisted men grades E-1 -- E-5.
- Seminar III: Racially mixed NCO's grades E-6 -- E-9.
- Seminar IV: Selected officers who held particularly relevant command and staff positions.
- Seminar V: Participants from each of the above groups, selected because they seemed especially able to contribute.

Medical units in the Group were asked to submit personnel rosters from which participants were randomly selected within the above stated racial and rank categories. Thus, for example, Black soldiers and soldiers of Spanish speaking origin, grades E-1 -- E-5, were randomly selected from each units' personnel roster, in numbers proportionate to size of unit. These men then participated in one of the seminars for lower ranking minority group soldiers.

In total, twenty seminars were held throughout the Group. The attempt was to elicit as accurate information as possible within the format of relatively unstructured discussions led chiefly by a Black psychiatrist and a Puerto Rican social work/psychology specialist with at least one other social work officer and/or psychiatrist in attendance as participant observers. Participants were encouraged to share their impressions about the situation and needs for change in the hope that Army policy and practice might profit from what would be learned.

In spite of the facts that this was a first attempt with this approach and it was conducted in a much too hurried fashion, it was our impression and that of the Group Commander for whom the service was performed, that it was a very valuable enterprise. I am here interested particularly in the potential this general approach holds for social work assistance to commanders who are badly in need of information about the state of morale and welfare in their organizations. It is generally acknowledged that higher echelon commanders do not usually have very easy access to such information. There is a widespread tendency on the part of subordinate commanders to deny, or at least

minimize problems as they report upwardly in the chain of command. They are, after all, rewarded in the system for solving problems rather than for reporting them unsolved; and the reluctance is only too human.

The IG system should, of course, be of great assistance to the senior commander in this regard. The IG system, however,--at least at lower levels,--tends to lack credibility, for whatever reason. It seems clear that the portion of the IG's function which has to do with investigating grievances should be performed by an officer who is relatively independent of the system against which the grievance is registered. There are rather recent precedents for this approach in certain modifications made in the organization of the CID and in the court martial system. Other more extensive modifications along these lines are being urged on the military justice system.

I make this digression about the IG's function because it might be argued that the function of assisting the senior commander to learn about potential or actual morale and welfare problems in his organization is part of the IG's function. But it is not for any reason uniquely his function. It could be a highly legitimate function for social work as well. And it could be an area in which social work might make a valuable contribution in a preventively oriented way.

It appears that a technique approximately modeled on the one just described could be used in large military organizations of all kinds to explore the range of concerns which relate to morale and welfare. This service could be provided on a regular periodic basis rather than as a "one time" affair. Information and suggestions could be of enormous value to commanders and staff officers with special interest in morale, health care, welfare and military justice. The Surgeon, for example, could benefit enormously by learning more about problem areas and possible improvements in his health care system as perceived by the consumers. Similarly so for officers in charge of athletic, recreational, PX, Commissary, housing and transportation services. The Provost Marshal should find invaluable an on-going source of information about community perception of and response to police policy and practices. Staff officers especially involved in relationship with the surrounding civilian community should benefit considerably from increased knowledge about actual or potential difficulties in the encounter between the neighboring civilian and military communities.

Should such a program be attempted I would recommend that certain features be incorporated at least at the outset:

(1) Seminar participants should probably be selected as randomly as possible. Many notorious problems are introduced when "representative" spokesmen are appointed from above. Randomized selection, of course, poses certain corresponding difficulties, but I suspect they would generally be less dangerous to the enterprise.

(2) Maximum attention should be given to enhancing the credibility of the program in other ways also. There are several dimensions to the potential for credibility problems in such a program. Those with relative lack of power in the system, especially lower ranking enlisted men, must be made to feel that the enterprise is not futile and meaningless. If it comes to be recognized as bureaucratic "eye wash" it would be worse than useless. On the other hand subordinate commanders and staff personnel must be able to come to regard it as a help rather than a threat. Both of these requirements are admittedly more easily prescribed than achieved. But they are essential to such a program. It would be my expectation that it would take some experience with the program to dispel these kinds of concerns. Nothing will help in this regard as much as vigorous and candid interest in the program on the part of the senior headquarters.

(3) Great emphasis should be placed on helping participants to introduce maximum clarity and specificity in their observations. Problems and needs described in clear and specific terms tend to lend themselves to solution much more readily than do vague expressions of discontent. Seminar participants should be urged strongly to produce realistic ideas for solution. The session, then, should come to be known as hardworking "think" sessions and not simply complaint sessions.

I now turn to Human Relations Councils as another example of areas for appropriate involvement in a preventively oriented social work program. During my Vietnam experience I was directly involved in setting up a Human Relations Council in one organization and I consulted with several other organizations in their effort to do likewise. Other social work officers in Vietnam were similarly engaged. The Human Relations Council idea is growing in the military and there is yet insufficient experience with it to know much about its value. Commanders, who attempt to set up such councils either on their own initiative or on direction from above, experience many understandable problems in conceptualizing and organizing them. They can often benefit greatly from the social work officer's knowledge and skill in the community organization area. I would encourage our

social work officers to develop an interest in this area. Even if you are not yourselves sold on the idea of the Human Relations Council, I suspect you will find that there will be increasing experimentation with the idea around you. Your interest and assistance can be valuable. It may well be that, in years to come, this movement, if it can be called that yet, will prove to be of considerable interest to historians who trace the course of military personnel policies and practices. I have not yet had enough experience with such councils to have many very specific ideas to share with you on the subject, other than to suggest it as an area for useful social work engagement. Concern about racial tensions has clearly been the inspiration behind this development. But I see no reason why Human Relations Councils should restrict their concerns so narrowly. They could be valuable instruments for commanders to stay in touch with actual and potential problem areas and to learn ideas about how they might be dealt with. But such Councils need to be planned with a great deal of care.

As a further example of preventively oriented consultation approaches I found group consultation meetings with the battalion commander, his staff and his company commanders and senior NCO's to be quite valuable. I used these almost exclusively to explore the drug abuse problems and to get all participants to share ideas on the matter. I was advised after several such meetings that problem exploration was considerably more open than was typically the case in ordinary battalion meetings. Again, I would encourage our social work officers to get involved in efforts along these lines.

Lastly, I will mention another activity in which I was involved directly as an organizer and expiditor. That is the area of drug abuse education programs with troops. Our initial effort in this direction was to provide such educational programs directly to troops. The number of units for which our KO Team provided mental hygiene support was so enormously large and so widespread throughout Vietnam, however, that this was very quickly recognized to be impractical. The experience in conducting such programs directly, nevertheless, proved to be a very valuable base for later engaging in efforts to train unit and dispensary physicians to conduct similar programs in the troop populations they serve. The real value of such programs has not yet been documented. But one need be engaged in only one well conducted question and answer session on drugs with troops to recognize that

for all the apparent sophistication about drugs in the young population, there remains a lot of dangerous misinformation; for all the widespread commitment to the values and norms of the drug culture, there is still a lot of youthful ambivalence on the matter; and for all the obvious distrust of and cynicism about establishment functionaries there is widespread readiness to learn from physicians and others who can teach what they know and admit what they do not know in a non-defensive, open engagement. I suspect that you might find, as I found, some considerable reluctance on the part of physicians to take on this task at first. It was my experience that this reluctance derived largely from "fear of the unknown." For this reason our KO Detachment set up an orientation to teach physicians how they might go about conducting a troop drug education session. To accomplish this we invited unit and dispensary physicians to attend a demonstration session as observers. They thereby learned a fair amount about how such sessions might be organized and conducted, what kinds of questions are typically asked, and the kind of reception they would be likely to receive. The physicians were then encouraged to contact us directly to ask any further questions in either substantive matters or matters of technique at any time they were going to conduct such education sessions. They availed themselves of this service and thereby gained more confidence about serving this function.

These programs are not described as ideal models for social work intervention. Rather, they are offered in the hope that they might stimulate more thinking about how we can more effectively reach out to help with the incredibly difficult human relations problems, and problems in morale and welfare which arise in the units we serve.

The Counterculture

My final task this morning is to relate to the so-called counterculture issue. My acquaintance with the counterculture is very limited at best. I am, of course, well familiar with discussions of it which appear in the popular press, in journals of opinion and some of the scholarly journals. I have read a couple of books which attempt to bring together the multiplicity of tendencies which in some way seem to hang together as a movement. I refer now to such books as Roszak's The Making of a Counterculture and Gerzon's The Whole World is Watching. For the most part, however, I am innocent of exposure to much of what counterculture adherents might regard as

primary sources, except for a bit of Goldman, less of Hayden and, of course, occasional purusal of the Berkley Barb and some of the other zany periodicals which now grace our city street corners.

Beyond such fragmentary readings my acquaintance with the counterculture derives chiefly from contacts with young people several years ago in graduate school, more recently as a teacher and most recently in what seemed at times like endless conversations with young G.I.'s who had only recently come to the Army from college campuses. These young people had been closer to the counterculture scene and served as useful informants on the subject.

From all of these sources I came away impressed that Roszak is probably correct when he identifies the technocracy in all its pomps and works as the core target of the counterculture. In this connection, I did read Jacques Allul's The Technocratic Society while in Vietnam, and I recommend it to you as a very thorough, if not very readable or optimistic analysis of the place of technology in our sociocultural system.

This very limited acquaintance with what we are here calling the counterculture hardly equips me to make any extended analysis of the phenomenon. And my Vietnam experience does not seem to provide me with any speical perspective on the matter. I will, however, make several observations about the counterculture critique of technocracy and how that critique seems to relate to professional social work.

I should begin by saying that I am struck by the validity and relevance of many of the concerns which are thematic to some of the counterculture critique of our technocratic sociocultural system. I am, however, also struck less by the novelty of that critique than I am by its continuity with a tradition of concern about technology expressed for some decades by earlier critics of humanistic and personalist orientation. It is in their concern about the dehumanizing influences of technocracy particularly that I find the social work profession has its greatest area of agreement and paradoxically its greatest potential for quarrel with the counterculture.

It seems to me, for example, that there is no better justification for a professional social work presence in the Army than a desire to attempt to humanize what can, after all, be a terribly dehumanized and dehumanizing social institution. Such a purpose would almost certainly be regarded by Allul as a terribly

Quixotic enterprise. More radical critics would object less to its naivete' and futility, however; their objection would go a lot deeper. They would regard the enterprise as a perversion of the humanitarian impulse,--I suspect they would use the word obscenity,--to engage in any activity which might have the side-effect, if not the stated purpose of strengthening the Army by making some of its demands more tolerable.

But the counterculture quarrel with professional social work would not be limited to its practice in the military. To the extent that modern professional social work can be understood as an attempt to develop effective human services to make life more liveable for individuals and groups, it will be attacked by more radical critics as serving toward the perpetuation of a sociocultural system which deserves nothing short of destruction. One does not, after all, radicalize a population by working toward humanization of existing court systems, health care systems, police systems and welfare systems. The radical revolutionary rather seeks to make such systems function at levels which will inevitably cause increased dissatisfaction.

There is basis for counterculture criticism of professional social work on several other levels which have less to do with radical revolutionary purpose. The emergence of social work as a profession has in part been due to a recognition of the need to convert humanitarian impulse and concern into effective programs of service. When one uses such nouns as "program", and especially when one modifies them with adjectives like "effective", it is a certain sign that he is already involved in the general "bag" termed "technique" by Allul. We are, of course, here talking about the intrusion of heavy doses of rationality into the processes involved in providing human services. If one is truly concerned about effectiveness, he must necessarily be concerned about technique. And if he lives in a world of reality, he must, in the face of scarce resources, be also concerned about economy and efficiency. It was then almost inevitable, for example, that the Army Social Work Program would have devoted at least part of one of these meetings to a consideration of the relevance of systems analysis and operations research to the delivery of social services, as it did last year. If our concern is to develop really effective services we must have a corollary concern with building a body of expertise sufficiently well conceptualized that it can be evaluated by research and taught to other practitioners. So we are caught in the "technocratic bag" to a very large extent. And we can be certain that

concern for efficiency, economy, effectiveness, expertise and rationality along with attraction to the methods of systems analysts and operations researchers will not endear us to the adherents of the counterculture. Our difference here is not due to failure in communication; it is due, rather, to a very different perception about the use of human intelligence and rationality.

There are then areas of very real difference. In addition, however, there are misunderstandings. Army Social Work, for example, need not be understood as having a necessarily technocratic purpose at its roots. Just as services to unwed mothers are not designed to perpetuate illegitimacy; just as services to convicts are not developed to perpetuate criminal life-style; just as services to the unemployed are not intended to perpetuate joblessness; neither are our services to meet the human needs of soldiers and their families inspired by a desire to perpetuate the need for Armies. But the need for Armies, like poverty, crime, racism, unemployment and disease are part of the real world as we know it,--part of the human condition as we experience it. Poets and mystics will not correct these problems alone. Anti-intellectual romanticists, however charming, will not eliminate these evils alone. Angry radical revolutionaries bent on destruction rather than reform will not do the job. Visionaries impatient with hard-headed concern over reality constraints will not bring about these purposes alone. But I am just as convinced that technocrats will not do the jobs alone either. The insights of mystics, poets and visionaries will be needed along with some of the anger and impatience of the radical. And if we borrow heavily from the best in technology to develop and test our methods, we should continue to borrow heavily from our mystics, poets and visionaries for our inspiration and purposes.

I can think of no more damaging criticism of social work as a profession, in or out of the Army, than that it has lost its humanitarian impulse and become nothing more than a tool of the technocratic system designed only to make human beings more effective and better-oiled parts of the man-machine system, or designed also to "cool out" the marks of that system. There is, one other criticism of the social work profession which would, perhaps, bother me as much; a criticism that we cannot even do that well. I guess that sentiment marks me as a rather unrepentant adherent of technocracy. I take comfort and hope, however, from one of the most vehemently angry complaints about technocracy made by counterculture critics. They bitterly complain that technocracy is capable of absorbing and using as its own even the most contrary trends which surround it. I hope that this is an accurate observation. And I hope that it is sufficiently true that our technocracy will absorb and make good use of the very best elements in the very counterculture which seeks its downfall.

Thank you for your attention.

The Future Soldier: A Profile of Today's Youth

Presented at the Conference on
Current Trends in Army Social Work
Denver September 1970

"Drugs, Race, The Counter Culture and the Soldier"

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This paper represents a departure from the original presentation made in Denver. Picking up on a theme put forth by Col. Morgan, the section on alienation has been much expanded to include some more recent data on the subject. The section on attitudes toward military service is unchanged. The remaining topics -- racial attitudes, drug behaviors and attitudes toward drug use have been deleted from this written version because they are to be covered in greater depth in future publications.

INTRODUCTION*

The data for this paper come from a large study of adolescence, the Youth in Transition project.** This project is a longitudinal study following young men from the start of tenth grade (Fall, 1966) to the time when most of them have been out of high school for about a year (Summer, 1970). It includes among its most basic purposes the study of attitudes, plans, and behaviors, particularly those relating to educational and occupational aspirations and achievements. In keeping with these purposes, the study was expanded in 1969, with Department of Defense support, to include special emphasis on military plans and attitudes. A complete description of the purposes and procedures of the Youth in Transition project may be found elsewhere (Bachman, et al., 1967); however, it will be useful here to mention a few highlights of the study design.

Youth in Transition began data collection in the Fall of 1966, using a national cross-section of about 2,200 tenth-grade boys located in 87 public high schools. The initial measurement (Time 1) consisted of individual interviews and group-administered tests and questionnaires. It required about four hours time for each boy to complete the various instruments. A second measurement (Time 2) consisting of individually-administered interviews and questionnaires, took place in Spring of 1968. The third measurement (Time 3) consisted of questionnaires administered in Spring of 1969. The fourth and last

* Portions of this paper are adapted from Johnston, Jerome and Bachman, Jerald, *Young Men Look at Military Service*. Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research. June, 1970. Available from the Publication Department for \$1.50.

** This project is being conducted at Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, under contract to the United States Office of Education.

data collection (Time 4) consisted of interviews and questionnaires administered in Spring and Summer of 1970. These are diagrammed in Figure 1.

The data collection in Spring of 1969 occurred when most of our respondents were nearing high school graduation. Two questionnaires were administered in small groups of less than ten by trained Survey Research Center interviewers. One questionnaire contained a standard set of repeated measures; the other contained a new set of questions on plans and attitudes toward military service. Each instrument took approximately one hour to administer. Since these group-administrations occurred outside of school and "after hours," each respondent was paid five dollars to cover his time and transportation costs.


The last data collection (Time 4), a year later, consisted of individual interviews with respondents. There were two interviews and three self-administered questionnaires. Average administration time was over three hours. Respondents were paid ten dollars this time, taking account of the fact that many of them had to take off up to five hours from paying jobs to come to a "neutral" site to participate in this interview.

Participation in the third data collection was secured from 1799 boys, representing 81 percent of those who began the study in Fall of 1966. At Time 4 we were able to contact 1620 young men -- 71 percent of the original sample. Only a small portion of panel losses were due to refusal to participate. More frequently, losses were due to the inability to locate some of the respondents who had moved, or an inability to collect data when respondents moved to locations "out of range" of our field staff. This year we did follow young men in the service, using special self-administered forms for boys overseas. It is clear from preliminary analyses that losses occurred more frequently among those panel members who dropped out of school; thus it must be noted that our sample in 1969 and 1970 tends to underrepresent dropouts. On the whole, however, a retention rate above 71 percent for a panel study covering almost four years reflects a high level of interest and involvement by Youth in Transition participants. Equally important, it means that the data to follow in this paper are based on a fairly representative cross-section of young men reaching the end of their high school years.

Figure 1
THE YOUTH IN TRANSITION STUDY
Overview of Research Design

Data from boys:

Data from school personnel:



I. ALIENATION

The profession of social work is problem-oriented. Thus, it is not surprising to find this conference focusing on some specific problems facing Army social workers today. But there is some danger here of over-reaction -- of magnifying the extent and influence of the Counter Culture* out of proportion. In an earlier paper Col. Morgan set the tone for this thinking when he said: "There can be no doubt that in all industrial nations today a cultural revolution has taken place which cannot but change radically the central values of all of modern man." He then went on to state that, "there seem to be no values of the past that are not under attack by the Counter Culture," and by inference he included all of youth as the prime movers of the Counter Culture. I do not believe that the Counter Culture is anything like a majority movement; I hope to present some evidence for this from this nationwide survey. What I will attempt to show is that there is indeed change taking place among youth today, but nothing like a total alienation from the values and mores of the older generation.

One of the major themes of the Counter Culture as described by Rosak is that of alienation -- from the Establishment, from middle class values, from "The System." In this section I would like to examine five content areas that suggest the extent to which today's youth can be described as alienated.

POLITICAL ALIENATION

Over the four years of the study we have repeated a set of six questions designed to measure political alienation. These appear in Table 1. Two items, C and F, ask respondents for subjective impressions of people in government -- how smart and honest they are. In tenth grade over three quarters thought the people running the government "almost always" or "usually" are smart people who know what they are doing. This figure remains constant through the high school years but drops to two-thirds one year after high school. A similar

* This term was coined by Theodore Rosak to refer to the alienated underground youth movement that gained prominence in the 1960s from their anti-war, anti-Establishment protest on many American campuses.

Table 1
POLITICAL ALIENATION

		Percentage Frequencies			
		T1	T2	T3	T4
A.	Do you think the government wastes much of the money we pay in taxes				
(1)	Nearly all tax money is wasted	5	4	4	5
(2)	A lot of tax money is wasted	25	34	42	51
(3)	Some tax money is wasted	40	43	39	35
(4)	A little tax money is wasted	23	17	13	7
(5)	No tax money is wasted	5	3	2	1
	Missing data	2	1	1	1
B.	How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right				
(1)	Almost always	28	19	18	11
(2)	Often	44	47	48	42
(3)	Sometimes	23	29	28	37
(4)	Seldom	3	4	5	8
(5)	Never	1	-	1	1
	Missing data	2	1	-	1
C.	Do you feel that the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing				
(1)	They almost always know what they are doing	30	22	22	13
(2)	They usually know what they are doing	48	56	57	53
(3)	They sometimes know what they are doing	17	19	17	25
(4)	They seldom know what they are doing	3	3	3	4
(5)	They never know what they are doing	1	1	1	1
	Missing data	2	1	-	1
D.	Some people think about what's going on in government very often, and others are not that interested. How much of an interest do you take in government and current events				
(1)	A very great interest	14	16	16	19
(2)	A lot of interest	27	33	32	37
(3)	Some interest	44	42	43	35
(4)	Very little interest	12	8	8	6
(5)	No interest at all	1	1	1	1
	Missing data	2	1	1	1

Table 1 (CONTINUED)

		<u>Percentage Frequencies</u>			
		<u>T1</u>	<u>T2</u>	<u>T3</u>	<u>T4</u>
E.	Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what the people think when it decides what to do				
(1)	It pays very much attention to what people think	16	12	10	6
(2)	It pays a lot of attention to what people think	36	35	37	26
(3)	It pays some attention to what people think	35	41	39	45
(4)	It pays a little attention to what people think	10	11	13	20
(5)	It pays no attention to what people think	1	1	1	2
	Missing data.	2	1	-	-
F.	Do you think some of the people running the government are crooked or dishonest				
(1)	Most of them are crooked or dishonest	5	3	5	6
(2)	Quite a few are	18	18	22	26
(3)	Some are.	48	53	55	56
(4)	Hardly any are.	25	23	16	11
(5)	None at all are crooked or dishonest.	4	2	1	1
	Missing data.	2	1	1	-

picture of moderate change emerges when they are asked whether they think some of the people running the government are crooked or dishonest. The median response at all times is rather non-committal; they say "some" are. But even at Time 1 almost one quarter thought "quite a few" or "most" of them are crooked; and by Time 4 this number has increased to one-third. I don't consider this representative of widespread alienation but it does indicate that up to one-third of the young men in our sample are disillusioned with government officials.

The shift is more dramatic, however, on other items dealing with behaviors of "the government." When asked whether the government wastes much of the money we pay in taxes (Item A), there is a steady increase from Time 1 to Time 4 of those who think "nearly all" or "a lot" is wasted. The range is from almost one-third to over one-half. The regularity of the increase suggests that

this may be due to something in the high school experience -- perhaps courses in history and government simply bring to light the waste that does occur. Two other items that change appreciably over time make their biggest shift during the year after graduation. At the beginning of tenth grade almost three-quarters thought one could trust the government in Washington to do what is right "almost always" or "often" (B). This erodes to two-thirds by the end of high school and then drops off to just over one-half one year later. On the other item (E) about one-half initially think the government pays "very much" or "a lot" of attention to what the people think when it decides what to do. This percentage holds through high school, but then drops off to only one-third by a year after graduation.*

In summary, there is indeed a trend toward increased political alienation between tenth grade and one year after high school. How much of this is a product of the particular times and unique to this generation is unclear. It could be that this shift represents normal maturation and loss of idealism as one is confronted with the facts of political life. Perhaps an older male sample would answer these questions in much the same way.

Tempering this picture are the results of two other items. In item D is evidence that increasing numbers are taking an active interest in government and current events. By Time 4 the percentage who take "a lot" or "a very great" interest has increased from 41 to 56. Further support for their interest is provided by an item asking whether eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to vote. Jennings and Levinson (1969) administered this item to some 20,000 high school seniors in 1965 and found 52 percent of the males in favor of the eighteen-year-old vote. The same question was first used in the Youth in Transition study in 1969 when most of the boys were seniors. At that time 80 percent were in favor of lowering the voting age. One year later the same percentage endorsed it. We might be more accurate, then, to characterize the earlier findings as indicative of growing disillusionment or disappointment with things as they are but not necessarily implying alienation. Requesting

* It should be noted that this survey was in the field between one and three months after President Nixon's Cambodia speech. It is interesting to speculate how much of the shift on these last two questions could be attributed to a disenchantment of youth with this action.

the vote reflects a desire for greater participation in the system as it now exists. This interpretation is supported by the fact that interest in lowered voting age was greatest among those who were most dissatisfied with U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. In other words, the dissenters do not want to drop out of the system; they want "a piece of the action" as represented by the eighteen-year-old vote.

THE SIZE OF THE COUNTER CULTURE

From the responses to three questions it is possible to suggest some limits on the size of the dissenters group or Counter Culture. One of a series of citizenship questions asked respondents to agree or disagree with the statement: "I feel you can be a good citizen even if you burn your draft card." The 26 percent who agree with this item are agreeing with civil disobedience as an acceptable aspect of citizenship, and accordingly could be grouped as at least somewhat sympathetic to the Counter Culture. Two other items provide similar data. The boys were asked: "Do you think military personnel have too much or too little influence on the way the country is run?" It would be expected that adherents of the Counter Culture would indicate that the military has too much influence, since by definition they are against governmental institutions -- especially the military. Twenty-five percent think that the military does have too much influence. But someone can hold this belief and not belong to the Counter Culture; so it has to be said that 26 percent is an upper limit and not an actual estimate of the size of this group. One other item asked this: "Assume you are a serviceman. Do you feel the military ever has a right to order you to do the following things?" There followed four things ranging from demanding an extra year of active duty to working on a job that is not of your own choosing. The possible responses were: "always has a right," "has a right in emergencies," and "never has a right." By virtue of their anti-military feelings, dissenters could be expected to deny that the military has a right to require anything of servicemen -- even things that are currently a part of everyday life in the military. Such is the attitude expressed by those who checked "never has a right" to the item: "You must work on a job that is not of your own choosing." Twenty-six percent checked this response. The weight of evidence from these three questions suggests that the percentage of adherents to the Counter Culture is probably less than 25 percent.

VIETNAM

Few issues have polarized this country as much over the last decade as the Vietnam War. Accordingly I would like to devote some attention to describing the attitudes of our sample on this issue.

Our first attempt to assess the attitudes of our sample on Vietnam was in 1969, using the six questions appearing in Table 2. The first two items asked respondents to assess the War in terms of this country's national interests. The third item asked them about the importance of the War to fight communism. The last two items asked them to assess the War's importance to America in terms of maintaining our international integrity. With appropriate reversals these six items were combined into a single index which is displayed in collapsed form in Figure 2. The bar in the center is made up of a group


Table 2

Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?					
<u>Percentage Frequencies**</u>					
	Strongly (1) Agree	(2) Agree	(3) Disagree	Strongly (4) Disagree	Missing (9) Data
a.* Fighting the war in Vietnam is damaging to our national honor or pride	10 <i>17</i>	37 <i>37</i>	43 <i>36</i>	8 <i>8</i>	2 <i>2</i>
b.* Fighting the war in Vietnam is really not in the national interest	9 <i>18</i>	35 <i>34</i>	46 <i>37</i>	8 <i>10</i>	2 <i>1</i>
c. Fighting the war in Vietnam is important to fight the spread of Communism	20 <i>21</i>	54 <i>45</i>	21 <i>25</i>	4 <i>8</i>	2 <i>2</i>
d.* Fighting the war in Vietnam is bringing us closer to world war	14 <i>14</i>	51 <i>52</i>	31 <i>30</i>	2 <i>2</i>	2 <i>2</i>
e. Fighting the war in Vietnam is important to protect friendly countries	12 <i>10</i>	55 <i>48</i>	27 <i>34</i>	3 <i>6</i>	3 <i>2</i>
f. Fighting the war in Vietnam is important to show other nations that we keep our promises	14 <i>11</i>	53 <i>43</i>	26 <i>35</i>	5 <i>9</i>	3 <i>2</i>

* These items were reversed in the construction of the index.

** Italics are for Time 4 data, roman for Time 3.

Figure 2
COLLAPSED DISTRIBUTION OF
VIETNAM WAR DISSENT INDEX*



* A summary score for the 6 items in Table 2 was calculated for each respondent by reversing the scale for items a, b, and d and then taking a mean of the responses over all 6 items.

** 3% of our respondents at Time 3 and 2% at Time 4 had missing data on the items that comprise the index.

that can be described as neutral on the issue. Apparently they do not feel strongly one way or the other.* The bar on the left is comprised of those who support the War on the dimensions asked. At Time 3 this totalled 40 percent. The bar to the right of center is composed of respondents who disagree with basic U.S. policy and these number some 20 percent.

At Time 4, this last summer, we repeated these same questions and observed a shift. The 40 percent supporters had reduced to 35 percent, and the dissenters increased from 20 to 32 percent.** Apparently much of the increased dissent comes from respondents who were formerly neutral. A look at the items in Table 2 shows the shift in greater detail. In the national interest items there is an average shift of 8 percent from "strongly agree" over to "disagree". On fighting the spread of Communism the loss is primarily from the "agree" column and is spread equally between "disagree" and "strongly disagree." The international integrity items, e and f, show the greatest change suggesting that, for this group, this rationale for the Vietnam War has become the least tenable of the arguments in favor of our commitments there. In sum, we have identified a shift of 8-12 percent of our sample from neutrality or support of the War to disagreement with the War.

The reader might well ask, how would such a profile and the corresponding shift in profiles compare with an adult male sample? In other words, is this data a sign of increasing alienation of youth from their elders and thus further proof for the existence of a generation gap? In an attempt to answer this question we added at Time 4 one of George Gallup's current measures of Vietnam sentiment. By carefully duplicating the wording and administration

* Actually there are two groups represented in this bar. One is as described. The other -- some 4-5% -- were fatigued or were not interested in answering the questions. They were identified in this way. The six items in this section were designed as a balanced scale. For a person to be consistent, he would have to agree to some extent with three of the items and disagree with the others. Four percent checked all agrees or disagrees. The other one percent allows for other less common patterns of response tendency that we were not able to test for.

** At Time 4 we were unable to interview nine percent of the Time 3 sample. This may affect our figures somewhat. (This will be investigated in the coming months.) No major shift is anticipated, however. Even if these losses do come more frequently from lower socioeconomic levels, recent evidence indicates that the poor (Converse & Schuman, 1970) and the non-whites (Gallup, July 1970) are more strongly against the War.

procedures, it was hoped that we could compare the distributions of our sample directly with those of Gallup's adult samples. The question appears below:

FOUR PLANS QUESTION

Now I would like to ask you some questions about Vietnam. Here are four different plans the United States could follow in dealing with the war in Vietnam. Which one do you prefer?

- PLAN A: WITHDRAW ALL TROOPS FROM VIETNAM IMMEDIATELY
- PLAN B: WITHDRAW ALL TROOPS BY END OF 18 MONTHS
- PLAN C: WITHDRAW TROOPS BUT TAKE AS MANY YEARS TO
DO THIS AS ARE NEEDED TO TURN THE WAR OVER
TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
- PLAN D: SEND MORE TROOPS TO VIETNAM AND STEP UP THE
FIGHTING

The Gallup Poll began using this question in December of 1969, and repeated it in March and May of 1970. Ideally we would have used a question that was asked both in the spring of 1969 and in the spring of 1970, concurrent with our Time 4 data collection. But none were available so it will be necessary to interpolate, using a Gallup question similar to the "Four Plans" to extend the time period to a whole year. This is the "Withdraw Now" question which was used in June and November of 1969 and again in February of 1970. The distributions appear in Table 3. Look at the figures for men. In June, 1969, 27 percent favored immediate withdrawal. This number declined sharply by November, shortly after Nixon's Vietnam speech, but quickly climbed again by February of 1970 to 34 percent. Overall then, the group advocating immediate withdrawal increased by seven percent in seven months, or approximately one percent per month.

Table 3*

WITHDRAW NOW: Some U.S. Senators are saying we should withdraw all our troops from Vietnam immediately, would you favor this?

		June 1969	November 1969	February 1970
Total	Favor	29	21	35
	Oppose	62	73	55
	No Opinion	9	6	10
Men	Favor	27	18	34
	Oppose	67	79	61
	No Opinion	6	3	5
Ages 21-29	Favor	31	25	39
	Oppose	64	73	57
	No Opinion	5	2	4

*(Gallup International, 1969-1970)

The data on the "Four Plans" question appear in Table 4. Here, respondents opposed to continuing the conflict are given an opportunity to choose one of two options, immediate withdrawal (Plan A) or a gradual but timed withdrawal (Plan B). Even so, looking at the data for men a similar pattern is apparent. The combined total endorsing Plans A and B is 33 percent in December and this total increases linearly until by late May it has reached 47 percent. This is a growth of over two percent a month. In summary we can say that the nation as a whole shifted over the last year, with those opposing continuation of the war increasing as much as 20 percent. This shift is comparable in size to what we saw earlier with the six Vietnam questions in the YIT Study. There we noted that the supporters had lost five percent and the dissenters gained 12 percent during the same time period. So the young men of this country do not appear to have widened the generation gap by their shift, rather their movement was in keeping with nationwide sentiments. But it must be noted that

Table 4

FOUR PLANS: Now I would like to ask you some questions about Vietnam. Here are four different plans the United States could follow in dealing with the war in Vietnam. Which one do you prefer?

- PLAN A: WITHDRAW ALL TROOPS FROM VIETNAM IMMEDIATELY
 PLAN B: WITHDRAW ALL TROOPS BY END OF 18 MONTHS
 PLAN C: WITHDRAW TROOPS BUT TAKE AS MANY YEARS TO DO THIS AS ARE NEEDED TO TURN THE WAR OVER TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
 PLAN D: SEND MORE TROOPS TO VIETNAM AND STEP UP THE FIGHTING

		GALLUP			YOUTH IN TRANSITION
		December 1969	March 1970	May 1970	May-July 1970
Total	A	19	21	23	25
	B	22	25	25	34
	C	40	38	31	27
	D	11	7	13	12
	No Opinion	8	9	8	3
Men	A	16	17	21	25
	B	17	23	26	34
	C	45	42	32	27
	D	14	10	14	12
	No Opinion	8	8	7	3
Ages 21-29	A	22	22	23	25
	B	26	24	29	34
	C	37	41	32	27
	D	11	7	11	12
	No Opinion	4	6	5	3

these young men appear to be somewhat to the left of their elders to begin with. Again look at the "Four Plans" in Table 4. While 47 percent of the adult male population support Plans A and B, some 59 percent of the 18-19 year old men endorse them. The proportion of Hawks appears to be about the same for the two groups (Plan D). Among those who do not favor stepping up the War, the younger men are obviously separated from their elders over the speed and guarantees of withdrawal. But rather than an unalterable generation gap, the trend data for adults suggest that the youth may simply be ahead of their elders' thinking by several months.

II. IMAGES OF MILITARY SERVICE

Thus far this paper has described the orientation of young men to the broad theme of alienation from the country as a whole. Another area of interest to Army social workers is the orientation of today's youth to military service. In an army composed largely of draftees, the predispositions of a cross-section of young men toward military service prior to entry are important to understanding their reactions when they do come to serve. The data for this section come from Time 3, when these boys were about to graduate from high school.

One of the measures used to assess images of military service is a Military Knowledge Test especially constructed for the Time 3 data collection. The test has two subparts. The first is concerned with knowledge of the requirements of Selective Service and the second deals with knowledge of military life. We found that well over three-quarters are familiar with the rudimentary facts about the draft and some of the educational requirements for acceptance into military service. They know the age at which they have to register for the draft and they are able to identify some of the common deferments.

When it comes to knowledge of military life and benefits, our panel is much less well informed. The 24 items in this area appear in Table 5. They can be grouped into three categories: pay, length and conditions of service, and fringe benefits. The items are ordered according to the proportion getting the item correct beyond what could be expected by chance.

Table 5
KNOWLEDGE OF MILITARY SERVICE

<u>Facts tested</u>	<u>% getting it correct</u>	<u>% expected by chance*</u>
PAY		
<i>Items answered correctly appreciably more often than by chance</i>		
A serviceman gets more pay if he has children to support. (I28)**	81	50
Bonuses are given for re-enlistment. (I26)	77	50
A serviceman gets extra pay for serving in combat areas. (I26)	74	50
Bonuses are not given for enlisting. (I24)	71	50
Draftees are paid the same as enlistees. (I14)	52	20
A single enlisted man receives about \$100 per month. (I12)	51	20
<i>Items answered correctly somewhat more often than by chance</i>		
All branches of the service pay the same to recruits. (I15)	37	20
A 10-year enlisted man with wife and two children, living off base, earns approximately \$600. (I17)	35	20
After 20 years a serviceman can retire with 50% of his basic pay. (I13)	33	20
An unmarried commissioned officer earns approximately \$400/month to start. (I16)	27	20
<i>Items answered correctly at or below the chance level</i>		
Officers receive more pay if they live off base. (I22)	51	50
Enlisted men receive more pay if they live off base. (I10)	35	50
LENGTH AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE		
<i>Items answered correctly appreciably more often than by chance</i>		
After one year a single serviceman typically lives in a barracks with 40 other men. (I11)	67	25
The usual term of active duty in the Air Force is four years. (I32C)	54	20
The usual term of active duty in the Navy is four to six years. (I32B)	54	25
A draftee serves for 24 months of active duty. (I31)	50	20
During peacetime a typical serviceman works 40 hours a week. (I35)	52	20
A serviceman receives 30 days of paid leave per year. (I19)	48	20

* Items were multiple response. 20% is the chance level for a 5-response item, 25% for a 4-response, and 50% for a 2-response (true-false) item.

Facts tested% getting
it correct% expected
by chance

FRINGE BENEFITS

Items answered correctly appreciably more often than by chance

Free medical service is provided for serviceman on active duty. (I27)	96	50
Part expenses are paid to enlisted men who want to go to college after discharge. (I18)	85	50
An enlistee has more choices of specialty than a draftee. (I33)	80	33
Partial tuition is paid for college courses taken during off-duty hours by men in active military service. (I30)	77	50

Items answered correctly at the chance level

Free travel throughout the U.S. is provided for men on active duty when they take leaves. (I29)	53	50
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In the area of pay, these youth know only the most general facts, such as servicemen getting more pay if they support children or serve in combat areas. Only half of them are sure that draftees and enlistees get paid the same amount, or that a single enlisted man gets about \$100 per month. A much smaller proportion yet -- between twenty-seven and thirty-seven percent -- accurately identify the pay of an unmarried commissioned officer or an enlisted man after ten years of service. The majority are unaware that enlisted men living off base receive additional pay. The image of poor pay and benefits is revealed more clearly when one notes the direction of the wrong answers; i.e., some wrong answers reflect a less favorable evaluation of military service than do others. For example, thirty percent think an enlistee gets \$50 instead of \$100 a month. Instead of \$600 per month for the ten-year career man with a wife and two children, over half of the respondents estimate that he would earn \$400 or less. Thus, in the area of compensation these youth see the military option as very unfavorable indeed.

A second set of questions, which asked about the length and conditions of service, provided additional evidence that their perception of military


life is on the unfavorable side. About one-third think (or guess) that a soldier has to work sixty or more hours a week even in peacetime; thus, they think that the military work week is half again longer than it actually is. Forty-one percent estimate annual paid leave at 15 days, whereas the correct answer is 30. Only in the area of fringe benefits -- the last set of items in the table -- do large proportions of youth seem somewhat well informed. Well over 80 percent know that medical service is free in the military, and that veterans can expect financial assistance for advanced education. In balance, however, it seems likely that perceptions of pay and working conditions are the most important factors in a youth's mind when he makes a career decision. If so, we must conclude that a very large proportion of these youth have an unfavorable image of the military as a desirable career choice.

A more positive image of the military emerges from another set of questions which asked these young men to rate each of 19 dimensions as to which type of career -- military or civilian -- was best. The dimensions appear in Figure 3. The items in the top third of the figure are those which are most distinctly associated with a military career. The first six items would appear to describe a conventional, somewhat romantic image of military service as producing strong, disciplined, responsible, leaders of men. In addition, being in the military is a service to one's country; through it one can help make the world a better place in which to live. Three additional items from elsewhere in the questionnaire complement this notion. A career in the military is seen as providing good opportunities for the disadvantaged. Almost three-quarters think that a boy from a poor family would have a better chance of getting ahead if he followed a military career instead of a civilian career. Over half think that a Negro would have a better chance of getting ahead and would face less discrimination if he chose a military career.*

The dimensions in Figure 3 that cluster on the civilian side fall into two categories. One is advancement and self-utilization. A civilian career is per-

* Examination of economic and racial subgroups showed both poor and black groups in our sample hold similar views on two of these items. The only difference is in the amount of perceived discrimination in military service. While the sample as a whole sees less discrimination in military service, the black subgroups tend to think that discrimination is about equal in military and civilian life. It's not clear whose perception is correct.

Suppose that at the end of your education you are trying to decide between a career in the military and a civilian job. Which would be better for the following things?



NOTE: The number of missing data cases for these items ranges from one to three percent.

Figure 3
MILITARY VERSUS CIVILIAN CAREER

ceived as superior if one wants to use his skills and abilities and "get ahead" in this world. A second category can be labelled independence: where it is important for a person to be his own boss, control his personal life or earn a lot of money, a civilian career is seen as far superior. This image parallels the one drawn earlier from the military knowledge test.

Some questions raised by these findings are these: For today's youth how important are the issues of becoming a man and serving one's country? Is manhood identified with the physical rigor of the Marine Corps? Is service to one's country an important motivator and if so is it identified with military service? While we do not yet have the data to answer this question, I would have to be doubtful; it is my impression that such values are decreasing in importance in an affluent America. Accordingly, it would seem that compensation and conditions of service (personal freedoms, etc.) would have to be improved. I would speculate that this is true for attracting young men, for retaining them, and for keeping contented those who are currently serving -- especially those who were drafted.

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FOREWARD

Lieutenant Colonel Roy E. Baxter, MSC

I have been asked today to participate in a review of the day's activities with Captain Lasater. Together we have decided to divide the area. I shall examine Professor Roszak's text and the University of Michigan study. Captain Lasater shall review Colonal Morgan's paper and that of Lieutenant Colonel Maillet.

Because of the geographic separation we did not collaborate so if repetition occurs we offer our apologies.

Personally, regarding my area, I would like to state that as I have attempted to evaluate both works I must state that if you believe that I am in conflict with your evaluation then it is only meant to be an evaluation.

REPORT ON THE MAKING OF A COUNTER CULTURE: REFLECTIONS
ON THE TECHNOCRATIC SOCIETY AND ITS YOUTHFUL
OPPOSITION

Professor Theodore Roszak

Theodore Roszak, finding us in "an historical EMERGENCY of absolutely unprecedented proportions, has responded with an interpretation of the counter culture: "A culture so radically disaffiliated from the mainstream of assumptions of our society that it scarcely looks to many as a culture at all, but takes on the alarming appearance of barbaric intrusions." He believes this counter culture might save us, with the guidance of "mature minds," from the mad rationality of our galloping technocracy. Thus, "there is no avoiding the need to understand and to educate them in what they are about."

Despite the fact that the editor of The Dissenting Academy has now chosen to treat disaffiliated youth academically, his own feelings are evident: A warm regard for the outraged and alienated young: an intense fear of the insensitive technocrats. He assumes the role of youth's apologist in troubled academia. Unfortunately, as an apologist for the other side to his own side, Roszak is trapped in a painful dilemma. He continually undercuts himself with reservations about his subject. Youth is "motley," "miserably educated," prone to "pornographic sadomasochism," and allowed "to nurse childish fantasies until too late in life." Worst, the young indulge in the "adolescentization of thought. With this characterization, in mind, one must search out an ethic of integrity in Marcuse's "Great Refusal."

The book has two main themes, the author's hatred of technocracy, by which he means science, technology, bureaucracy and practically everything else about contemporary society. American society in particular is ugly, repressive, destructive, and subversive of much that is truly human. As a culture it tends to give preference to property rights over personal rights, technological requirements over human needs, competition over cooperation, violence over sexuality, concentration over distribution, the producer over the consumer, means over ends, secrecy over openness, social reforms over personal expression, striving over gratification. In short, he contends this whole pervasive conspiratorial, subtle and invisible system that is engulfing us must be destroyed if there is to be any salvation of man. Countering technocracy of all kinds and in all guises, he sets up the realm of the magical, the ecstatic, the world of nonreason, typified by what he thinks a shamanistic society would have been and should be like. A humane existence can be achieved only by a thoroughgoing rejection of the rational ideal which has dominated western

civilization. Such a suggestion, he admits, "runs the risk of appearing to be a brazen exercise in perverse nonsense."

This is his principle theme, but the bulk of the book is taken up with a long, tedious literary criticism style of a group of older writers to whom some of the young have attended, and through whose eyes he, hopes to see the future culture which he assumes youth is ready to build, tutored by a few of these disgruntled men of the past. Here, two criticisms may be introjected. First, though well-written and insightful on a number of topics of contemporary dispute, they are only ancillary to the main line of Roszak's argument.

In his terms, the young are substantially what this galaxy of writers, all members of a previous generation, wrote and preached and acted out. Yet, I can hardly believe that the contribution which today we can expect from a new generation is to be derived from the most meticulous investigation of such writing. This new generation's alienation and disgruntlement and defiance of the status quo has given them a spurious standing, but actually young people today are without any mentors and prophets. They stand alone, without models, struggling with an understanding of the issues of the modern world, which as Margaret Mead points out, they alone understand as birthright members of this new age. One must question what "mature minds" Roszak had made reference to in prefacing his book.

So we have a chapter in which Marcuse and Norman O. Brown are presented as the modern representatives, in now mixed terms, of the great opposition between Marx and Freud. "Is the psyche, as Marx would have it, a reflection of the mode of production of material life?" Or is the social structure, as Freud argued, a reflection of our psychic content? The question as raised and the discussion which follows is perhaps best summated, however ironically, with Roszak's own quotation: "Perhaps, conjectured the philosopher frog, 'this bird is mad, after all. Surely we have no further need of these cryptic songs. And in any case, it is very tiresome to have to listen to fantasies when fantasies have lost their social relevance."

Then follows a discussion of Paul Goodman and a utopian thought. Here Roszak drops all pretense of writing about fashionable ideas and seizes on Goodman's little-known brand of Gestalt Therapy to pull together his concept of the case of the new culture--the reintegration of man with nature; an invocation for contact with the spirit of the earth to restore community, sacrament, and visionary experience. Here, Roszak would lead us to believe, lays the theoretical foundation for the great dropout. "Only a social order built to the human scale permits the free play and variety out of which the unpredictable beauties of men emerge." Yet one must ask, how do youth today grow up? How do they build a community on a theoretical foundation? Again, Roszak's own dubious conclusion: "Nobody knows quite how it is to be

done. There are not many reliable models. The old radicals are no help: They talked about socializing whole economics, or launching third parties, or strengthening the unions, but not about building communities.... If there is no community for you young man, make it yourself." Roszak seems to have gotten so engrossed with Goodman that he overlooks a good deal of historical perspective. The New England colonies grew out of utopian communes, so that the dropout tradition is not only old, but perhaps one more reform movement, attempting to revive a decayed tradition once important to our present society.

However, Roszak does focus upon one aspect of the counter culture which can not be lined with historical precedence, the "heavyweight obsessions" with the psychedelics. Here he must be given credit for following in the footsteps of St. Timothy the Tripper, who recently tripped out of a California jail. Roszak makes the very obvious yet consistently overlooked distinction between the use of hallucinogenics by a man of experience, intellectual discipline, and trained curiosity, and a "fifteen-year-old tripper whiffing airplane glue until his brain turns to oatmeal." He ends with the very deft prediction, I believe, of the absorption and victimization by the old culture of this vehicle of rejection. It is only a matter of time, when the psychedelic experience is but one more pharmacological panacea, a safety valve for social neurosis.

To return to the major theme of the book, I feel compelled to exam several of his major guiding prenesis. First, that there is a good deal wrong with modern industrial America goes without question. The old culture which proclaims itself reasonable, pragmatic, realistic, and scientific has perpetrated many rather than a few horrifying events. Technocracy's apolitical nature, its independence from old time profiteering, its lieutenancy of counterfeiters, etc., are not esteemed by many. But of this new culture? Who is to participate, what are they to change and what are their goals?

Roszak would have us believe that youth's outburst of rebellion and dissent are amalgamating into a coherent, though as yet uncompleted, culture. This new culture as an integrated, monolithic pattern is very far from the case. There are many varied and contradictory streams feeding the new culture. Angry blacks don't even qualify because they are as culturally old-fashioned as the nationalist mythopoesis of the nineteenth century. Its unfortunate that the only people in sight who have concentrated their energy and join into dance, who move with grace that expresses their determination to be free, have been excluded. Such people, I would think, would be a logical inhabitant for Roszak's shamanistic society. Recently, black people worked through an attempt to appeal to the moral fiber of the silent majority. This civil rights movement actually gave birth to the youth protest movement. Yet, the author neatly counterposed these cultures into opposing camps. But there is a very real connection there. Black

people are liberating themselves in a struggle. They regard that struggle as a moral one. But since they blame men instead of systems, Roszak finds them culturally, old-fashioned.

Another glaring split in the new culture is that which separates militant activism from the traits I generally associate with the hippie movement. The first strand stresses political confrontation, revolutionary action, radical commitment to the process of changing the basic structure of modern industrial society. If this revolution succeeds, the militants will have been so corrupted by old culture premises and technology that Roszak would expect it. The second movement involves a renunciation of that society in favor of the cultivation of inner experience and pleasing internal feeling states. Yet as Roszak confesses, the psychedelic syllogism will not work: "A change in the mode of consciousness is not going to change the world."

The most troubling proposition is Roszak's contention that the root of our troubles is western society's unquestioning acceptance of the "ideology of objective consciousness," the ideal of methods of science. Can we really trace the manifest evils of modern society to the methodology of science and a myth of objective consciousness. Certainly for many people, the better they understand science, the less they are going to like it; for science embodies many values and assumptions that are widely repugnant to the counter culture and anathema to youth. Science exalts the principle of intellectual authority, always aims at authoritative pronouncement, and tolerates dissent only because it promises to reconstitute the authority of science on firmer ground. No intellectual animus could possibly be more foreign to many young idealists of the now generation. They resent the principle of authority and despise the aspiration toward it. They cannot bear the idea of a privileged utterance, carrying a primary authority and putting the onus of contradiction upon others. They associate it quite simply with social and economic privilege and consign it to the same oblivion. Even worse, they view science as a risk. For a rising generation in an age which craves security, the impending holocaust which science has made possible makes the old slogan about science producing better products for better living ring increasingly hollow.

Yet, Roszak is extremely ambiguous about the precise content of the "Scientific world-view." With a few horrifying examples from the diverse crypto-pacifist statements of Kahn, and an assortment of others designed to conjure up the image of the mad scientist popular in TV and mass media in the mid 1950's; one would think Roszak hasn't the slightest conception of the difference between science as a self-correcting system of inquiry and a technology run wild because contemporary society has not yet developed a way to control it. His examples of repressive and inhuman social practices makes it clear that his primary targets are economic exploitation, political domination, and

the depersonalization, which results from institutional bureaucratization. Hence his real villain is the social scientist, not the natural scientist. Roszak reveals his confusion over the identity of his target in his quite insensitive discussion of the character of pure scientific investigation.

What is most horrifying about this proposition is its total lack of scale. The author parades the inhumanity with which an experimentalist studies blind rabbits, and yet fails to deal with what the breakdown of our technologically dependent society would mean for millions of human beings, most of all his flower children. He utterly fails to grapple with the realities of hunger in the world to which the answer is not more shamanism, but rice and wheat. No primitive shaman ever thought that the life of the spirit was so important that the whole question of food and water should be permanently disregarded.

Despite the very great sophistication of his analysis, Roszak succumbs in the end to exactly the same mistake as the anti-rational counter culture. No one will ever perserve or restore the natural environment merely by looking reverently at it. All the manipulative powers of science will be required. Not the science which serves as a tool for the establishment for manipulating public opinion at home, suppressing national liberation movements abroad, and generally keeping a lid on social ferment. But a science exercising some of its ingenuity to get the world back into the condition it was in before it shook it out of all recognition. A science such as ecology, which has so fired the enthusiasm of youth today. Roszak is right that youth are fleeing from the idea of reason, but to encourage them in their flight is to play into the hands of reaction.

REVIEW OF YOUNG MEN LOOK AT THE MILITARY

JOHNSTON AND BACHMAN, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
DECEMBER 1969

It seems appropriate that I preface what follows with several general observations which may serve as a way of establishing a general frame of reference.

First, from a methodological point of view. I feel Johnston has done a more than adequate job under the circumstances as I understand them. To start asking new questions in an already on-going research project is not the most desirable approach. The general design, his use, presentation, and conclusions drawn from the data are sound. Most importantly, he is always quick to point out the limitations, weaknesses, and fallacies of the study.

Secondly, I hesitate to accept the validity of this study in the here and now of Fall, 1970. This report was initiated in the Fall of 1966, and reports data collected at best over a year ago. In short, the climate of the times may have changed a great deal when one concerns himself with this issue. To offer a few examples:

The escalation of the war in Southeast Asia (Cambodian Involvement); the new mobilization committee's march on Washington; the radicalization of campus confrontation and disorder; the polarization and increased vocalization of liberal versus conservative at every level from Congress to the local PTA; the increased and open traffic in drug use; and finally, the growing minority which Roszak describes as the counter culture.

All of these events, to name but a few, when presented to adolescents who's attitudes are at best volatile, by a mass-media which tends to reify and exaggerate, can have a very subtle, but real effect on their attitudes toward, and plans for, the military. What I am suggesting here is that in dealing with a population of this age, one must ask how susceptible are they to the increasingly outspoken challenge to the whole system of which the military is the major target? How many subjects and from what subgroups have changed their plans? A more precise and definitive change has occurred in the draft laws and procedures of the selective service. The institution of the lottery system is sure to have some impact on the decisions of this 18-19-year old population. Also, the severe cutback of deferments, both vocational and educational, is a very real consideration for one faced with this decision.

Finally, we must examine my own perspectives. As one who is approaching middle-age and somewhat past high school, I have no appreciable contact with high school students. Therefore, I have little

ground from which to question the attitudes which this study professes to report. Another limitation is my understanding of the military. I have lived and participated in this bureaucratic organization called the Army for many years, and at times, I wonder if I comprehend it any better today than when I stared out as a young enlistee. I sometimes become confused at what the military expects, wants, or hopes to accomplish. In short my objectivity and understanding of the complexities involved may be biased.

To begin with methodological consideration, I would question Johnston's sampling procedures. Although no details are given as to population selection, it is certainly not representative geographically. I would ask if they have the same sampling population available as the selective service system. Also, we must question what types of school districts were approached for the project, which were willing to cooperate and are these representative of both urban and rural communities? In addition, how were the individual subjects contacted and what group would not participate? A reported 19 percent of the panel study dropped out. For what reasons and from what subgroups? Did they move, drop-out from school or choose to discontinue the study? Nineteen percent of the 18-19 year-old national population is a sizable number of available youngmen to lose contact with. It would seem that the high school drop-outs constitute a readily available source of manpower for the military which this survey does not reflect. A certain percentage of this group readily enlist in the military, either as an escape mechanism, for vocational training, or for a "see-the-world" sojourn. It would be interesting to explore what incentives they perceive the military as offering.

The demographic categories utilized by the study could possibly be refined. The measure of socio-economic level is not explained thoroughly and appears to be so broad that it does not serve to differentiate. Also, to accept occupational aspiration as a criterion variable is questionable. The author himself notes a degree of fluidity from the first to third measurement. Both career aspiration and vocational aptitude have a remarkable way of changing after high school; in addition, a substantial percentage (51.5) are reportably college bound. Obviously, as we live in the age of "every-one-must-go-to-college" phenomena, one must consider, of this sizable majority, how many are to be accepted, how many drop-out and how many flunk-out. The report tends to treat this subset as a homogeneous group that for a period of four years are not available. This group is merely asked if they plan to participate in the military during the next ten years. The authors seem to treat very lightly the fact that during these college years, students' beliefs, values, and plans often undergo modification. They make no prediction of what percentage of half their entire sample will do after college. Another consideration is from this college-bound subset, how many engage in graduate study or professional training before availing themselves to the military.

Within this same area of discussion, one could suggest several additional subgroups for comparison purposes. The ROTC programs would seem to attract a category of young men especially interested and involved in the military. Why not sample students in high school ROTC? Also, what percentage of college-bound subjects plan to utilize the Officer Training Corps Program. This would at least serve as a source of validity for the questionnaire used.

This leads me to directly question the validity of both the "military knowledge test" and the "Vietnam war dissent index." Both obviously have neither established reliability or validity in terms of predictive validity. Although the author claims both face and construct validity, there is absolutely no behavioral measures involved. It would be interesting to know how many of those subjects who score high on the dissent index have participated openly in peace movements, have burned their draft cards, or engaged in other anti-military behaviors. To dichotomize a population on the basis of these two questionnaires is questionable. To confront high school students with six highly ambiguous and complex questions and then use the derived score as an index to the degree of dissidence to the military is not convincing to me. The author himself notes the seemingly contradictory and confused responses elicited in this area.

Another methodological criticism could be the manner in which all of their data are collected. As the authors themselves indicated, when using paper and pen instruments, one must guard against response-bias and acquiescence influencing responses. Both could definitely be a source of contamination when dealing with such nebulous and admissible "hypothetical" items. Apparently, all of these findings are derived from group testing situations with no opportunity for individual interviewing or exploration to transpire. This would have been very beneficial in establishing the sincerity of subject responses and avoiding many of the misinterpretations which must have occurred.

One must also consider the fact that these subjects are being paid. If any single thing in the study can be questioned, this is it. In the first place, the author doesn't tell us under what guise the investigation represented themselves to the subjects. It is quite possible that they were perceived by the subjects as another authoritarian figure administering group test that are frequently encountered during one's education.

It is well established that any type of monetary regard will modify behavior elicited under such conditions. A good deal of the "favorable" responses may be nothing more than the "give-take" effect; that is, telling the questioner or experimenter what you know he wants to hear. This is nothing more than role conformation or conformity and could be responsible for some of the inflated categories.

Finally, the use of the "hypothetical" no-war, no-draft questionnaire generated a lot of useless and contaminating data in my opinion. Encouraging a high school student to expose his fantasy life with two incongruous situations is not a useful means of answering these questions.

One point the author raises but does not elaborate on is the use of the war in Vietnam as merely a rationalization for not entering military service. In other words, Vietnam is a point of reference or physical example for these students' feelings toward the military as a system. There is a percentage of people who no longer feel an obligation or responsibility toward supporting the military preoccupation of their society. The duty does not delineate this subgroup adequately.

The author also utilizes Festinger's concept of cognitive dissonance as an explanatory device. Yet he would be hard pressed even to defend the concept when looking at the military today. Anti-war and anti-military attitudes are quite visible within the system as without.

Finally, the report never establishes who the military wants to offer incentives to; that is, what population do they want to attract? It is very doubtful whether the same incentives will be attractive to both a body shop mechanic with a high school degree and a Ph D research mathematician. What are the positions to be filled, in a no-draft military?

In conclusion, I would suggest the report serves two purposes. First, it offers some degree of empirical conformation to what many observers would have hypothesized concerning most of these questions. This, of course, is the main objective of scientific investigation. Secondly, its own inadequacies pose serious questions which must be answered before considering a no-draft military system. Who does the military want to attract? Does it want short term enlistees for combat, career NCO's for highly skilled technical positions, or already trained professionals for officers? This would seem to be the main criterion when attempting to determine incentives.

PERSPECTIVES ON DRUGS: A PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW

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1. The contemporary drug scene differs from the traditional patterns of drug use and abuse known previously in America or elsewhere.

A. Drug use is widespread throughout the society, and affects all social classes, races, and ages. The drug subculture is not exclusively that of the ethnic minorities, the ghettoized, and the poor; it also includes in increasing numbers privileged adolescents and young adults from white, middle and upper class society.

B. The variety of drugs now used and abused is great, and includes, in addition to the traditional drugs of abuse (opiates, sedatives, and amphetamines) recently developed psychedelic (mind-expanding) drugs and other psychotropic (mind-affecting) compounds.

C. Users of psychedelic drugs tend to proselytize for the use of these drugs as beneficial agents for the solution of social as well as personal problems, and defend their right to use them. They argue that these drugs are not harmful, do not lead to physical or psychological

dependence or addiction, and do not lead to more serious forms of drug abuse. They tend to deny evidence which contradicts these assertions and attribute adverse reactions to these drugs to the presence of adulterants or to situational or personal variables.

D. Only those who have suffered severe adverse reactions (e.g., "bad trips", "flashbacks") or who feel that they have lost certain mental faculties (e.g., memory, concentration) tend to seek or accept psychological treatment. The great majority of psychedelic drug users do not consider themselves in need of counseling or treatment.

E. In addition to their pharmacological effects, these drugs are often used as symbols of rebellion against or rejection of the traditional values of our society. The great majority of marijuana and psychedelic drug users are deeply alienated from the dominant culture and are highly critical of current institutions, policies, and principles. Even those who are involved only minimally in the use of these drugs tend to feel more comfortable with other users than with non-users, and a great majority of them believe that they have found a greater sense of acceptance and can communicate better with other members of a drug using community.

II. Drug abuse may lead to serious medical and psychiatric consequences, but it should also be viewed as symptomatic of deep-rooted personal and social problems.

A. Research on drug users suggests that they turn to the use of drugs as an attempt to cure themselves of various personal problems, or to compensate for longstanding impairments in their functioning.

Relatively few drug users manifest problems which cannot be seen to antedate their involvement with drugs.

B. Regardless of their social class origins, intellectual potential, or achievements prior to adolescence, drug users tend to be "loners" who have never developed intimate and enduring relationships, particularly with their peers. The loneliness and outcast status of drug users typically dates from early childhood, and is based frequently on inadequate family background.

C. Another significant factor in the development of many drug users is their exposure to a continual series of stresses throughout childhood and adolescence. Unlike many of those who develop other forms of psychiatric pathology (e.g., neuroses, psychoses) the background of the drug user is characterized by a high degree of disorganization and chaos throughout childhood. Thus, they do not appear to have had the opportunity for even brief periods in which they might withdraw from intense overstimulation. Lacking such opportunities for the development of inner resources to cope with these pressures they eventually turn to the use of external (chemical) means of coping.

D. The use of drugs does not lead to the resolution of problems but is effective in directing the users' attention away from their problems. Thus, the psychological development of the drug user tends to be arrested as they no longer experience the anxiety and frustration which might otherwise motivate them to resolve their problems.

III. Effective drug abuse prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation

programs should be focussed on the causes as well as on the consequences of drug abuse. The user and not the drug should be emphasized.

A. A knowledge of the pharmacology, acute effects, and potential problems associated with the use of various drugs is an essential prerequisite for the professional working in a drug abuse program. Such knowledge is particularly important in emergency treatment of adverse drug reactions and in establishing a good relationship with the drug user who is seeking objective information. Drug users frequently are quite knowledgeable about the drugs they use and will not cooperate with those who are less informed or who give out erroneous information.

B. Effective intervention with drug users rests on the ability of the professional to diagnose accurately the extent and nature of an individual's involvement with drugs. In the great majority of cases drug use will not prove to be the real problem. An understanding of the motives underlying drug use, the choice of preferred drugs, the circumstances in which drugs are used, and the subjective effects of drugs, will provide the best clues to diagnosis and selection of treatment approach.

C. The user must be assured that you are concerned about him in an individual. This will help him to focus on the problems which lead him to the use of drugs and will also provide him with a significant relationship through which he might overcome his fears and difficulties about communicating and relating to others. Treatment programs which emphasize detoxification, and which ignore the motives for drug use have proved to

be relatively unsuccessful except in medical or psychiatric emergencies.

D. Preventive and educational programs should familiarize students with the variety of psychotropic drugs used, and should then focus on the factors which might lead an individual to use these drugs. In pointing out the potential dangers of drugs, attention should be placed on the use of drugs as substitutes for the use of inner resources in dealing with problems, the temporary nature of solutions achieved, and the continued failure of the user to resolve or learn to resolve his real problems. Material which exaggerates the medical or psychiatric consequences of drug use and abuse, moralistic arguments, and punitive approaches appear to have little effect in deterring drug use and should be avoided.

The Street System, Drugs, and the Military Service

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U.S. Army Social Work Conference
"Drugs, Race, the Counter Culture and the Soldier"

Fitzsimons General Hospital
Denver, Colorado
Tuesday, September 22, 1970

The observations I will be making this morning have been drawn from a field study of an Italian, working-class community in a large Eastern city of the United States. The original intent was to examine the social features of drug using behavior and, hopefully, to develop a conceptual scheme on how values, beliefs, and life styles in the so-called "natural environment" underpin the origins and spread of drug use. The study began with the research question posed as follows: "What features in the social organization of the community made it fertile for the development of drug use among youth?" The study addressed itself primarily to the behavior of males.

The focus of the study was not directed toward collecting data on the military service careers of respondents. In our present day, however, when we have since 1945 fluctuated between cold and hot wars, it was natural that impending, present, or past military experiences infiltrated informal conversations and more formal, tape-recorded interviews. My point is simply this: Until I was asked to speak to an army audience, the concern for the data on the military service careers of the respondents was a subordinate interest to the other 50 or more conceptual categories that included such items as:

- 1) Local Social Types
- 2) Drug Experimentation
- 3) Drug Switching
- 4) Contact w/ Law Enforcement
- 5) Drug Preferences and Rejections
- 6) Learning the Ropes
- 7) Young Users
- 8) Treatment Contacts
- 9) Families of Users
- 10) Consequences of Criminal Reputations
- 11) Efforts to Quit or Control Drug Use
- 12) Urges and Relapse
- 13) Old-Timers
- 14) Periods of Abstinence
- 15) Wives and Girl Friends.

All this is by way of saying that even though the material on the military is presently tentative, other aspects of the study, which will be summarized this morning, have been amply documented.

In a previous article, I tried to suggest that young men in lower socio-economic communities tailor their strivings for prestige and acceptance through efforts to compete and survive in street life. The qualities of excitement, feats of strength, and a multitude of risk-taking activities comprise the day-to-day props that make up the social interaction of what I refer to as the street system.

The street system, I believe, emerges out of the collective experience of low income people, both youth and adults, to manage their lives within the context of an increasingly bureaucratic world that depends on an impersonal delivery of goods and services. Children grow up recognizing that both they and their parents are at the relative mercy of the representatives of bureaucratic systems. And whether the impersonality is the result of arbitrary treatment by a cruel individual or the consequence of complicated administrative regulations, the results are the same: the individual situation is subordinate to the smooth operations of the bureaucracy. As children -- in my cases, young men -- run through the institutional experiences either alone or with their parents -- they develop a heightened sense of their unimportance. In contacts with the schools, hospitals, police, courts, welfare, housing authorities, and the like, the course of interaction is frequently a reminder that both they and their families are in inferior and/or powerless positions. The sense of worthlessness gets heightened if the person comes from an ethnic or racial group already encumbered with discrimination. But worse, still, is the youth or family whose special need has not been clarified in an administrative directive and requires individual handling.

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As the youth develops his own life experiences, observes those of his friends, listens to or watches those of his family, he learns that representatives of the important social institutions that impinge on his life (or on people like him) have defined him, under the most optimum conditions, as a burden to the smooth operations of their bureaucracy; or, as a near-person hardly worth the ink used to fill out the form that identifies him distinctly as an individual. The cumulative effects -- and these assaults on his dignity occur with grinding regularity, especially for the young in the school system -- lead the low income youth to develop a double view of his social contract. On the one hand, he harbors a bitterness toward social institutions -- symbolized by teachers and police -- for triggering the events that place him in a demeaned position. On the other hand, he comes to view himself as the bureaucracy might view him: unworthy for better treatment, powerless, and unimportant to the bureaucratic system as anything more than a case or number.

One of the more important routes for young men in lower socioeconomic neighborhoods to guard against assaults on their self-respect, to protect themselves from the corrosive damage to their sense of dignity, and to strive toward a self-image that merits recognition from others lies in their participation in a street system. One might say that the street system is a collective response to the ways social institutions diminish the self-images of young men in poor neighborhoods and assault their senses of dignity. As a result, the street system permits young men to participate in social activities where prestige and importance get determined by locally defined rules and unwritten bylaws that are independent of

formal organizations.

With respect to my time allotment, I would like to offer briefly a summary of the quality of street life and its relationship to drug use. And even though the data may be sketchy, I would like to illustrate how the demands of the military experience might clash with the expectations of young men involved in both the street system and the drug experience.

For a large minority of males in lower socio-economic neighborhoods, street life begins early. It may be identified for each individual as that point where the values of the street corner group become more important as a guide to behavior than the teachings of his parents. Even in elementary school years, boys begin seeking status positions among street friends and participate in activities that have embryonic features of toughness, daring, and a willingness to show bravery in the face of pain. These early street games, rather than emphasizing skills of coordination, test a youth's eagerness or reluctance to give and take brutal punishment. They are his first vivid demonstrations of courage in situations that chance injury.

As the boys grow into early adolescence, the excitement escalates to minor law-breaking activities such as joining friends in stealing cigarettes or vandalizing a school. The shared, forbidden activities become the bonds that tie youth together in a sense of solidarity. These activities may be viewed as "wrong" but they are almost never defined as "crime." Even when police become involved, the fun of escape for them seems more like an extension of street games than an example of the rising rate of delinquency.

As loyalty to peers grows stronger, parents unknowingly begin to lose their monopoly as agents of socialization. In carrying out his street

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activities, the youth must play a tricky secondary game of keeping information of his adventures from parents while trying to maximize public announcements of misdeeds among friends. As long as he does not get caught or apprehended, he may hold these two separate roles -- street activist and dutiful son -- without conflict.

The dual audience of parents and peers requires, however, a collusion of secrecy in which loyalty to street codes and street friends is pitted against conventional agents who might feed information to parents and disrupt the image he presents at home. Early in life, boys discover that "being a rat" -- the act of divulging discrediting information to conventional socializing persons with authority to censure -- is a violation of street confidentiality. In this light, the youths' commitment to street life becomes a search for trust among one another, both in carrying out exciting activities as well as in sharing intimate knowledge about them. The rewards of mutually shared adventures and the earned trust among participating youth are evidently greatly satisfying. The loyalty is evidence in those youth who move from the neighborhood but travel great distances to return daily to hang with friends on the corner or stand with them in the cold of a schoolyard.

While the rewards of trust are comforting, within the close network of friends a dangerous undercurrent of competition makes group ranking an uncertainty. Youth attempt to stabilize their status, to make the responses of others more predictable, to bring some uniformity of expectation to street relationships. These efforts come in the form of status assertions. And status assertions appear in a variety of ways. The most common one is the verbal insult -- called in the study neighborhood "ball-breaking" -- and the most dramatic is fighting. Because of the special

focus of the study, another important status assertion would be excessive drinking. In any case, the plan of action is to clarify a boy's position vis-a-vis his friends and hopefully in some observable way to enhance how others see him.

"Ball-Breaking"

As the name of the activity indicates, the aim of "ball-breaking" is the reduction of someone's manly status carried out through insult or sarcastic humor. It is the gruff and frequently brutal counterpart to the middle-class "put-down." Rather than the ritualistic verbal interaction of "playing the dozens," where motherhood is the choice target, "ball-breaking" is spontaneous and attempts to magnify a person's weakness. In its cruder form, the verbal attack is simply name-calling; and the names selected always have a negative local meaning. The way in which the intended victim deals with the "ball-breaking" attempt -- whether he retaliates with counter statements of equal or superior verbal agility, becomes embarrassed, or loses his temper -- will determine the manner of deference his friends show him. Within a verbal situation, "ball-breaking" pasttimes become demonstrations of who controls any given situation through abilities of phrasing, timing, or selection of invidious names. "Ball-breaking" can be mild, clever, or harshly insulting, depending on the situation, the creativity of the individuals or the status of the participants. The main point of "ball-breaking" is that a young man's street position in the hierarchy of social types may rise or fall to the degree to which he can make others objects of "ball-breaking" and exempt himself.

The impact of being the central figure in a game where the goal is humiliating a person by forcing into public view personal and painful shortcomings, of becoming for brief or long periods an unwilling clown, is a

bitter experience youth would prefer to avoid.

Fighting

In the street life of the study neighborhood, no personal quality is more respected than toughness. It is one of the major, and in some cases the single, individual feature upon which a high status street reputation is built. Toughness, however, is an abstract concept, and for the designation to be associated with a particular youth, claims to toughness must be demonstrated in some observable way. Athletics, especially games like football where excellence is determined by the manipulation of physical strength, provide one route. A youth can show he possesses qualities of fearlessness, determination, and physical coordination, by the way in which he tackles or blocks his opposition. While these athletic skills are respected among the youth in the study neighborhood, they lose their glitter if the same qualities are not transferred to the street where the basic unit for the proof of toughness is the fight.

For the youth set on winning respect and deference in the streets, he must realize that fighting is one of the principal instruments. One youth observed the widespread acceptance of this dictum when he described himself in relation to street life in the following manner:

You'd be surprised. You grow up in certain areas and they become values. You know, who could steal the most, who could fight the best and they become like normal values. You know because you just merely adjust to the environment. These were the values that all your friends appreciate. (Would you say that it was a way to get status?) Yes. The one that could fight the best was looked up to. In other words, like all my desires were to fight a lot when I was young. It was the accepted

thing because, you know, obviously I looked around and saw the ones that were looked up to the most and respected were the tough guys. That's what I craved.

Two important aspects set the stage for individual fights: the social setting of peers whose opinions are the basis of a youth's social ranking, and some initiating gesture or comment that threatens to lower that social position. The consequences of the lowered position have repercussions beyond the incident itself. For a youth in the study neighborhood to permit someone of lower (or even equal) status to "insult" him, according to street etiquette, raises the question of whether his claim to the status position he holds is completely merited. Failure to respond with appropriate action has the potential of opening the door to innumerable future attempts from other youth jockeying for a higher street ranking. Not only will more people consider themselves eligible to "break his balls," but the quality of content may become more degrading and the intensity of insult may increase.

Still, fighting is less frequent than the amount of talk about it would indicate. In more middle-class areas of the study city or in the memories of yesterday, a fight between two boys may have been something of a boxing match, if not carried out strictly according to the Marquis of Queensberry rules, at least with some gentlemanly understanding that an opponent knocked down be permitted to rise before being hit again. In the study neighborhood, the stakes of the game were higher, and the risk of injury considerably greater. Frequently, fighting involved use of hands, cleated shoes, chains, knives and, on occasion, guns. Since fighting has the potential of triggering far more violent results than the precipitating incident apparently merits and where severe bodily injury may be only an insulting word away, hesitancy about pursuing a conflictful situation becomes understandable.

Drinking

It is significant that even at the time of the study, most respondents reported that their first experience with a drug-induced intoxication was not with marihuana but with alcohol. Few respondents reported light, social drinking and stated that even very early drinking had one clear objective: to get high. Almost all respondents described three significant components to their drinking: 1) it was initiated within the peer group, 2) the aim was to get drunk, and 3) the side effects of sickness, vomiting, dizziness, and the hangover syndrome were memorable and distasteful by-products. In the face of anticipated physical misery, these ordeals of drinking and the subsequent suffering become the occupational hazards in securing a street reputation. When compared to fighting, however, getting drunk as a method of declaring a claim for respect does not place the youth in danger of physical injury in quite the sudden, dramatic way a street brawl might. Because parental and legal prohibitions make adolescent drinking a form of risk-taking, although a mild one, it could act as a minimal selling point to all observers that a declaration to the code of the streets had been issued. With other street boys as witnesses, a youth can demonstrate that he has flaunted prohibitions of law and family rule by daring an act denied him by reason of his age. He does not need to possess special qualities of physical strength; he does not have to pit his skill and muscle against someone else's where defeat or victory might lower or raise his standing. He need only have an orientation toward impressing his friends, the determination and endurance to force down sufficient amounts of alcohol and then wait for the intoxicating effects. Drinking, in brief, is a street game anyone can play.

Local Social Types

The way in which a youth manages street challenges of fighting, "ball-breaking," drinking, and other forms of action behavior adds up to the sum total of his character as evaluated and judged by other local youth. As he grows older, these tests become part of the repertoire of activities that begin to divide a youth's loyalties between insiders and outsiders. Youth who declare (through their actions) loyalty to the street become insiders, and the symbol of societal opposition is epitomized by the police. Loyalty to friends upheld in the face of personal disadvantages (such as arrests, police brutality, etc.) contribute to the prestige youth strive toward. If the tests for gaining entry have been successfully passed, even on a minimal basis, the youth is designated a "solid guy." He may have failings, but his main characteristic is that he can be trusted by other insiders even though he may hold low social ranking within the street status scheme. In group actions, the "solid guy" can be depended on for support in illegal activities, defenses against outsiders, and pledged to an informal code of secrecy from parents and police. In the study neighborhood, all aspirants to the "solid guy" role can be charted on a continuum from low to high status and get locally defined in the following listing:

- a) "Faggot"
- b) "Asshole" or "Jerk"
- c) "Solid Guy" (garden variety)
- d) "Tough Guy"
- e) "Crazy Guy"

"Faggots" constitute the lowest ranking in the status hierarchy. The designation does not refer to any homosexual aberration but merely to the individuals' inability to manage manly actions. They are either physically weak or display inordinate fears. Most frequently, they hang at the fringes of the street group. Often they preserve conforming moral standards, and their attempts to participate in the rough-and-tumble activities of the street cause more laughter than respect. Their outstanding feature is an inability to protect themselves from verbal or physical abuse from others. In attempting to ward off becoming the focus of group "ball-breaking," they usually offer a submissive defense that is interpreted by others as "silly," "stupid," or "dumb." Unsure of themselves physically, they receive physical punishment without attempts at retaliation. Some members see the person in the "faggot" status as merely the object of a time-consuming joke, the topic around which amusing stories revolve. With other members, he is a focal point of anger and directed hostility. Occasionally, higher status members show concern or express guilt about actions and statements made against the person in the "faggot" status. These infrequent offers of protection, plus the individual's desire to cling to the fragments of friendship he finds in the group, provide the few thin threads that make him a group member.

The status of "asshole" or "jerk" is similarly low, but not as low as "faggot." It is more a temporary designation, situationally induced. He may have put himself in a position where someone of equal status has outwitted him or reduced his manly claims. His failure to take action against an offender, to accept humiliation without recourse to violence, diminishes the respect others might otherwise grant him. Under such circumstances, the individual becomes a figure of scorn because he either permits "someone to make an asshole out of him" or "acts like a jerk" when

a youth claims a stance of toughness when he had in fact acted less aggressively -- either exaggerating or lying about his defense of self -- and his pretense to toughness gets unmasked, the status of "asshole/jerk" may become a more permanent street label.

Avoiding these derogatory designations in the early years of adolescence becomes a struggle for each male, and he must master his inner fears of personal injury. Failing this, he learns to accept the ridicule that comes with low status ranking. Because the designations of "faggot," "asshole" and "jerk" are stinging attacks on his total character and may well determine the quality of respect (or lack of it) from his peer group, and knowing that these relationships will last into adult life, the majority of street youths strive painstakingly to avoid becoming placed in these low status categories. A boy on the streets has only two choices: avoiding contact with local street youth, or acting more in conformity with local demands of toughness. Either course becomes perilous and sets in motion high tension levels.

The middle ground position has no locally designed label, and I have called a youth in this status position simply "solid guy" (garden variety). He has sufficient qualities of strength or daring to enable him to manage all other youth on the "faggot/asshole/jerk" level. He may lack physical qualities of coordination or strength which would help him rise to a higher position in the status hierarchy. His willingness to chance daring behavior or to fight bigger and stronger opponents, even though losing is inevitable, demonstrates his courage. In the language of the street, he "has balls," which means that he exerts his rights in situations persons of lesser status would accept. He has, however, an intelligent understanding of the social order of "solid guy" types and avoids circumstances that would pit him against the "tough guy" or "crazy guy."

"Tough guys," for the most part, meet and pass local tests of strength with a minimum of effort and seem to have natural physical qualities of speed, stamina, and tenacity. They frequently fight opponents who are three or four years older or opponents whose high status has been generally recognized. In doing so, they develop a street reputation when they perform respectably or, in some outstanding cases, actually win. Some "tough guys" search out situations that enhance their street reputations, bringing with them an audience of friends who take the core truth and embroider folktales of their strength. Others prefer a less conflictful existence than their followers thrust on them. What holds true, in either case, is the determination to avoid being considered an "asshole" or "jerk" in any situation that can be clarified with a fight.

A step beyond the "tough guy" is the "crazy guy," someone who conscientiously strives for a reputation that extorts fear and respect for his capacity to fight with such ferocity and brutality that inflicting physical pain or injury on his victims has little concern for him. His terms of battle are unconditional surrender and total victory in which he uses whatever means he has available: knives, broken bottles, bricks, lead pipes, pool cues, guns. Although his face-to-face relationships may be restricted to his own street corner group, stories of his actions become widespread. Within the "solid guy" hierarchy, the "crazy guy" earns the highest prestige. It should not be assumed, however, that the "crazy guy" is necessarily psychiatrically ill. Rather than a distorted view of "reality," his understanding of local expectations and practices is frequently brutally accurate. He recognizes that violent action is a route to respect, and then conscientiously, even rationally, maps out tactics of aggression. Such actions are carried off for their maximum dramatic effect

and are calculated to provide lurid details upon which a "crazy" reputation may be steadily built. Over the years, he has battled and earned the fear/respect due him; and his biography could be told by the scars he has accumulated. The toll it has taken can be charted in what seems to be an almost ridiculous series of arrests and incarcerations.

Yet, the "crazy guy" has a unique sociological function within the street system. To the individuals who surround him, his apparent disregard of danger to himself gives him an air of heroism, a sense of being slightly larger than life. By the time his reputation as "crazy" has been secured, he may have survived one or two stabbings himself or have been on the receiving end of a shooting and have converted injury into victory. His capacity to make others yield to his will, to dominate a troublesome situation and conclude it on his own terms by means of terror, strikes a note of envy in the inner world of wish fulfillment of street boys who too often feel that fate, bad luck, or fault of character makes them inevitable losers. From the viewpoint of the street youth, the "crazy guy" never seems to know defeat. He manipulates situations to his liking; he appears to control the course of his own destiny. As a hero, he is no distant gladiator performing in Madison Square Garden. He is local and his victories have proximity. For young men growing up in a neighborhood where the code of the streets makes toughness and risk-taking a necessity, these top-level "solid guys" are symbolic of the latent belief that with enough daring, enough masculine confident, enough "balls," an individual, even one with humble physical qualifications, can master a threatening environment. And the need for such local heroes is evidenced by the way in which tales of his exploits are exaggerated.

Tension Levels and the "Solid Guy"

One of the serious by-products of behavior that flirts with violence, violations of law, and a life style that produces in the time it takes to throw a punch instant victors and victims is that, carried out day-by-day, participants live lives, not of quiet desperation, but ones in which the stomach juices churn constantly. People on guard against being the butt of a local con-game, who feel the loss of prestige and status at any minute, or who live under the threat that an embarrassing or humiliating incident may brand them in the eyes of their friends as "assholes" or "jerks" or "faggots" live in a chronic state of preparedness for conflict. Their tension level remains high. Tension, then, becomes a natural state of being. And the youth involved in the everyday affairs of the street hardly recognizes the inner disquiet as tension. Evidence of it shows in nail biting, stammering, picking at open sores, and often blunt expressions that life in the neighborhood "sucks." A great number of youths live with constant anxiety as though each new encounter has the potential of erupting into a major confrontation. Under conditions where large numbers of youth and young adults lived daily with these unspecified anxieties, the social climate was conducive not only to new forms of action but was attuned to activities that might alter a personal feeling-state of tension.

It is significant that in the neighborhood under study the first reported drug used on a widespread basis was a cough syrup with a heavy codeine component. While the earliest stages of drug experimentation in the study neighborhood are historically clouded, what seems overwhelmingly clear is that the first wave of drug users were high status "solid guys" with local reputations of either "tough" or "crazy."

I will not detail how these early discoverers pioneered the various

system the very fact of their involvement in drugs made the activity a form of action fascination for a large number of "solid guys" eager to latch onto a new and reckless fad. And because the drug experience provides a pleasurable feeling-state, the sum total of the activity made an almost perfect match for the life-style of the street system. It had components of illegality to provide adventure. Young men could demonstrate their loyalties to one another in dramatic exhibits of silence. The risk to body and life inherent in ingesting a foreign or unknown substance could illustrate daring and risk. And the final pay-off was frequently a condition of well-being, often too ecstatic for verbal description.

The Military Service

I suspect that there was a time in our modern history when the kinds of young men I have described would have been ideal candidates for the military service. Their search for adventure, their love of excitement, their pleasure in fighting, their willingness even to die as a way of becoming after death the kind of hero they know is valued on the street, seems tailored to a war machine. But in the days of the Vietnam war, a new kind of cynicism about military service has emerged, not only among the resentful middle-class youth who view this particular war as illegal without the consent of Congress, but also among the dependable working-class youth who have traditionally volunteered their bodies and angers amidst patriotic slogans and sentimental farewell parties. If the young men involved in my study are representative, there appears to be among the stable working-class youth a growing dissatisfaction with the responsibilities of military service. Some of these dissatisfactions have their roots in drug-associated behavior and other dissatisfactions seem more connected to the

mismatch between street aspirations for status (based on glory) and the requirements of the military to wage a war of attrition where the military goal appears to be a body count rather than the more traditional objective of land acquisition. The very nature of the war style has raised serious questions among many of the working-class youth in the study area regarding the utility of military service as a route to gaining prestige in the civilian world of street life.

Prior to my beginning the study in 1968, a number of street influentials had already served some short or long period of military service and had come home. Almost without exception their military experience had been less than beneficial to them, both during the years of service and on their return to the community. These experiences, especially for the top level "solid guys," were discussed, almost always bitterly, so that lesser street youth developed a sour outlook as a prejudgment of what military service would probably be like. In many cases, their subsequent military careers provided supportive evidence to what they had been told. I noted a distinct difference, for example, between the stories the veterans of my generation told and those of the young men from the Vietnam experience. And the major difference was that my generation tended to screen out negative experiences and remember the good times while these young men minimized the benefits of military service and choose to speak almost exclusively of the incidents they hated, underscoring where possible the ubiquity and intensity of the evils, deceptions and hypocrisies they witnessed.

For some young men, the entry point into the military is non-voluntary, frequently a form of punishment delivered by either the court

system or the draft board. It is not uncommon for judges in district courts, especially in lower socio-economic neighborhoods, because of an absence of civilian facilities perhaps, to suggest -- which is tantamount to a court sentence -- that enlistment in the military be considered an acceptable punishment in lieu of jail. This tactic seems to be a carry-over from the old English judicial system which helped the navy, especially, to maintain its enlistment quotas. Today, in America, it may also serve a similar purpose but has the added motive of removing one "trouble maker" -- according to those who staff the court -- from both the street and the court system. Just how young men who enter military service through this route fare may be the basis for future research. At present, to the best of my knowledge at least, there has been no systematic study made. The young men I have spoken with have, almost without exception, run into difficulty and have been discharged early in their military careers under less than honorable circumstances. Some of them, in fact, were the early pioneers of the drug subsystem in the study neighborhood.

Another non-voluntary route comes through a form of punishment at the draft boards or induction centers. Evidently there are persons staffing these operations, either under official directives or with a patriotic fervor, who view any physically firm young man not eager to surrender two or more years of his life as a likely candidate to be punished via military service. When drug use is involved, the situation becomes more opaque. Indications or direct statements by young men of their unsuitability for the military are considered less than valid, as the following quote from a tape-recorded interview with a male respondent demonstrates:

So that day I went there /induction physical/. I was stoned. I said, "I'm going to make them throw me out. I ain't going." So, I was stoned. The guy /staff/ didn't want to hear nothing. He was passing me on every test. I couldn't even see the board. He'd say, "Read the chart." I could hardly see it. He says, "All right, you pass." I says, "Pass? I didn't even say it yet." They just took, they didn't know nothing. I guess they done it for spite. They knew I was trying to get out.

If the rest of the military experience had been a reversal of the beginning, it would have read like a John Wayne movie where the reluctant recruit slowly sees the blessings of the corps and ends the scenario in some heroic act in combat. In this case, however, the young man received, after an investment of staff time, mainly from the medical branch of the army, an undesirable discharge. Presently, he is serving a jail sentence on a drug-related conviction.

The failure of appropriate screening, of drawing unqualified personnel into the service, seems to have laid the groundwork for a transfer of the drug subsystem from civilian life into the military. Once into the military, young men from similar working-class backgrounds tend to collect together, not by any "natural" inclination but through planned action. And the army policy of punishing drug violators appears to provide one form of publicity necessary to identify drug users to one another. As one respondent in the air force claimed:

...Some guys got busted, you know, for smoking pot. So, I started, you know, "Wow, here we are." You know, "Junkies in the service. I finally met my kind. Let me go talk to these dudes."

Much has been said recently of drug use in the war zone of Vietnam, but I know of no study directed to the analysis of how drugs function to reduce the tension levels of men in combat areas, in much the same way drugs function in neighborhoods where reputations are built through risk-taking. According to my limited discussion with respondents who served in Southeast Asia, the comparisons of tension have a similarity, but with one very important difference. In the street system, violence is connected to settling disputes between men, carried out under unwritten rules that bind the combatants to injure only those persons connected to the core of the dispute. In Vietnam, any Oriental, so I am told by some of the returning veterans, is a potential enemy and punishing civilians -- including women and children -- whose loyalties are ambiguous does not seem to fit the picture of honor street youth have been socialized to respect. In World War II, at least according to the war films young men of this generation see on the late show, the enemies were men, fought hand-to-hand, or rifle-to-rifle, but under a code only the enemy would violate, such as employing old people, taking innocent hostages, destroying civilian homes, or, most horrifying of all, killing or maiming defenseless children. The experiences of the combat veterans of Vietnam with whom I have spoken have indicated they manage their own violations of this code in one of two ways: 1) they view all Vietnamese as potential enemies, and justify their own brutality in a street system style of defense: "I got him (them) before they got me," -- and it might be useful research to find in what magnitude and what depth, or 2) they come to identify themselves as possessing a strange mixture of irrational brutality and patriotic zeal, which frightens them. I know of one marine veteran of $4\frac{1}{2}$ years of service, part of which was served in Vietnam, who was unable to neutralize or forget his own acts

of violence against women and children and these recurring confessions were made to me at least a year before publicity on the My Lai incident. His experimentation with heroin, a rather strong tension reducer, may well have been his treatment alternative to a continual sense of war guilt and confusion rather than the help through psychiatry he spoke of seeking so often. He died, so I am told, in a furnished room in Maine where he had gone as an escape from heroin. The facts are not clear, but he was found in his bedroom with an empty bottle of methadone he had gotten from a doctor for withdrawal. Evidently, he had vomited and died as the result of asphyxiation. Both suicide and homicide were considered in the investigation, I am told, but for those of us who knew and heard him speak of his war experiences -- acts he clearly defined as crimes if they were performed in the street system of his home neighborhood -- may cause us to infer that one solution to what he called "crazy feelings" was to mask them with drugs. Military researchers might explore the ways and undercurrents these internal Nuremberg trials erode the sense of honor and eat away at strivings to maintain a constructive view of self.

I know I have already run over my allotted 30 minutes and I will not have time to raise questions on the struggles some veterans face when returning to neighborhoods where a drug subsystem contains a large portion of friends left behind. The veterans I knew, naturally, had become drug users either prior to their military service, during, or after it. I am sure there were other veterans who did not become involved with drugs, but they were outside the present scope of my study. For those who became involved with drugs and were caught by the authorities, I noted that a favorable war record was of little benefit in receiving help with a drug problem. In fact, one young marine who had been seriously wounded

in Vietnam was arrested for "being present where a narcotic drug was found." He himself admitted to beginning heroin use, perhaps twice before he was arrested. He was placed on \$25,000 bail, a figure he claimed was higher than the bail given to the big shots of the Mafia. He was committed to a maximum security hospital for observation, and subsequently placed on two-year's probation. At no time did his military service record act as a point of leverage in a reduced sentence; and no one, not even he, suggested treatment for drug use at a veterans' hospital, even though he had been released from one only a few months prior to the drug arrest.

Either through neglect or design, we have permitted a drug problem to grow. We have structured a system of cure based almost solely on punishment of individual users (and have developed an explanation of cause consistent with the punishment). With regard to the military, the civilian sector has dumped the drug problem on the services, believing, perhaps, that its special brand of discipline will in some inexplicable fashion remake young men already tailored for a street system. The military, in turn, a bit too smug about its potential for character reformation, has concluded that it cannot incorporate intoxicating substances other than alcohol into its mores or remove the punishment from its code of military justice. As a result, it has, in turn, dumped the problem back onto the civilian sector. Together, both the military and the civilian world have colluded to provide young men with war-time experiences that have apparently scrambled our society's moral order -- and this includes the moral ideologies of the street system. Without a well-formulated plan of treatment that demonstrates to young men that their society has concern for their health and well-being -- both in the military and out of it, without a significant alteration in administrative policies to permit drug

users to escape criminal designations, without a thorough revamping of our outmoded drug laws that have little relationship to a scientific understanding of the problem, the projected course of the relationship between a large segment of our youthful population and their government will be, I think, one of collision; or one of disparate directions in which young men grow increasingly cynical in their belief that bureaucratic efforts and political decisions get made, not on the citizens' behalf, but for the gain or profit of men in power.

The young men among whom I gathered my data have, for the most part, acted in good faith with their government. They may have made mistakes -- and many of them accept an archaic form of punishment for those mistakes far better than you or I would -- but they still continue to strive toward a stance of individual dignity, whether they use drugs or not. I think the goal of any effort to grapple with the drug situation must understand that the root causes lie not in the pathology of individual users, nor in the violent quality of life in the street system, but quite clearly in the relationships between individuals and the social institutions that play such an important part in shaping the sense of self, which we call an identity. Each social institution has the responsibility to examine its own social function. The task of the military, as I see it, would be to provide experiences that promote a respectable sense of self and not to confine itself solely to training young men in the instruments of war.

I would like to underscore that my comments on the interrelationships between drug use and military service have not been based on a direct study within the military system. They came from retrospective comments of

young men who had spent time in one of the services. None of them blamed their military service as the cause of their turn to drugs, even though they admitted that access to drugs compared favorably to their civilian experience. Perhaps more indirectly, they raised questions on how the military experience reinforced the aspects of their street ideology that were based on the manipulation of violence. The impact of the military tour of duty on youths' conceptions of their private moral order should be more closely examined by our psychologists and sociologists in order to understand the effects of clear training directives for war, like the one a marine veteran claimed his platoon sergeant gave, "Remember," my ex-marine respondent quoted his sergeant as saying, "You ain't nothing but a hired killer."

A DRUG PROGRAM - ITS SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

Captain James P. Gilchrist, MSC

The drug problem, or perhaps more appropriately the drug dilemma at Fort Bliss, is widespread just as it is Army-wide, and for that matter nation-wide. The purpose of this paper is to discuss a drug abuse program which was initiated with one artillery group at Fort Bliss. We will point out what has not worked for us, as well as what has been successful, and discuss implications for future programming.

In mid-February of this year, our multi-discipline team¹ at the Mental Hygiene Consultation Service, Fort Bliss, Texas, was presented with a request which said, in essence, "I have a drug problem in my unit and I want you to solve it." This statement came from a commander of a large artillery group comprised of about six battalions and their supporting units. The total population numbered approximately 5,000 men. The colonel recognized the problem as being one which could not be handled with a traditional disciplinary approach, one which was widespread, and one for which he felt the helping professions should have an answer. As a result, he called on us, "the experts." Unfortunately, we were not able to push the proverbial button for him and pull out a panacean solution to the problem of drug abuse. In our estimation, there is no single answer to the problem of drug abuse.

I think initially the commander's reaction to this was that we were holding out on him. This is quite frequently the reaction of lay people when those in the helping professions are unable to give a concrete solution.² Their viewpoint seems to be: "You are the expert, why don't you have the answer?" After finally convincing the colonel that we were not holding out on him and that there was no single answer, we proceeded to help his command formulate a multi-faceted approach to the drug situation.

It was first necessary to find out how much of a commitment the artillery group was willing to make and also to establish with the colonel a set of realistic expectations about solutions to the problem. We explained that, as mental hygienists, we could not do the whole thing.

¹Our multi-discipline team is comprised of MAJ Robert W. Conroy, M.D.; CPT John Werner, psychologist; CPT James P. Gilchrist, Social Worker; SP5 George Wallace, SP4 Lonnie Hazlewood.

²Schwartz, Felix A., "Why Do The Experts Hold Out on Us?" California's Health, Vol. 28, July & August 1970, pp. 10-11.

We would be willing to consult, assist, and advise his command. With this understanding, he assigned two young officers and an enlisted man full time to the program. One officer was a lawyer, the other an experimental psychologist, and the enlisted man was a college graduate.

With this group, we set out to design a comprehensive program on drug abuse. The conceptual model was that of Kaplan's primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention.³

To implement the program a group drug advisory team was organized. It was comprised of the three core people mentioned previously and also a drug knowledgeable volunteer from each battalion. Prior to the initiation of the program, a one day seminar was conducted at Mental Hygiene Consultation Service for the drug advisory team in which we discussed psychological, physiological, and judicial aspects of drug abuse, as well as approaches to be used when speaking about the drug question.

The area of primary prevention was to be handled by the core team and the battalion volunteer coordinators. It was their job to disseminate information to the individuals in the unit. This was done primarily through small group discussions, distribution of selected reading material, and guest speakers. The approach used was low key education not geared to scare tactics, particularly when speaking about marijuana. This approach was selected because most enlisted people in the units would not respond favorably to any type of false information or fright campaigns. They already knew a great deal about drugs. Also, it seemed to us that the use of scare tactics is the traditional Army approach, and we have no evidence that such approaches worked in the past.

The response received from the participants in the small groups was amazing. These young soldiers were eager to talk, and in most cases, it was difficult to stop the groups. In contrast, a didactic lecture format was often met with the usual bored, blank stares.

Not all of the battalions had a successful program. The most important reason why some failed was the commander. Too frequently, the commanders thought we were not using a hard enough approach and refused to sanction it except for a one hour large group lecture. Often commanders saw the only solution as throwing the abuser in the stockade, thus removing the problem from sight (or site). Most of them also believed that everyone who smokes marijuana goes on to harder drugs. In this regard, they reflect attitudes of the larger civilian society. These commanders oftentimes could not get past their emotions and really look at the problem objectively.

³Kaplan, Gerald, An Approach to Community Mental Health, New York, Grune and Stratton, 1961.

This brings us to another important point. Without unit sanction, no program, particularly as emotionally laden as this one, will work. So the first thing one must do is sell and educate the commanders. We attempted to do just this by giving lectures and attempting to promote discussions with battalion officers and senior NCO's. This portion of the program was particularly unsuccessful due to the prevailing hard line attitude and erroneous misconceptions mentioned previously. There are two possible solutions to this segment of the drug abuse problem, as we see it. One is to initiate dialogue between officers and enlisted men in an open and nonjudgmental atmosphere. One can imagine the problems in trying to break through the social distance created by chain of command in order to initiate such a program. The second solution is to advise command that, while you share some of its frustrations in working with this problem, hardline approaches do not seem to curb the problem. To the contrary, they "turn the men off," make it more covert, and break down rapport with the younger soldiers.

In the second phase of our program, secondary prevention, the aim was to identify the individuals who appeared to be in the early phases of drug abuse and attempt to resolve the drug abuse in this stage. In these cases, the individual was either called in or referred to the battalion coordinator or the core group to determine the extent of the problem and ascertain if the individual wanted help. The conversations were confidential. If, after this contact, the soldiers were considered to have a significant problem, they were referred to Mental Hygiene Consultation Service, and their unit commander was included, when appropriate.

The possible actions that could come of this contact lapse over into the tertiary aspect of the model. They were: (1) elimination from the service by means of an administrative discharge, (2) transfer to another unit, (3) rehabilitation attempts at Mental Hygiene Consultation Service, and (4) disciplinary action. In most instances, combinations of the first three alternatives were used.

The administrative discharge was used only in situations where the individual did not want to remain in the service, and where the unit believed he was a poor risk, too disruptive, or totally inadequate in his job performance. This solution posed the problem of opening "Pandora's Box" in regard to opening the door to an "easy way" out of the Army. This was immediately resolved by letting it be known that our purpose was to return men to duty, not discharge them, and presenting the facts that an administrative discharge exacts its price in future civilian life.

Disciplinary action was never recommended and could not be carried out on the basis of an interview. It was used by unit commanders on occasions where individuals were apprehended, either prior to our contact with them or subsequent to it, but not due to information we supplied. On one occasion in the beginning of the program, the Criminal Investigation Division requested that the drug advisory team divulge information

about our soldier contacts, but this was quickly corrected, thanks to the commander of the artillery group.

When the individual was referred to Mental Hygiene Consultation Service for possible rehabilitation, he was evaluated to determine what treatment plan would benefit him most. Not many of us had ever worked with people using drugs, so we made some errors. An early one was that we got preoccupied with the drug abuse and overlooked the individual. We soon learned that for every person who abuses drugs, there are as many reasons for the abuse. Working with these people is particularly difficult because they are engaged in activities which can ultimately lead to their demise, physically, emotionally, and socially. Yet when we take them into treatment, we are asking them to put up with physical and emotional pain. If you accept the assumption that the reason some of the people are abusing drugs is to cover up some of their emotions and avoid pain, you are asking in treatment for them to tolerate pain. The problem, of course, is determining what emotions they are trying to deny and to help them strengthen their coping abilities.

Not all people are hiding their emotions; some are merely seeking pleasure. This is part of what may be one of the changing mores of our society--the change from the work ethic to the pleasure ethic. Trying to help someone stop something which he finds pleasurable and which has questionable psychological and physical effects, is quite obviously an uphill fight. This is particularly true with marijuana, even if not the case for the amphetamines and barbiturates. What we attempt to do is teach responsibility; i.e., sex is pleasurable, but just because it is you don't attack every good looking female you see.

Another thing we found was that some individuals were coming to the group and using it strictly as a cover while continuing to use drugs. In these cases, we experienced the result of considerable displeasure from their units. The approach that we used with such patients was that we stressed their inability to perform their jobs, and that any harassment they received from the unit was their own responsibility, due to their blatant use of drugs. We further explained that we would not cover for them, but we would attempt to help them with their problem. We then attempted to explore their reasons for acting out in this obvious fashion. This supports another conclusion. Most of the individuals who are referred for drug abuse are also inadequate in other areas of their performance. If we only concentrate on the drug problem, we will never be able to return this man to duty as an adequate soldier.

Another important dynamic necessary to understanding the drug abuser is that of peer group pressure. These people are experiencing group pressure to continue to use drugs. Peer pressure cannot be used as an impetus for their stopping "soft drugs." It will work, to

some extent, with people "shooting" heroin, methadrine, and, to a lesser extent, with LSD. Heroin and methadrine are considered by most of the young people as being dangerous, and they would not use them.

What are our results? They are not dramatic. Of the 30 or so people we saw in the group over a period of about four months, only five were significantly helped. Our successes were primarily due to two factors. The first was the individual's sincere desire to stop, and, second, the unit's sincere interest in them as individuals. One of the persons was, in essence, self-medicating himself with amphetamines. He was a chronically depressed individual whom we medicated with anti-depressants. He is now functioning adequately.

Of the remaining people in the group, ten were able to learn to tolerate the situation they found themselves in and stopped abusing amphetamines and barbiturates. These men did not stop using marijuana completely; they used it only on weekends and occasionally during the evenings. In many instances, this may be all we can hope for due to the extent and fashionability of marijuana use among younger people. Perhaps we need to reappraise marijuana in the same light as alcohol; i.e., how it interferes with an individual's duty should be the important question. In other words, our efforts should be directed toward teaching soldiers to assume responsibility for their actions and to suffer the consequences if they don't.

The remaining 15 or so men showed no appreciable difference in their drug abuse and eventually dropped out of the group to either eventual discharge or disciplinary action.

Currently our program is in a great deal of flux, primarily because of new Mental Hygiene Consultation Service personnel coming in and others leaving. We have a new commander in the artillery group. It remains to be seen what his attitude will be toward the advisory team. We have also had an almost complete turnover in battalions as old ones ship out and others replace them. We are thus faced with the age old problem of starting over with the educational program and perhaps trying some different methods in working with battalion officers. We also have plans for setting up information and reading programs in the battalions and battery areas. The MHCS is going to be starting a new group treatment, but this time we will accept only individuals who appear to have a sincere desire to curb their drug abuse.

Effective this October, the Army will have a new drug abuse regulation (AR 600-32). The news media played it up a few weeks ago citing how the Army is becoming more lenient with the drug abuser because it is offering him rehabilitation instead of punishment, if he turns himself in.⁴ It is clear that the new Army policy on drug abuse

⁴Draft Army Regulation 600-32, "Illegal or Improper Use of Drugs."

is one which reflects to a large extent the prevailing attitudes of our larger society. The intent of the regulation is to rehabilitate individuals, but, like our civilian society, it also makes sure that if we don't succeed in that effort that we have some teeth left in the law to clout them severely.

Thus we find the regulation progressive in the sense that it talks of rehabilitation rather than punishment, but at the same time it grants "amnesty" to those who turn themselves in. "Amnesty" is what is offered to those guilty of a crime that is otherwise punishable. It talks rather strongly of the "moral implications" of drug abuse upon family and friends. What is perhaps most important for mental hygienists is that it affords the commander with considerable latitude in what action he takes with a drug abuser. He can do nothing, he can seek severe disciplinary action, or he can try some kind of rehabilitation program utilizing chaplains, legal officers, medical officers, et cetera. It is appropriate that the commander should have the prerogatives since the man belongs to his unit, and he must consider his unit as well as the individual soldier. It means that the commander is going to have to be better informed and professionally knowledgeable on the whole issue of drug abuse in making these decisions.

It is doubtful that commanders are suddenly going to be deluged with a mass of troops "turning themselves in" for amnesty and rehabilitation, but it is certain that the first brave souls of a unit who test a commander's decisions will be the ones who determine whether the problem remains covert and covered up, or whether an honest rehabilitation program stands any chance on any post. If command's attitude is really rehabilitation oriented for the majority of its drug users, it may be that the professional trouble treaters will be in for a heavy influx of demands for services.

Still another aspect of this new regulation is education. This function is an important one which must be approached in a manner that will reap benefits. We are concerned that a great deal of the education may be the hardline, scare type. To prevent this, we are moving toward becoming involved in the new postwide program on drug abuse. We are fortunate that one of the lieutenants who was in our original program in the artillery group has been asked to work fulltime in the post program.

All of us working with active duty troops have an obligation to be aware of this new regulation and become involved at least as a consultant to those responsible for the implementation of it. In this way, we will have our fingers on the pulse of the prevailing attitudes of unit commanders, be better able to work toward success with our troops, and help command achieve a program that can be truly rehabilitative, not just on paper, but also in content.

THE FORT BRAGG DRUG PROGRAM*

Raymond M. Marsh**

On September 1, 1970, the Congressional Record contained progress in treatment and rehabilitation of Army drug addicts as part of the order of business on the floor of the United States Senate. The Acting President pro tem recognized the Senator from Iowa, Mr. Hughes, who opened his statement as follows:

Mr. Hughes: "Mr. President, last Thursday and Friday three members of the Special Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Narcotics - the Senator from Colorado (Mr. Dominick), the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Schweiker), and I - visited Fort Bragg, N.C., to see in operation the Army's only project in this country for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts within its ranks. We were inspired, and our hopes were raised by what we saw."

This morning during the time allotted me I would like to describe to you the drug program currently in operation at Fort Bragg that resulted in its mention on the floor of the United States Senate and became a news item in the NBC News Report.

This will primarily be a description of the program with very little critique and/or editorial comment. As preliminary remarks, I should mention, however, that the program has been in operation for only approximately four months. Because I have personally witnessed only two months of the actual program operation I will rely heavily on letters, memoranda, and various other reports that have been generated by various officials associated with the planning and development of the program. Later in this conference I will participate in the "action laboratory." My assignment for that session of this course is to provide you with suggestions on setting up a "drug program" on an Army post, using my experiences at Fort Bragg as a point of reference. At that time I will identify operational and planning problems in Fort Bragg's program, recommend possible alternatives and offer suggestions to those of you who in the future may be able to institute a "drug program." Perhaps another remark should be made prior to launching into the description of the program. Because the Fort Bragg program has received considerable publicity, there has been a tendency among both professional officers at Fort Bragg and my colleagues at other posts to be somewhat critical of the efforts and "claims" being made regarding the appropriateness and effectiveness of the rehabilitative aspects of the program. At the risk of

*A paper presented at Current Trends in Army Social Work, Denver, Colorado, September 1970.

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sounding somewhat defensive in behalf of those who originated and implemented the program, it should be made abundantly clear that the program is in no way being set forth as a model one. It simply represents an effort on behalf of concerned officials at one Army installation to deal with a complicated societal problem. When the rehabilitation program was instituted and at every presentation by the staff where the program was discussed, its limitations were set forth. As Senator Hughes stated in his address on the Senate floor on 1 September:

"Mr. President, this is strictly an experimental program and, for that reason, no one need expect dramatic statistics or news of a spectacular cure out of Fort Bragg perhaps for some time to come."

In early 1970 the Commanding General of the XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Lieutenant General John J. Tolson III, became increasingly alarmed at what appeared to him to be a substantial increase in the use of illegal drugs in the Fort Bragg and Fayetteville, N.C. area. The General was mainly concerned with the usage of the so-called "dangerous drugs" (opiates and amphetamines). An increase in the number of patients admitted to Womack Army Hospital with hepatitis and overdoses of drugs along with an increase in illegal drug traffic as reported by military and civilian police were other indications that drug abuse within the community was becoming a severe problem. Pat Reese, a staff writer for the Fayetteville Observer and an ex-drug addict considered an authority on the local "drug scene and counter culture," reinforced General Tolson's concern by reporting to him that there had been an increase in the availability of heroin in the community when "Operation Intercept" at the Mexican border resulted in the decrease in the availability of marijuana. The General was assured that drugs of all kinds were readily available in the community and in fact were being used excessively by members of his command.

In March of 1970 General Tolson directed that a coordinated three-prong attack be launched against the extensive and growing problem of drug abuse at Fort Bragg and in the surrounding civilian community. This was to include law enforcement, education and rehabilitation.

In the civilian community, the Cumberland County/Fort Bragg Commission on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs was appointed. An exception was made to Department of Army policy and two officers from Fort Bragg were permitted to accept positions on this politically appointed body. This commission composed of city and county officials and representatives of Fort Bragg is responsible to the county government. The commission has an advisory committee chaired by the Deputy Chief of Staff G1 and is composed of 20 members of the civilian and military community representing an array of social and governmental agencies. The commission is just now becoming operational and the advisory committee is still in the planning stage. The commission's efforts as of this time have resulted in a 3-day seminar on Drug Abuse Education

sponsored by the Civics Club. Additionally, the commission has established "Friendship House" in downtown Fayetteville. This drop-in "haven" for the "strung-out" or disenchanted youth is to be open on a 24-hour basis and governed by a board consisting of drug users and abusers. It is part of a more elaborate community-wide drug abuse program that hopefully will be financed with federal monies. Friendship House is just now opening with volunteer staff - pending Congressional appropriation of a \$270,000 grant.

Within the military community the three-prong attack on drug abuse directed by the Commanding General was implemented with the Corps G1 being given staff supervision of the comprehensive effort. The post Provost Marshal was given the responsibility for the law enforcement effort. The Director of Education was given the responsibility for developing and coordinating the educational program, and the Hospital Commander was charged with the responsibility for the rehabilitation effort. This rehabilitation effort was delegated to the Chief of the Department of Psychiatry & Neurology and was developed and implemented under the specific professional direction of Major Richard L. Crews. This portion of the program was dubbed "Operation Awareness" and will be described later in this paper. It should be pointed out that despite the fact that the rehabilitation portion of the community-wide effort has received favorable publicity, other activities and treatment for the "drug abuser" are at least equal in importance to the Fort Bragg program and an effort will be made to include all of them.

Again rather than presenting historical material and rationale for the development of these current programs during this presentation, only the description of the present program as it currently exists will be viewed. Perhaps during the Action Laboratory Friday morning, highlights of the history and rationale for the development of the present program can be discussed in relation to processes and growing pains of instituting any new or innovating program.

The Deputy Chief of Staff, G1, formed a coordinating committee with representation from all major commands located at Fort Bragg. As a consequence of regular weekly meetings, three general areas of concern were brought under close examination. The chairman of the committee has the general attitude that persuasion is preferable to coercion and consequently efforts to sensitize representatives from major commands to problems of drug abuse are as much an effort during these meetings as is the stated objective of coordinating and communicating activities and efforts of the drug abuse program on the post. This committee continues to meet regularly and because of personnel turnover the importance of the committee continues to be an important vehicle for communication and coordination.

Before describing the programs developed to launch the three-prong attack on drug abuse, it is important to know that General Tolson made two important decisions that made major changes in the manner in which the drug addict is treated. First an informal amnesty program was instituted.

Any soldier who voluntarily requests treatment because of illegal use of drugs is granted immunity from investigation and prosecution. The second exception the Commanding General made to Army Regulations was the opportunity for a soldier to be rehabilitated rather than to be separated from the Army administratively.

LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS OF THE DRUG ABUSE PROGRAM:

The law enforcement effort is a two-prong attack on the abuse of what are considered dangerous drugs. The two prongs are focused on drug traffic on the installation and cooperation and coordination of military policing with civilian authorities. The Narcotics Team (NAARCO Team) is employed under the operational control of the Commanding Officer of the 3d Military Police Company (CI). The team is composed of one accredited criminal investigator and six Provost Marshal investigators (plainclothes military policemen). This team provides support to an organization in the civilian community known as the Interagency Bureau of Narcotics (IBN). This interagency is composed of members of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, Cumberland County Sheriffs Department, and the Fayetteville City Police Department as well as the CID team mentioned earlier. This team was actually formed in October, 1968 and since its inception has made approximately 400 drug arrests. A Fact Sheet from the Office of the Provost Marshal, XVIII Airborne Corps, lists the following advantages of forming the IBN:

- a. The agency can cross city/county lines because of its composition.
- b. There can be a free-flow of information among narcotic agents of the various law enforcement offices. Because the various agents have their own means of receiving confidential reports, the amount of information generated by pooling all efforts is greatly increased.
- c. Identification and criminal files are available to all members of the IBN and therefore duplication of effort is minimized. This program is unique in the State of North Carolina and is still considered a pilot program by the Governor's office.

THE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM:

Beginning in mid-1968 drug abuse educational effort at the company level was instituted. The GI's coordinating committee scrutinized this program and generally agreed that it had been ineffective, or certainly it had not been well received by the troops. Responsibility for conducting drug abuse lectures had been delegated as an additional duty to some junior officers who knew little about drug abuse problems much less the types of drugs being abused. For the most part lectures were handled in a perfunctory manner and had little command interest. In June of 1970 the first step in a renewed effort in the educational endeavor began when a panel of eight, including two ex-addicts, conducted four seminars for the

major unit commanders and staff officers at Fort Bragg. This was part of an overall campaign of the Drug Abuse Coordinating Committee to re-think educational effort and to define target audiences that would be receptive to presentation of drug abuse information. As a result three target groups were identified: Senior officers (majors and above); company grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers; and the young enlisted soldiers.

There appeared a need for better understanding of the use and effects of drugs and to clarify problems related to drugs. It was felt that this first target group needed to be stimulated in its desire to know more about drugs and drug abuse. The senior officers and NCOs have educational needs similar to those of the middle-aged civilian. Experience revealed that educational efforts directed at the young soldier, however, should be less formal, more intimate, and responsive to his immediate need for knowledge. "Rap sessions" where drug users or ex-addicts could exchange information and answer questions appeared to be the most logical way to respond to the young soldier's needs.

Based on the experience of the Post Drug Committee formed by the G1, major unit commanders were directed to initiate comprehensive drug abuse educational programs for their units. The responsibility for and the major involvement with unit level drug abuse education remains in the hands of the major unit commanders. However, a subcommittee of the Post Drug Committee at the post level Educational Steering Committee was formed that provides commanders with consultation services and programs to assist in the difficult task of developing and carrying out effective drug abuse education. This subcommittee meets each week and directs its efforts toward planning of resources and monitors and evaluates the impact of the educational activities with the main units.

In addition to reviewing proposed programs submitted by unit commanders in behalf of their educational efforts, attempts have been made toward the development of the concept of "Awareness Counselors." As now conceived, the "Awareness Counselor" would be a relatively mature young individual with some college education, preferably in behavioral science, and a representative from the unit which he would serve. He would not necessarily be in the chain of command but would represent a unit and would be willing to volunteer some segments of off-duty time. He must have a desire to participate in the program designed to help young people either on individual or group basis. He will need to undergo a period of training in matters of drug abuse and drug abuse education as well as some aspects of personal interviewing and counseling, knowledge of community and its surroundings. In his role as Awareness Counselor it is hoped that he will help fill the manpower shortage that exists in carrying out unit level educational programs. In addition, the Awareness Counselor would complement the treatment and rehabilitation program conducted by the psychiatric staff at the hospital. Hopefully, the Awareness Counselor would be an informal resource in the unit to commanders as well as to young soldiers regarding drug abuse education, drug abuse treatment resources, etc. The Awareness Counselor concept was born only a few

weeks ago and is not yet operationalized.

The 82d Airborne Division was the first major unit to develop and to implement an educational program (the Awareness Counselor concept is not a part of that program as yet). Nevertheless their program reflects the experience accumulated by the Division Chaplain. That particular individual (Chaplain McCullough) has been an active participant in the drug program at Fort Bragg from its very inception and provides leadership in the civilian community. He, perhaps more than any other single person, has brought the need for a comprehensive drug abuse program to the attention of command. The 82d Airborne Division's educational program as developed can be briefly described as follows: A one-hour panel discussion to commanders and troop leaders of each battalion (the panel consists of the: Division Surgeon, Division Psychiatrist, Staff Judge Advocate, Criminal Investigators, Division Chaplain, and two former/or actual drug abusers).

A panel discussion aimed at E5s and below in company-size groups is scheduled for a period of 90 minutes. This panel consists of a medical officer, chaplain, and four former/actual drug users/abusers. Further, an on-going program of open-end discussions and personal counseling on a volunteer basis will be conducted in the evenings at the Social Activities Room of the Division Chapel. Films on the dangers of drug abuse are planned to be shown weekly, followed by a discussion group. As the evening program proceeds, it is envisioned that perhaps the Division Psychiatrist, and other medical officers as well as other division personnel, will be included in the evening programs. Chaplain McCullough has had approximately one year's experience in conducting such programs during which time he accumulated a great deal of information about the extent of the drug problem in the Fort Bragg/Fayetteville area. As a matter of fact, the inclusion of a general officer in civilian clothes in one of these sessions was instrumental in making such an impact on the need for a special effort regarding the drug abuse problem at Fort Bragg. The 82d Airborne Division's current educational program will be an all-out effort to include the 86 company-size units in the Division in a matter of weeks. However, a permanent educational program will be integrated into the in-processing schedule of the Division Replacement Detachment for all incoming personnel.

TREATMENT/REHABILITATION PROGRAM

Rehabilitation aspect of the drug abuse program has been made the responsibility of the MEDDAC Director and it is fashioned after the so-called "clinical model." The treatment programs were conceived, organized, designed and administered by individuals of the psychotherapeutic professions. There is a recognition among this group of professionals that drug abuse is not necessarily an illness, or in some cases not even a symptom of psychological maladaptation. It is difficult to describe the treatment program at Fort Bragg because it is not only a varied one but is changed frequently, depending on the particular personnel assigned to the various medical units and their individual approach in treating individuals who abuse drugs. It must

be remembered that Fort Bragg has three major units that have a psychiatrist assigned to them and they are all involved in treatment programs. These include: 82d Airborne Division, the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance and Womack Army Hospital. Within Womack Army Hospital there are two treatment activities in Operation Awareness that offer treatment to persons with drug problems (these will be described in detail later).

The staff psychiatrist at the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance and the Division psychiatrist of the 82d Airborne Division are not under the operational control of the Chief of Psychiatry and Neurology of Womack Army Hospital. Therefore, they are freer to develop their own particular drug abuse treatment modalities and referral policies for inpatient care at Womack.

At the present time the 82d Airborne Division is staffed with one psychiatrist, one social work officer and several social work technicians. Patients with drug abuse problems who are treated by the outpatient service are handled as any other individuals referred with personal adjustment problems. That is, the traditional approach of Mental Hygiene Consultation Service work is pretty much the order of the day - a history taken, a psychiatric interview conducted, a unit contact made and a rehabilitative effort or administrative discharge recommended; whichever seems to be the most beneficial to the individual and the services as judged by the psychiatrist, social worker and the commander. The social worker and the Division psychiatrist also participate in rap sessions of the educational program developed by the Division Chaplain described earlier in the paper.

The psychiatrist in the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance has a very limited outpatient practice because he is primarily a staff physician. His approach is primarily one of viewing the drug abuser as having an adjustment problem or as being a victim of our larger society's pathology. Because of the nature and mission of that organization, the role of the psychiatrist and disposition of the drug abuser is somewhat different than other units at Fort Bragg. The psychiatrist in that unit has no staff and functions where emphasis is on prevention - an aspect of the drug abuse problem to which he is firmly committed.

While Operation Awareness is an arm of Mental Hygiene Consultation Service, it is physically removed from that office and most of the personnel have not been integrated into the psychiatric staff at Womack Army Hospital. The MHCS personnel, however, support Operation Awareness in a number of ways. Most significant is that the Chief of the MHCS conducts group psychotherapy with the inpatients in Operation Awareness.

Operation Awareness is the program which has received the most attention by MEDDAC personnel, has had considerable publicity, and is generally thought of as "the Fort Bragg Drug Abuse Program." It is housed in two wards in the old hospital area. One ward consists of a closed psychiatric type ward and

the other ward is called the "Rap House" where out-patient and community activities are headquartered.

The in-patient service treatment program consists of an initial detoxification phase during which time the patient is getting drugs out of his system. Medication may be prescribed to ease the emotional tensions and physical discomforts.

A toxicology program has been established to monitor "patients backsliding."

A major feature of the rehabilitation effort centers on the implementation of an elaborate "points system" based on an operant conditioning psychological learning theory model. This model was instituted because of the belief that:

"The patients require a clearly outlined, closely supervised set of constructive and organized expectations which can be administered in a fair, objective and positive way; leading them toward learning a psychologically and behaviorally organized life and developing emotional strengths to maintain appropriate life patterns later on. A patient can earn points by engaging in various constructive activities and can spend points for various recreational opportunities and privileges. The operant conditioning point system is comprehensive enough to cover a 24-hour period, 7-day week, work, recreation, sleep schedule and yet it is supposedly clear, objective and simple enough to administer."¹

In addition to the points system, a special aversive conditioning procedure is utilized with the specific goal of helping the patient get over the urge to use a needle. A room on the ward has been set aside as "the shoot-up gallery" or "Crews' Pad." In a word "the shoot-up gallery" represents a recreation of the so-called drug scene within the closed medical treatment facility. The gallery consists of a closed room painted black with mattresses on the floor for seating. During "shoot-up times," there is loud hip music, psychedelic art, darkness and a quality of secretness both in terms of the physical setting and the manner in which the doctor administers drugs for the self-administered injections. The attempt here is to give negative value to using a needle to take narcotics by requiring the patient to "shoot up" twice a week in a setting as similar as possible to the one that he might be in when using drugs outside the hospital. The pharmacologic agents ideally duplicate the feeling of the drug experience but this is followed by a period of significant aversion. Ipecac is dropped in a soft drink at the same time that a drug selected by the physician is "shot up." The patient gets a "high" from the drug for a few minutes followed after 15 to 30 minutes by the onset

¹Richard L. Crews "Status Report on Operation Awareness," 4 August 1970. (In the files of the Chief of Psychiatry and Neurology, Womack Army Hospital, Fort Bragg, North Carolina),

of nausea from the ipecac. The nausea lasts several hours. Based on the belief that a random schedule of reinforcement is a more potent determinant of behavior than regular reinforcement, approximately 15 to 75 percent of the patients get the drug and ipecac at each session; the rest get placebos. It is assumed that patients elect to take part in the "shoot-up" sessions because they receive points or a change in privilege status, and because it has developed social stimulus value on the ward just as it has on the outside.

The elaborate points system and the increasing demands and privileges the patient is given as he progresses through the program will not be discussed. For those of you who may be interested, there is a 19-page booklet that outlines this rather complicated portion of the ward routine and can be attained upon request from Operation Awareness. The patient graduates and is eligible to leave the program when he has met the requirements of the points system as interpreted by the director of the program. This should take at least 12 weeks, however, and as of this writing there have been no graduates. It is anticipated, however, that several people will graduate some time in the near future.

Other treatments and rehabilitative aspects of the program are not as unique as the operant conditioning and aversive conditioning procedures. Included is group therapy twice a week by a "visiting psychiatrist" - that is, a psychiatrist who is not directly involved with other aspects of the drug program. He simply comes in and goes to the conference room and patients must buy his services with the points they have earned during the week. Those patients who do not elect to spend points for receiving this treatment are free to engage in other activities or busy themselves earning points so they can spend them in any manner that they choose. The concept of "work therapy" has been instituted and patients are placed in various jobs within the hospital or post where they can engage in useful activities during the day and at the same time earn points, depending on the quality of their performance while working. Special attention is given to educational needs and at the present time a program is being developed where the exception will be made to Project Transition and patients will be able to participate in that job training program despite the fact that they may otherwise not be qualified. The command consultation portion of the program as of this time is limited to providing avenues for smooth and informative liaison with the patient, his unit, and the hospital. When the Awareness Counselor concept becomes a reality, opportunity to influence these activities should enhance both the educational program and command consultation.

The "rap house" housed in a ward adjacent to the closed ward is a fairly attractive drop-in lounge facility that is used as a source of counseling and education about drugs. Activities in that building got underway only a few weeks ago and at the present time they consist of an outpatient service for drug abuse. Group therapy and management of patients on the waiting list for admission to the closed ward are the primary activities at this time. Command consultation, some activities of the Educational Steering Committee, and a 24-hour drop-in lounge staffed by social work specialists are now beginning in this building.

This concludes a description of the Fort Bragg program. I have attempted to present the full range of activities without a detailed account of any one program. Because of the comprehensive nature of community effort and the complexity of the organizational structure within the military community, coordination of the activities is through necessity a momentous task. While much has been done at Fort Bragg, more formidable tasks remain before the ideas of successfully treating and preventing drug abuse can become a reality.

ESTABLISHING A DRUG PROGRAM ON AN ARMY POST -
REFLECTION ON THE FORT BRAGG EXPERIENCE*

LTC Raymond M. Marsh**

My assignment today is to provide you with practical guidance and suggestions in setting up a drug program at your local post. Specifically I have been asked to use the "Bragg experience" as a basis for my remarks - what our experience has taught us and how you may benefit from it in the event you become involved in a similar effort in your military communities.

Changing community resources is not simple. As a matter of fact, it is perhaps the most difficult task in the practice of community organization or social planning. Of course, it is easier in communities where a central authority can direct change - easier - but not easy. There is ample knowledge in the study of human relations; small group behavior; community theory and in organizational theory to help us understand the human and organizational resistance to change. This conference last year studied the "General Systems Approach" and here the participants were exposed to theory that explains the organizational "resistance" phenomenon. I have been warned by your program chairman not to approach my assignment this morning from a theoretical stance but to conform to the spirit of the "action laboratory," so I will not go further into theory. I want to suggest that you re-read the proceedings of last year's conference. During the past ten years a number of papers have been given in the conference that are relevant and may be helpful in instituting any new program. May I suggest, therefore, that you selectively review the past conferences' proceedings.

The first point I want to make is that it is absolutely essential that the Commanding General either approves or actively supports the idea of establishing a drug abuse program. His staff Officers and the operators of the program cannot assume that everyone in the command will actively support the program, and that the program will be implemented swiftly, efficiently, and with adequate resources. Of course we all use our commander's name, some times as a threat, to stimulate a recalcitrant bureaucrat to support us, but at the time we do so we really know that the apparent threat is only a technique of persuasion and it is not as coercive as it may initially appear. The Post Committee on Drug Abuse formed by G1 at Fort Bragg is a sound administrative structure to deal with the complexity of their drug abuse program. Coordination, communication, coercion and persuasion can all be used in an effective non-threatening manner by the skillful chairman of that group.

* A paper presented at Current Trends in Army Social Work, Denver, Colorado, September 1970.

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At Fort Bragg the composition of the Post Drug Abuse Committee includes representatives from all major units on post. They are not a homogeneous group. The committee consists of 25 members with representation from all major units on post. Representatives from Pope Air Force Base also are asked to attend. For the most part, members of the committee are program operators; however, command and special staff officers are also represented. Achieving a consensus on issues and program activities with this varied group is not easy, but at least efforts are made to do so. Weekly meetings of this committee facilitate routine organizational matters, and with the rapid turnover of personnel, these meetings also serve to facilitate the integration of the new members of the committee into the drug abuse program. Weekly meetings also serve to remind all concerned of the emphasis and importance given the program. Despite the fact that representatives of the committee who have attended for long periods may feel frustrated because of the time involved and the repetitiveness of the content of material discussed, it nonetheless is necessary to effect a coordinated effort of this comprehensive program. The chairman of the committee (Deputy G1) believes that "change" is a process and this understanding is reflected in his leadership of the committee. One other organizational aspect of this committee is important. The chairman of the committee must occupy a position in the hierarchical structure that gives him "walk-in privileges" to the commander. This not only insures that the committee can be immediately responsive to the commander's desires, but it also facilitates quick resolutions of operational and planning problems.

The presentation thus far assumes that a comprehensive community program on drug abuse will be instituted and, of course, this necessarily means changes in community resources and may include the reordering of priorities and resource allocations within the command. There has been an impact of the drug abuse program at Fort Bragg on other activities particularly within the hospital. The Hospital Commander, Colonel Richard B. Austin III, in a report to the Commanding General included the following impacts Operation Awareness had at Womack Army Hospital: functional non-availability for 212s, 206s, and conscientious objectors was invoked; dependent inpatient psychiatric care was terminated; outpatient psychiatric care for dependents was curtailed; number of staff conferences was reduced; professional staff time spent supervising social work technicians was abbreviated.

It is important to realize that to institute a community-wide program requires resources - scarce resources. Note that Colonel Austin, the MEDDAC Director, did not list money, supplies and physical facilities. He could have because they too are crucial in his overall operation. The time that highly qualified personnel devote to one program can be catastrophic to other activities. Fort Bragg's program has resulted in an ambitious endeavor - but I would like to suggest to you that even a much smaller endeavor will result in a heavy demand on your professional time. Both Major Richard Crews and I have found it difficult to leave other ongoing programs unsupervised,

although this has sometimes been necessary. Working after duty hours or on weekends for many is routine and is expected.

In my presentation on Tuesday I deliberately avoided a detailed account of all activities on the closed ward (Operation Awareness) and the administrative problems of instituting and operating that ward. Major Richard Crews, who directs that program, has referred to it as "Mission Impossible." It is exciting to me in the sense that the Commanding General and the Hospital Commander are supporting a unique and innovative idea. (That is, the use of operant theory on the closed ward.) (Operant conditioning is, of course, not unique, but the combination of the total program effort currently underway in the old hospital area, along with planned activities referred to Tuesday, are unique). To work in an environment that permits the opportunity to experiment is gratifying. Major Crews is interested in a new and different approach in treating drug addicts and consequently has embarked on a difficult task. He is actively supported by all of us. From a practical stance, however, I would not recommend that a similar undertaking be done at other Army posts at this time. Rather, I suggest that a strategy for developing a program be undertaken with less ambitious goals. Perhaps the inpatient service could consist of a detoxification program with some supportive-type therapy. This could easily be complemented with an aggressive command consultation program. (When I refer to command consultation, I am not referring to just the "Caplan Model," but to one which also embraces sociological concepts.)

For those of you who are not discouraged by my remarks and would like to benefit or add to Major Crews' experience, you should contact us at Fort Bragg for a more detailed account of his experiences.

The experiences at Fort Bragg have demonstrated that if an amnesty program and treatment facility are to be developed, they must provide the commander some avenue to channel the soldier who is physically addicted and yet from a psychiatric point of view may not necessarily be a good candidate for rehabilitation. Such individuals are problems to their unit commanders because the usual administrative separation is no longer a routine means of disposition. The hospital should not require the commander to provide them with drug abusers who must meet an elaborate set of qualifications in order to be admitted. It is my suggestion, therefore, that your program be tailored so that it is sensitive to commander's needs as well as to the individual. Not only does a detoxification program along with other psychotherapeutic activities incorporate this concept, but it also provides for a highly visible program that allows every patient to be successfully treated. To be sure, the objectives are necessarily limited - but it provides a base from which to expand or change, depending on the local need, and at the same time it provides a service that can be easily understood by the community.

Wherever possible I think existing organizational structures should be used to support your program. In my opinion, it is appropriate to develop a drug program just as it is appropriate to establish any number of specialized treatment programs. But that does not mean other activities should be down-

graded and established policies and procedures pertaining to them disregarded. As a matter of fact, utilization, exchange of resources, and collaboration with other community resources is an excellent way to mobilize support for your program. The 82d Airborne Division's educational program, discussed Tuesday, is an excellent example to illustrate the use of existing structures and relationships to implement a new program.

The reference to the 82d Airborne Division educational program introduces my next point. In my judgment, the Army Chaplains are a valuable resource, a resource the Army social work community has for too long formally ignored. They are frequently involved in more social welfare activities than the average clinical social worker. There are enough social welfare problems on most posts to go around to all of the "helping professions" and I urge you to actively seek the support and help of your chaplains. My experience has been that most chaplains are just as willing to learn as social workers. Both professionals, however, may need to be oriented on drugs and social problems resulting from their illegal use and/or abuse.

Incidentally, you will no doubt find that basic drug educational programs may also be needed in orienting medical personnel as well as all other potential or new staff members. Major Crews assumes this responsibility in Operation Awareness, and due to the frequency with which he is required to orient new personnel or visitors, he has developed an effective presentation. A book entitled Drug Abuse: Escape to Where, published by Smith, Kline and French Laboratories, serves as an excellent supplement to the formal presentation and later as a handy reference for the persons working in the drug program. This book is available at \$2.00 per copy and can be obtained from the National Educational Association, Publication-Sales Department, 1201 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 (Stock Number 244-07816). There is a steady growth in the number and variety of articles, books, films, pamphlets, and other educational aids. The staff at Bragg has spent considerable time in reviewing these educational aids and trying to determine their appropriateness in the educational program. Plans are now underway to maintain a central reference file in order to make them more readily accessible. This is an important aspect of an overall community effort and I suggest that your drug program include it.

My presentation today has assumed that setting up a drug program will be a total military-community effort. It is to be understood, of course, that a specialized clinical treatment program can be instituted within the hospital or medical treatment facility. Existing personnel and facilities can be used without necessarily planning with other social agencies in the military and civilian community. Such programs will necessarily have limited objectives completely remedial in nature and with limited opportunity to incorporate preventive measures. Developing such a program has merit provided its long-range purpose is to demonstrate a need for a more comprehensive community approach and/or to sensitize the staff and key military personnel to the drug abuse problem.

Time does not permit for a detailed presentation of all the problems and issues that may need to be addressed or resolved when a military community is establishing a drug abuse program. I would like to mention some additional problems, however, that are of concern to many of us associated with the Fort Bragg Drug Abuse Program:

1. There is a bias in many officers' and senior non-commissioned officers' minds as to whether the Army should be engaged in such social welfare activities as drug abuse programs. Disregarding the Army's experience and benefits associated with administering the Civilian Conservation Corps camps, these individuals feel that the military community should be mission-oriented and civilian agencies should be expected to cope with our societal problems.

2. The implication of a local, informal amnesty program regarding soldiers' legal rights in subsequent investigations and prosecution is a genuine concern of unit commanders and JAG officers.

3. There is not a consensus among the medical staff as to the best method to treat drug addicts and/or drug abusers. The dangers or desirability of the use of some illegal drugs are also frequently debated.

4. The technique of utilization of drug addicts in the educational program occasionally presents problems. These patients are a great resource - and they can communicate far more effectively with the young soldier than some of us who are older and less intimately knowledgeable about the drug culture. The desirability of using them repeatedly in formal presentations and in rap sessions, however, has been questioned.

5. Most of us are concerned with our inability to define precisely the nature of the drug abuse problem in our communities. One survey has been conducted at Fort Bragg in an effort to determine the prevalence of drug abuse and plans are underway to refine the instruments used and to conduct further studies. We are still far from arriving at a precise description of the problem and the development of remedial and preventive measures.

I am fully aware that I have not given suggestions on how to set up a rationally designed program. Nonetheless, I hope that you will benefit from the experiences at Fort Bragg as they have been presented to you this week. In closing, let me repeat again that while we are very excited about the possibilities of the program at Fort Bragg, it is not presented as an effective program. I believe that it is a most useful effort, however, and holds the potential of being effective. Pat Reese, a staff writer for the Fayetteville Observer, has told me when discussing the possible impact of our efforts that its very existence is comforting to the drug abuser because they provide him with an option for help although he may never elect to use them. Efforts to rehabilitate the drug user are significant also because they represent the Army's admission that they have a drug problem and symbolize their commitment to help the addict as opposed to routine administrative separation from the service.

COMMANDER'S BRIEFING: OUR MORAL HERITAGE SERIES

1. Introduction

(3 minutes)

Sir: I am Chaplain Day. (The briefing chaplain will introduce himself in two or three sentences so as to clearly identify himself to the Commander whom he is addressing.)

The purpose of this briefing is to introduce you to the new Character Guidance instructional materials which will replace the "Duty-Honor-Country" Series. The new series is called "Our Moral Heritage" and will go into effect 1 July 1970.

The "Our Moral Heritage" Series subscribes to those principles which have undergirded the Character Guidance Program from its inception. Those principles are basically the traditional Judaeo-Christian values which find common acceptance in all moral systems. They contribute to a deeper understanding of the long range goals of the program, which are:

First, to contribute to the soldier's understanding and appreciation of the dignity and value of the individual;

Second, to help the individual soldier practice the arts of self-discipline;

Third, to increase the sense of personal responsibility in all members of the military community.

The new series is prepared to meet the same basic goals as have characterized the program from the beginning: helping the individual soldier come to terms with the moral problems that face him in his personal life. Since World War II, Character Guidance has been the Army's vehicle for facing some of the personal problems of each generation of soldiers. The Army of Occupation after the Second World War was confronted with record highs in venereal disease and AWOL rates. With the inception of Universal Military Training in 1947, the need for some form of character education was imperative. The Character Guidance Program was begun in this UMT context as a series of "Citizenship and Morality Talks." This involvement of the chaplain in the soldier's training was a new approach. It was directed to the individual soldier as being capable of personal responsibility for moral decisions. The success of these early talks was so evident that in September 1947 they were adopted Army-wide by direction of the Secretary of War. The talks were called "The Chaplain's Hour."

In 1951, the discussion topics became the "Duty-Honor-Country" Series of the Character Guidance Program. In the early 1950's the

discussion topics dealt with the moral basis of citizenship. The defection of a number of American soldiers during the Korean Conflict called for a response by the Army. The result was a renewed emphasis in Character Guidance on the individual soldier's moral responsibilities to himself, his friends, his home, and his country.

Today, new problems challenge the Army. Many of these problems are created by the fast changes in our society. They affect morale in the Army as well as the morale of our society as a whole. Character Guidance instruction must continue to address itself to the soldier and his personal moral values as he wrestles with the new problems of his generation. This generation is involved with behavior more subtle than sex and whisky. They are challenged by drugs, dissent, and divisiveness.


This new generation of young Americans are the products of the communication explosion of the last two decades. They are better educated, more outspoken, and more independent in their thinking. Recognition of these facts led to the development of the "Our Moral Heritage" Series. We hope it will be a tool to bridge this communications gap with the soldier of the seventies. Both the content and the instructional techniques of the revised materials are aimed at discussing more freely and effectively with the soldier in the classroom.

2. Explanation

(10 minutes)

a. Content of the new series.

NOTE: Expose Visual #1



Let me touch briefly on the content of the "Our Moral Heritage" Series. It is based upon the recognition that our American society is a diversified culture unique to the world. It is pluralistic: people of varied races, national groups, and religions maintaining much of their racial, national, and religious identities. We no longer speak of a melting pot producing homogeneous Americans but rather of unity with diversity. This unity which binds us together as a nation of diversities is partly a result of these unifying moral values. Americans of all colors, classes, and religions do have something in common: a "social cement" of basic moral purposes. This moral heritage is a body of ideals about

human relations. They are essentially principles of social ethics that have been worked out in our national history by people of widely varied backgrounds. In terms of the content of the new series of Character Guidance discussion topics, this fact demands that certain subjects be discussed.

NOTE: Expose Visual #2.

FIRST YEAR TOPICS

My Country
The Real Person
Responsibility
Endurance
My Birthright
Fair Play

Ambition
Social Concern
Personal Freedom
Common Sense
Self-Discipline
Marriage-Go-Round

Visual #2

These topics are the means for helping the new generation of soldiers make moral commitments to the values that are basic to our democratic society.

b. Reasons for the new approach.

NOTE: Expose Visual #3. 2^A *Send yr. Subject*

THE NEW GENERATION

has

A NEW STYLE OF LIFE

Visual #3

The reasons for the new approach to value education lie in the emerging style of life of the youth of America. The generation gap is more than anything else a value crisis in this continuing development of American culture. The young soldier is part of a new generation whose style of life in many ways is a sharp break with the past. This leads to a questioning of many traditional values. To reach him and to share our mutual concerns will require on our part a break with the traditional methods of character education. He will not respond to being lectured to or "preached at." Thus, the need for real dialogue with the soldier on questions of values and morality is more compelling than ever before. This requirement for discussion and dialogue explains the new classroom technique which is being written into the new material.

c. Format of the New Material.

NOTE: Expose Visual #4

DISCUSSION THEME:

"Responsibility...."

TEACHING POINTS:

1. Communication, key to responsibility
 2. Responsibility requires decisions
 3. Evaluate your responsibilities
- Visual #4

The instructor is first confronted with the Discussion Theme. Our example is taken from the new series and the subject is "Responsibility." The Discussion Theme gives the instructor the objective he will seek with his class: "Responsibility is a process of decision-making which helps a person meet his obligations." As we look briefly at the format of the new materials, let me emphasize the purposes they are designed to serve. They are written for the instructor so that he can elicit maximum participation by the soldier. The materials are designed for open discussion within the boundaries of the subject, and they permit the instructor latitude in his planning for the discussion.

Under the Discussion Theme are the Teaching Points. These

provide the broad parameters within which the discussion will move. They are the major points to be emphasized by the instructor. However, he can be quite flexible. Thus he can readily relate this material to the needs of the local military situation.

NOTE: Expose Visual #5

QUESTION: What is an easy way to avoid making a decision?

DISCUSS: Acceptable behavior can be demonstrated without exercising the power of personal decision.

Visual #5

These teaching points are developed by a question and answer technique. The heart of the technique is to use the questions to elicit discussion on the topic under consideration. This structure is designed to enable the instructor - in discussing responsibility - to generate dialogue about what makes for responsible behavior. The instructor should put these statements and questions in terms and language best suited to the needs of soldiers in their day-to-day situation. He is required to make a lesson plan that will meet the objective of the topic.

NOTE: Expose Visual #6

GUIDANCE TO THE INSTRUCTOR

This guidance to the instructor is one of the safeguards against the new teaching technique becoming a gripe session.

Visual #6

In preparing the lesson plan, the instructor is given specific guidance on how to handle the subject. This is to keep him within the objectives of the lesson, and at the same time relate it to the needs of the unit. This guidance to the instructor is one of the safeguards against the new teaching technique's becoming a gripe session. We know that it is possible for dialogue and discussion to degenerate into a harmful complaint session. It is the instructor's responsibility to keep the class with the subject's parameters as drawn in the DA Pamphlet. We must emphasize at this point that the instructor as a staff officer with the responsibility of the program must have the fullest confidence and trust of his commander. One of the keys to the success of this new approach is mutual trust between the commander and his chaplain-instructor.

NOTE: Expose Visual #7

The Instructors Role:

CATALYST

RESOURCE PERSON

INVOLVES STUDENTS

Visual #7

Let me pull together the implications for the instructor in the new series. The new format calls for class participation in discussion, rather than listening to a lecture. This means that the instructor is at times a catalyst, that is, one who precipitates an interchange of ideas and attitudes and keeps his own participation in a low key. He is a resource person, whose experience and knowledge can be shared as part of the learning process. He should act as a source of facts: he corrects misinformation. In summary, Character Guidance continues to be the Army's primary endeavor to meet its responsibility for character and value education for the soldier. The DA Pam's format, the emphasis on classroom discussion, and the place of the instructor in the program are all designed to meet this need for the Army of the 1970's.

d. The Commander and Character Guidance

NOTE: Expose Visual #8

The Commander:

SHOWS PERSONAL INTEREST

INVOLVES JUNIOR LEADERS

Visual #8

This is the commander's program. This fact is basic to the success of the "Our Moral Heritage" Series. To implement it, the commander will probably continue to rely on the chaplain to be the principle instructor in the classroom.

The commander's interest in the morale and moral tone of his command is served by this program in the following way:
it gives the soldiers an opportunity to discuss some of their personal moral problems in a setting that respects their dignity and intelligence.
In addition to this, it can be the commander's barometer that measures the morale and esprit of his unit.

NOTE: Expose Visual #9

"These are challenging times...."

William C. Westmoreland
General, USA
Chief of Staff

Visual #9

In his recent letter to all officers, General Westmoreland said:

"These are challenging times for those of us who share responsibility for the leadership of the Army. Faced with severe personnel turnover and reduced levels of experience, we are required more than ever to draw on fundamental principles as guides for our actions. Moreover, today's society provides less support than formerly for traditional values. Thus, the individual officer bears even more responsibility for the establishment and observance of scrupulous, ethical standards."

This admonition of General Westmoreland points up the necessity for all levels of command to be involved in the moral leadership. This is particularly true for NCO's and company grade officers. The soldier is most influenced by his peers, but the leaders who exercise the greatest

influence on him are his junior officers and noncommissioned officers. And it is true that it is at their level of leadership that most of the day-to-day decisions are made. Hence, their involvement in the program is of benefit to the commander and to the Army. A briefing for the commander and staff or for an officers' or noncommissioned officers' call is included in each month's lesson plan package. Regulations do not preclude attendance at the Character Guidance discussion hour by E-6's and above. Attendance at the class and support of the program by junior leaders is not only desirable as a benefit to the commander and the soldier, it is imperative for good moral leadership. General Westmoreland underscored this point in the letter earlier referred to when he said: "While basic laws underlie command authority, the real foundation of successful leadership is the moral authority derived from professional competence and integrity. Competence and integrity are not separable."

3. Review

(1 minute)

This briefing has outlined the reasons for the new "Our Moral Heritage" Series, the format of the new materials, and the recommended teaching techniques. The value of the program to the Army can be summed up in the following ways:

First, the "Our Moral Heritage " Series will help make the man in uniform a better soldier by strengthening his commitment to the moral and ethical values of American democracy.

Second, the new approach to character education will strengthen the soldier's personal moral commitment to the issues in our time and thereby increase his future usefulness as a citizen of our country.

Third, this is a positive program which we hope will assist the commander to deal creatively with those problems that are pressing upon the military man--which are the same problems that are disturbing our society as a whole.

This concludes our briefing. I will be pleased to answer any questions.

(If film is available, introduce with following remarks.)

At the conclusion of this briefing we will show you one of the new Character Guidance films. This film will support the topic "The Real Person." The main character of this film, Private Johnny Cool, has a problem. He doesn't know who he really is. He appears in many roles which are figments of his imagination. We see him playing the roles of a sportsman, a hippie, a beat musician, and a man of the world. But his buddies, his girl, and his commanding officer see him as he is, a man desperately searching for his real self.

This film, like all others in the new series, uses the sights and sounds which will challenge the young soldier to discuss the moral implications in the topic.

ARMY SOCIAL WORK AND THE BLACK EXPERIENCE

Introduction

COLONEL ALBERT B. KILBY, MSC

The "Black Experience"! The concept of "black" in our culture means opposite to white; dark-complexioned; Negro; without light; dark; dirty; evil; wicked; sad; dismal; and sullen. There is a literary custom in our society to attach black to any form of negative implications, like blackball, blacklist, blackmarket, and blackout. This is the way we have associated black.

We are so familiar with that connotation of black, so let's explore the feeling of being Black. Langston Hughes' concept gives a much better feeling of what being Black is:

"Black is being Mayor in the city and banned in the suburbs.

Black is not needing a psychiatrist to tell you what's bugging you.

Misery is when you heard on the radio that the neighborhood you live in is a slum but you always thought it was home.

Black is learning that at an early age equality is only skin-deep.

Black is not having to get in the mood to sing the blues."

It is a hard thing for many white people to believe that their own racial attitudes could be the fundamental cause of the hatred, fear, dislike or indifference of so many black people toward them.

It is much easier and much more pleasant to believe that the fundamental cause is the laziness and fecklessness and irresponsibility and innate savagery of the black man.

Alan Paton, the South African novelist, stated that it doesn't do much good to argue with people who believe this. Their psychological need to hold such beliefs is so great and deep that one cannot reason with them. There is only one therapy that can do them any possible good, and that is to bring them into contact and communication, and collaboration if that is possible, with people they fear and despise.

Most of them will not submit to therapy, for why should one wish to know more of such irresponsible and savage people? But there is hope in applying the therapy to their children.

It was the sudden leap forward in man's understanding of and control over his physical environment that led to our present racial situation, because this leap forward took place in the West. Why was this? Some of us believe that it was due to the innate superiority of the white races, others that it was due to an accident of history and luck and climate.

I don't think the answer to this question is yet established. All I can say is that I believe it was an accident. I believe this because it is my experience, and a very common one among other Black men, that when I have enjoyed the same benefits of education, I speak to you (my white brothers) in your own idiom, and understand your thoughts and cherish the same ideals for man and his society.

For those of you who contend that the situation is due to the innate superiority of the white races, I often think of the British philosopher, Josiah Royce, who stated:

"The trouble comes when you tell the other man, too stridently, that you are his superior. Be my superior, quietly, simply showing your superiority in your deeds, and very likely I shall love you for the very fact of your superiority. For we all love our leaders. But tell me I am your inferior, and then perhaps I may grow boyish, and may throw stones. Well, it is so with the races. Grant then that yours is the superior race. Then you can say little about the subject in your public dealings with the backward race. Superiority is best shown by good deeds and by few boasts."

When anti-change people hold the power, they can act as ruthlessly toward those who advocate change as the revolutionaries can act toward those who resist it. Anti-change extremists derive pleasure, and seem to be justified, by the catastrophic nature of these events, and seem justified by the unrest of the cities.

It is not always easy for whites to understand that black crime hurts mostly blacks and that it is often the result of desperate poverty and urban chaos, for which the blacks are not to blame. It is not always easy for whites to realize that the violence of black rhetoric, the call of "get Whitey" and "kill the pigs," spring from a deep wound caused by 3½ centuries of blatant injustice and from a feeling that polite, peaceable methods have not worked.

The blacks' new aggressive assertion of their separate identity helps to strengthen white segregationists, who are only too happy to keep them separate. Some whites see this new mood as racism in reverse. But to the extent that it celebrates black culture and nourishes black pride, it is a positive, important, undoubtedly permanent phenomenon. To the extent that black separatism represents a retreat in hate for U. S. society, it may be only a temporary phase; the hope is that, once blacks have gained necessary strength and confidence, they will turn back outward toward white America and deal with it on more nearly equal terms.

We have experienced the black leaders as integrationists, nationalists and radicals, voicing their demands in a brisk, precise, eloquent, often tough but not unrealistic manner. It would be safe to say that most black leaders are now committed to militancy short of violence. Considering their grievances, America's blacks have been more patient and less violent than the white world had any right or reason to expect.

The young black civilian finds himself in the Army facing some of these same racial injustices. Is there no measure that can be taken to prevent or lessen it? There is one, I believe, and we all know what it is, but we take it half-heartedly. It is for Army Social Workers as individuals, and as a group, to devote more of our skills and energies to the development of Command, to respond to the inequalities that the era has bequeathed to us.

A FEW COMMENTS ON SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE
AND THE BLACK EXPERIENCE

Lanny Berry, MSW

The focus of our discussion today will center on the black experience, that peculiar set of conditions that directs and shapes the lives of black people. Lately it has become quite fashionable in social, academic and working circles to discuss the black experience in quite some detail. In recent years, particularly with the advent of poverty and communication programs, we hear the need for increased involvement by the poor in decisions and activities which will affect their lives and community. As social workers we were fed this profound principle as part of our training, but often found, to our chagrin, that its profundity was more abstract than functional. As a result, our clients and the general public whom we serve began to raise serious questions about social agencies, social programs and social work practice.

Some present day concerns around social work practice as they pertain to the problems of the general community has generated a number of important questions. Among the more challenging are the following: Is social work, by its very nature a palliative profession? Do the fundamental problems of ethnic or racial groups lend themselves to slow, laborious solutions? What are the prerequisites to resolving apparent conflict between the entrenched individualistic orientation of social work and the collective problems of these same ethnic, racial and special interest groups? To what extent does social work, as a legitimized societal institution, possess vested interests in the perpetuation of seemingly oppressive tactics? What is the relationship between social work as a secondary human service institution and the primary institutions of politics and economics? To what extent is racism operative in the broader social welfare establishment and what forms does it take?

These are difficult, complex questions which do not lend themselves to simplistic answers. That an ever larger number of black and third world people and practitioners of social work practice have begun to pose and grapple with these questions is reflective of the progressed level of awareness and sophistication that have come to characterize these groups generally. Army social service personnel, if they are not only to understand the black experience but work within it, must understand that many blacks have assumed a more radical perspective from which to analyze their status in American society and the

complicated institutions which comprise it. It should also be increasingly apparent that these more revolutionary voices emanate from all segments of the black community. To attempt to specify the sole arbiters of this new black identity is becoming an ever more futile task. A number of thrusts have energized and directed the current black experience. It is painfully obvious that the integrationist ethic as it is described by Harold Cruse failed to change the abysmal conditions of the masses of blacks. These barely discernible advancements coupled with the nation's great affluence stimulated what some writers called a revolution of "rising expectations". In this writer's opinion a powerful factor is the realization by blacks that this country will and has reneged on its promise of voluntarily fulfilling the legitimate aspirations for economic well being and increased participation in the socio-political interchange. To fulfill this long overdue obligation would require a restructuring which would undermine the interest of the status quo. This painful realization had led blacks to a sensitive understanding and appreciation of the concept of "power" and the many insidious and blatant ways this concept is used to exploit them--creating a state of powerlessness. This is an extremely important point for Army Social Workers to understand because it follows that this newly developed perspective of black people, which centers on the structure of power relationships, holds profound implications for social work. For one thing, one is compelled to ask to what extent are social work and the orientation of its training institutions compatible with this power oriented stance? This is another way of posing the questions about the relevancy of social work practice and its understanding of and relationship to the black community. In these few remarks I could not adequately answer this and the preceding questions, but I do think it provides a base to offer a few points which warrant consideration.

Any serious student of social institutions would conclude that the basic problems of the black underclass are structural in nature. That is to say, they emanate from the arrangement, nature and operation of the nation's institutions which historically have excluded blacks. Social work as a sanctioned societal institution, has colluded with more fundamental political and economic interest to preserve the deplorable state of affairs outlined above. The nation's welfare programs, laudable comments withstanding, are domestic pacification programs that cool, soothe and suppress the natives. It is inherently false to suggest the problems of blacks are solved by integration into the politico-economic mainstream without removing the structural barriers which historically have precluded such integration.

To adequately evaluate social work's role vis à vis the black community it is necessary to view it in institutional terms. The fact is that the field of social work represents an institutionalized set of interest. It is institutionalized in that the society in which it operates has bestowed legitimacy upon it and its function. Among other things, this means that social work is accountable to and dependent upon a wider constellation of political and economic institutional forces. Needless to say, the degree of control which blacks experience over these forces is less than negligible. Social work is preoccupied with "self maintenance", that is, it exhibits all the characteristics of an "establishment" including vested interest, bureaucratic structure and aversion to the effects of radical change.

This brief analysis suggests some important implications which appear below.

Social work's institutional function is basically intermediary, mediating between the casualties of American free enterprise and the politico-economic forces which regulate and sustain the system. Crudely put social work "picks up the pieces". Moreover the profession promotes subservience by society's victim to their adverse conditions. The adherence to the principles of psycho analytic theory with its emphasis on interpersonal dysfunction, has been more than harmonious with the interest of those who would preserve the external order. Blacks have repudiated this notion of individual pathology and have declared that the middle man role of social work and their problem needs as colonized people are antithetical.

This creates an extremely difficult problem for the social work establishment. Society still expects that social work perform its ascribed function of pacifying the natives but it finds the natives unwilling to accept their services. How this dilemma will be resolved, if in fact it will, is a question up for grabs at the moment.

A second and equally compelling point is that social work, as an institutionalized entity, is as permeated by the venom of racism as is the larger complex of institutional structures of which it is a subsector. It does not require uncommon perceptual virtuosity to recognize this fact. Any cursory examination of the ethic composition of public and private welfare agencies, including non-black schools of social work, would illuminate the problem with blinding clarity.

For many, if not most, of the policies and practices of social work, not to mention the national politico-economic establishment, are borne of racist beliefs and proclivities.

As such they are destined from the outset to conflict violently with the self determined interest of black people.

These brief remarks have alluded to some of the difficulties social work faces in its work with the black community. In many instances these same obstructions are found in the armed services. I have continually been struck by the variety of methods the Army has used to resolve racial issues at bases in the U.S. and throughout the world. Some bases denied there was a problem, some handed down edicts that this type of conflict would stop because the Army was integrated so no one was supposed to be fighting. Still others tried a variety of human relations approaches with varying degrees of success. In viewing much of the literature that has examined racial conflict in the Army it becomes rather obvious that a sizeable part of the conflict has its genesis in civilian life. But the real question in the Armed services as in civilian life is one of the structure of the Army as a social institution, its use and ordering of power and its relationship to non-white soldiers.

It is quite obvious that non-white soldiers are redefining their identity and roles in ways that conflict with the institutionalized values of the Army. These soldiers are quick to point out the contradictions a black man faces in the armed service. He represents a disproportionate percentage of fighting men in Viet Nam and in the injury and death toll. At the same time the black soldiers face the same nemesis of racial injustice in the fighting zone as he finds back home.

As a counteractant black soldiers have banded together in a communal, collective way to protest and support their mutual interest and safety. In many instances this has been met hostilely by Army officials. The question to be raised here is what Army social workers can and should do to be of some assistance in affecting changes. If we agree that an important consideration in understanding the black experience is to understand the nature of a social system, then it suggests that we begin to analyze the Army as a social institution. In so doing we may begin to more clearly and profoundly understand the reaction of black soldiers to a set of debilitating conditions, values and constrictions that emanate from the ordering and actualization of the Army as a social system. Therefore, any attempt at resolution of current conflicts at bases throughout the world must be viewed in social systemic terms. Any attempts to ameliorate the problems must be done in a more objective systematized manner than the current crisis oriented piecemeal approach. Let me close by proffering a couple of suggestions based on some cursory understanding of the problems.

(a) The Army as a social institution must commit itself to a program of training relative to race relations in the same way it commits itself to training about the latest in methods of weaponry and warfare. If this commitment to racial equality is communicated early to all incoming soldiers and has the complete support of all higher commands it will be believable and in all likelihood acted upon favorably. Inherent in a race relations program should be a clear definition of the term integration as it is or should be used in the Army. It becomes painfully obvious that the Army's view of racial integration, with recent minor expectations, has been that black soldiers would integrate into and become assimilated, with little thought to their own subcultural values and interest.

(b) The Army must be willing to support black soldiers who fight for this country and are then denied justice in the fighting zone and back home in the states. We must begin to confront the gross maniacal forms of racial injustice that black soldiers face. It is a travesty of macabre proportions that a black soldier from Georgia who gave the ultimate he had to give for his country--his life--was denied a resting place lest in the solitude and quiet of death he might in his blackness pollute fellow white cadavers lying nearby. Why didn't the Army brass and veterans groups demand that this injustice be corrected? Is there any better example of racism being part of the Army's bag? I think not.

(c) The Army must also look at the communities where their bases are located. Rather than placate communities hostile to non-white soldiers, base officials should be very objective in dealing with racial conflicts in the community even to the point of not dealing with local merchants and businesses, who openly discriminate against non-white soldiers.

(d) It must be clearly understood that professional social workers, black and white, who wish to be a part of and contribute to the energy of the black experience must re-examine their position relative to confrontation politics or disruptive tactics. At this point we must not delude ourselves, pressure tactics while offensive to the nation in general and social workers in particular, have demonstrated themselves to be an effective leverage when used well in the best circumstances. In operational terms, this means that change oriented individuals, groups and organizations must somehow organize into a workable network of forces to more adequately combat the divisive and corrosive effects of racism.

Much of what I've said is questionable but possible. If our commitment to racial justice is real we will be about the job of making it possible, but we had better hurry-time can and may run out.

WORKING TOGETHER

by

Ike & Tina Turner

Calling out to all the sisters and brothers...Regardless of race, creed or color. The problems of the world will never be solved, unless we put a little love in our hearts.

Working together we can make a change...working together we can help better things. Let us put our hate aside and let us let love be our guide. Let's now try a little love for a change...try a little love for a change.

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PRE-GROUP DISCUSSION AND GUIDANCE

COLONEL ALBERT B. KILBY, MSC

Before we leave the plenary session I would like to summarize and give some guidelines of expectations in our small group workshops. We have discussed and intellectualized the racial problem for years. For a different approach, we are calling on everyone to examine "self" - where are you at this point and time in relation to this problem. Secondly, examination of your professional-self and the Army Social Work at this particular time.

SELF

It is time that you (my white social work brothers) search your consciences, muster your moral and physical courage, shed your intimated silence and declare your consciences.

We are in a crisis of consciousness. The hardest task in the world is:

1. To begin to see ourselves as others see us.
2. To understand both how we affect the lives of others by what we do, and
3. Why we feel that we have to do what we do.

One way to get hold of this problem is to try to spell out how we see ourselves and to understand what contributed to this vision, and then to ask how others see us and what contributed to their vision of us.

The real problem is changing ourselves - not changing society. Psychologically, it is an inward challenge.

Between the observer (white) and the observed (black) is time (3½ centuries), and all kinds of ideas which prevent the observer from seeing the facts of the observed (slavery, jim crow, welfare, institutional racism, etc.).

The observer (the image) looks at the image he has created. When the observer realizes he is the observed, all action stops.

The network of escapes prevents us from understanding the problems (physical escapes like moving to the suburbs; psychological escapes such as the defense mechanisms). It is necessary to free yourselves from the psychological structure.

Man is incapable of facing what is the fact. The fact, the formula and action are contradictory with each other. Man is in constant battle with himself. The best examples of this are the Kerner Commission Report with recommendations directed at ghetto conditions and not at the white structures and practices which are responsible for those conditions; the poverty programs implemented to meet the symptoms but not the causes.

Free the mind from fear; as long as there is fear, that fear will take over. If the observer could eradicate the myths and blurred facts about the observed, he would view them as people with dignity. Dignity of man is most desired by all of the observed (blacks, browns, reds and yellows). Dignity could replace fear because with it, the observed would feel no need to strike back and the observer would have no fearful guilt.

Society doesn't want man to be free - freedom means disorder - revolution means disorder. It is always revolt against society but not against the inner psychological structure that created society. We talk about changing society, "the good society" - the real problem is, can there be a mutation of the human mind.

PROFESSIONAL-SELF AND ARMY SOCIAL WORK

What are we? What ought we to be at this point in history and what are we willing to sacrifice of what we have, in order to become what we ought to be?

We as clinical practitioners and Army Community Service Social Workers have to work simultaneously along two parallel lines:

1. Clinically, we must ask the individual soldier and military families to accept certain kinds of responsibilities.
2. ACS must create the community framework in which individual responsibility and participation are feasible.

From lessons learned at last year's "Systems" Current Trends Course, it is apparent we operate in an "Eight to Five System" and an "After Five Before Eight System".

In the "Eight to Five System", we do so many uninterrupted things: clinically we co-therapy together as black and whites; whites see black individuals, couples, families and groups. At ACS we have our lending closet, AER, waiting wives groups, survivor assistance and many other functions for all races without incident.

When we arrive at the "After Five and Before Eight System" - all hell breaks loose! The blacks seen in the clinic by whites often feel and verbalize after five that they have not been understood and you don't know what they are feeling. How many of my white brothers have said initially to a black client, "I can't understand your coming to me for help knowing the way you have been oppressed by whites." A different approach would really communicate that you want to know and become involved, such as involvement in the community with appropriate black organizations.

In the community surrounding our military establishments, we respond very quickly when there is a black and white brawl at the local tavern. What's wrong with preventive measures? Black families of E-1 to E-3 are separated because of financial reasons and inadequate resources; namely, housing, recreation and moonlighting. These are just some of the problems for ACS to examine, and pressure the Equal Opportunity Section and Command to get involved and to be more responsive to the racial problem.

The true task is to make an effort to design Army Social Work at the top level so that we are capable of continuous change, renewal and responsiveness. We can less and less afford to limit ourselves to routine repair of breakdowns. In evaluating the various proposed changes in the medical service, and equating the magnitude and dimension of today's problems like race and drugs - where are we and where should we be?

We have to deal with problems by putting our teeth into them. To understand is to transform what is - find a way of living differently. In seeking this there is no teacher, pupil, master, or leader. So in the group, let's free ourselves of being one's self.

GROUP LEADERS

1. Encourage the participant to identify changes.
2. Encourage participants to suggest solutions.
 - a. Participants examine each solution posed and what it might mean in terms of what will have to be sacrificed and whether the participants are willing to make that sacrifice.
 - b. Participants confront and deal with the issue in terms of their personal degree of commitment.
 - c. Who expect to resist the change and why?
 - d. Is reason for resistance valid?
 - e. If valid, is it important enough to prevent the change?
 - f. Raise question of how such resistance could be ameliorated without sacrificing the change.
 - g. Do you really want to change or, do you wish only to change your image?
 - h. How much are you willing to sacrifice when it comes to making the change which you agree is necessary?

AN OVERVIEW OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE ARMY

LTC JAMES S. WHITE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL,
HQS, DA

CURRENT TRENDS IN ARMY
SOCIAL WORK CONFERENCE,
FITZSIMONS GENERAL
HOSPITAL, DENVER, COLORADO
23 SEPTEMBER 1970

I WAS VERY PLEASED TO RECEIVE AN INVITATION TO ATTEND THIS CONFERENCE AND SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF MY VIEWS ON THE CURRENT RACIAL SITUATION IN THE ARMY.

IN EARLY 1969, GENERAL WESTMORELAND DIRECTED THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL TO MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF RACIAL TENSION IN THE ARMY AND IDENTIFY ANY MAJOR RACIAL PROBLEMS WHICH WERE IMPAIRING MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. HE ALSO DIRECTED THAT THE EXISTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM BE EXPANDED TO IMPLEMENT POSITIVE ACTIONS TO COPE WITH THOSE PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED IN THIS ASSESSMENT.

I WAS GIVEN THE TASK OF MAKING THIS STAFF STUDY AND PREPARING A BRIEFING FOR PRESENTATION TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF. MUCH OF THE INFORMATION NEEDED FOR THIS PROJECT WAS ALREADY AVAILABLE TO MY OFFICE. MY PREDECESSOR, AN INFANTRY LT COLONEL LATER KILLED WHILE COMMANDING A BATTALION IN VIETNAM, HAD DONE A TREMENDOUS JOB OF GATHERING INFORMATION ON ARMY-WIDE RACIAL PROBLEMS DURING HIS STAFF VISITS TO INSTALLATIONS IN CONUS AND OVERSEAS FROM 1966 TO 1968. I ALSO HAD AT MY DISPOSAL REPORTS OF RACIAL INCIDENTS WHICH HAD OCCURRED AT OUR INSTALLATIONS WORLD-WIDE; COMPLAINTS OF ALLEGED RACIAL DISCRIMINATION RECEIVED FROM BLACK SOLDIERS; CHARGES OF RACIAL

VIOLENCE MADE BY WHITE SOLDIERS; AND STATISTICAL REPORTS ON THE RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY.

ADDITIONALLY, I VISITED TWO CONUS INSTALLATIONS TO GATHER MORE CURRENT INFORMATION ON OUR RACIAL PROBLEMS. THESE VISITS WERE MOST INTERESTING AND PRODUCTIVE. AT BOTH INSTALLATIONS, FOLLOWING A COMMAND BRIEFING, OUR TEAM HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE INSTALLATION STAFF AND WITH PERSONNEL OF ALL GRADES AND RACES. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH THE STAFFS AT THESE INSTALLATIONS WERE TOTALLY UNAWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF RACIAL STRIFE AT THEIR POST. THE INDIVIDUAL STAFF OFFICERS RESPONDED IN THE SAME WAY WHICH MANY OF THEIR COUNTERPARTS ON THE ARMY STAFF HAD ANSWERED MY QUESTIONS CONCERNING RACIAL TENSION IN THE ARMY. NO ONE SEEMED AWARE OF RACIAL UNREST OR WILLING TO ADMIT THAT PROBLEMS OF THIS NATURE EXISTED. THIS I LATER REFERRED TO AS THE "HEAD IN THE SAND" SYNDROME. BECAUSE OF THEIR LACK OF AWARENESS, THESE STAFF OFFICERS WERE NOT PROVIDING THEIR COMMANDER WITH THE INFORMATION HE SO VITALLY NEEDED. (I AM PROUD TO SAY THAT THIS IS NO LONGER A MAJOR PROBLEM.)

IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICERS, NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN, WE FOUND THAT AS WE WENT FURTHER AND FURTHER DOWN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND WE FOUND MORE AND MORE AWARENESS AND CONCERN FOR THE EXISTENCE OF RACIAL VIOLENCE. JUNIOR OFFICERS, JUNIOR NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN OF BOTH RACES WERE EAGER TO DISCUSS THEIR VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT WITH OUR TEAM. A WHITE E-5 TOLD OF DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES BY OFF-POST CLUBS OPERATED BY LOCAL CHAPTERS OF THE AMERICAN LEGION, THE AMVETS AND THE VFW. WE ALSO LEARNED THAT THERE WAS DEVELOPING A GREAT DEGREE OF RACIAL POLARIZATION

AMONG TROOPS BOTH ON AND OFF-POST. THE ARMY'S RACIAL SITUATION WAS CLASSIFIED AS VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND HORIZONTAL SEGREGATION. ONE WHITE SOLDIER STATED THAT WHEN WHITE SOLDIERS GET TOGETHER THEY INVARIABLY TALK ABOUT THE BLACK SOLDIERS. THERE APPEARS TO BE A GROSS MISUNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER. EACH GROUP DOES THINGS WHICH ANGERS AND TENDS TO POLARIZE THE OTHER GROUP. HE ALSO SAID THAT WHITE SOLDIERS ARE GREATLY DISTURBED BY THE "BLACK POWER" SALUTE AND GREETING USED BY THE BLACK SOLDIERS. BLACK SOLDIERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, SPOKE OF THE SUDDEN CHANGE IN RACIAL ATTITUDES OF WHITE SOLDIERS UPON THEIR RETURN FROM VIETNAM. THEY COMPLAINED OF INJUSTICES IN PROMOTIONS; ASSIGNMENTS; SELECTION FOR WORK DETAILS; THE ADMINISTRATION OF BOTH NON-JUDICIAL AND JUDICIAL PUNISHMENT; AND IN OTHER AREAS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THEIR IMMEDIATE SUPERIORS. THEY ALSO COMPLAINED OF GENERAL HARASSMENT OF BLACK SOLDIERS BY THE MILITARY POLICE AND THE INABILITY OF THE BLACK SOLDIER TO OBTAIN REDRESS FROM THE CHAIN OF COMMAND OR THE ARMY'S COMPLAINT SYSTEM. A COMMON COMPLAINT WAS THAT "BLACKS WERE THE FIRST TO BE TICKETED; THE FIRST TO BE JAILED; THE FIRST TO BE PUT ON DETAIL; THE FIRST TO BE BUSTED; THE FIRST TO BE IGNORED; AND THE LAST TO BE PROMOTED." ONE BLACK SOLDIER EXEMPLIFIED THIS TYPICAL BLACK ATTITUDE WHEN HE ASKED: "WHY IS IT THAT I MUST STILL WORK FIVE TIMES AS HARD AS THE WHITE SOLDIER AND BE FIVE TIMES BETTER JUST TO STAY EVEN OR RETAIN MY RANK; WHILE THE WHITE GUYS JUST WALK AROUND GOOFING UP AND STILL GOING UP WITHOUT PENALTY OR REAL EFFORT? MAN, I DIDN'T GET SHOT IN 'NAM' TO TAKE THIS STUFF AND I CERTAINLY NEVER EXPECTED TO BE TREATED LESS THAN A MAN IN THE ARMY. I WORK HARD AND DO MY JOB AND KNOW MY JOB BETTER THAN ANYBODY ELSE. YET YOUNGER, LESS KNOWLEDGEABLE, DISINTERESTED, NEWLY-ARRIVED, NON-VIETNAM WHITES GET PROMOTED OVER ME AND GET LESS MESSY

DETAILS. CAN YOU IMAGINE ALL OF THIS INJUSTICE BEING TOLERATED IN THE ARMY TODAY? WELL, I AIN'T GONNA TAKE IT ANYMORE. I'M GONNA FIGHT BACK EVEN IF IT KILLS ME!" THIS STATEMENT REFLECTS THE BASIC CHANGE IN THE BLACK SOLDIER OF TODAY WITH WHICH THE ARMY MUST NOW DEAL. BLACK SOLDIERS ARE NO LONGER WILLING, AS WERE THEIR COUNTERPARTS OF 10 YEARS AGO, TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE TO BE "SUPER NEGROES" IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN THE ARMY. IT IS THIS CHANGE THAT PUZZLES WHITE OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WHO ARE UNAWARE OF THE BLACK SOLDIER AS A SEPARATE EXPERIENCE NOT IN THEIR IMAGE.

AS A PART OF THIS ASSESSMENT, IN SEPTEMBER 1969 I PRESENTED A BRIEFING TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY. SOME OF THE MAJOR CONCLUSIONS PRESENTED TO THEM ARE LISTED ON THESE CHARTS.

IN SUMMARY, WE FOUND THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN INCREASE IN RACIAL TENSION IN THE ARMY; THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF AN ORGANIZED EFFORT BY EITHER BLACK OR WHITE EXTREMIST GROUPS TO PROMOTE RACIAL DISHARMONY AMONG OUR SOLDIERS; THAT NO RACIAL UNREST EXISTED IN THE "FIRE BASES" OR "NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS" IN VIETNAM; AND THAT EFFORTS MUST BE MADE AT ALL LEVELS TO FOSTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND TRUST AMONG ALL PERSONNEL.

THE ASSESSMENT FURTHER DISCLOSED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE ARMY HAS MADE, AND CONTINUES TO MAKE, GREAT PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING ITS GOAL OF TOTAL EQUALITY, IT IS A PART OF A SOCIETY WHICH IS UNDERGOING RAPID CHANGE. THE DIFFICULTIES STEMMING FROM POOR BLACK - WHITE RELATIONS AND RACISM CONSTITUTE ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS FACING AMERICAN SOCIETY. PRIOR TO ENTERING THE ARMY, SOLDIERS OF ALL RACES HAVE BEEN EXPOSED, TO SOME EXTENT, TO

THIS TRAUMATIC RACIAL SITUATION. MANY OF THEM CARRY OVER INTO THE ARMY THE POOR RACIAL ATTITUDES DEVELOPED IN THEIR HOMES AND COMMUNITIES. THE ARMY, OF COURSE, CANNOT CHANGE THESE ATTITUDES OVERNIGHT. HOWEVER, AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF RACIAL UNREST IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, WILL GREATLY ASSIST A COMMANDER IN HIS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE RACIAL HARMONY IN HIS UNIT.

THIS NEXT CHART ILLUSTRATES THE EMERGING RACIAL TRENDS WHICH WERE IDENTIFIED IN THIS ASSESSMENT. WE COMPARED THIS SITUATION TO AN ICEBERG - PART OF THE PROBLEM IS ABOVE WATER AND VISIBLE, BUT MUCH STILL REMAINS UNSEEN. I MIGHT ADD THAT THESE TRENDS, IN MY OPINION, ARE STILL CURRENT.

BLACK SOLDIERS ARE NOW MORE VOCAL AND AGGRESSIVE. THEY ARE NO LONGER PATIENT AND PASSIVE WITH WHAT THEY FEEL IS ARBITRARINESS, INJUSTICE AND MISTREATMENT WITHIN THE ARMY. THE BLACK SOLDIER IS ASKING TO BE RESPECTED AS A MAN ON THE BASIS OF HIS INDIVIDUAL WORTH WHILE STILL RETAINING HIS IDENTITY WITH HIS RACE. SOME WHITE OFFICERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS DO NOT UNDERSTAND THIS RESURGENCE OF INTEREST IN BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS, AND LOOK UPON THIS NEW RACIAL PRIDE IN TERMS OF A CONSPIRACY OR AN INFILTRATION BY BLACK EXTREMIST GROUPS.

THE YOUNG BLACK SOLDIER RESENTS HAVING HIS NEWLY FOUND RACIAL PRIDE CONFUSED AND TAKEN AS EVIDENCE THAT HE IS A BLACK MILITANT OR A BLACK RACIST. HE SHOUTS "BLACK IS BEAUTIFUL" NOT OUT OF RACIAL HATE BUT OUT OF RACIAL LOVE. HE IS NOT NECESSARILY ASKING FOR PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT, BUT INSTEAD IS DEMANDING THE SAME THINGS WHITE SOLDIERS WANT. HE WANTS THE BEST TRAINING, LEADERSHIP AND DISCIPLINE THAT HIS COMMANDER HAS TO OFFER.

THE COMMANDER WHO STATES THAT ALL SOLDIERS ARE "O.D" IN HIS EYESIGHT MAY NOT INSURE THAT HIS SUBORDINATE LEADERS ACT ACCORDINGLY.

BLACK SOLDIERS EXPRESS SUSPICION OF THE MOTIVES NOT ONLY OF WHITE COMMANDERS, BUT OFTEN OF BLACK COMMANDERS AS WELL. THEY CHALLENGE BLACK SENIOR OFFICERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS TO SPEAK OUT FORTHRIGHTLY ON PROBLEMS OF RACE RELATIONS, AND TO BE FIGURES WITH WHOM THEY CAN IDENTIFY DURING THEIR MILITARY CAREERS. THEY CHARGE WHITE OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH FAILING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE UNIQUE PROBLEMS THAT PLAGUE THE BLACK SOLDIER; AND OF BEING UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO APPRECIATE THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS OF BLACK CULTURE.

THE PROBLEM OF POLARIZATION OF THE RACES IS BECOMING MORE SERIOUS, AND IS A DIRECT RESULT OF A LACK OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS. TO SOME EXTENT, SEPARATION INTO RACIAL GROUPS IS NORMAL. HOWEVER, WHEN OVEREMPHASIZED, OR WHEN THE GROUPS PROMOTE RACIAL FRICTION, THE SEPARATION IS NOT DESIRABLE AND SHOULD BE REDUCED. THE FORMATION OF CLIQUES CONTRIBUTES TO THE OVERALL FRICTION BETWEEN RACES BECAUSE THE ISOLATION SUFFERED BY THE INDIVIDUALS IN THE GROUPS COUPLED WITH THE "BRAINWASHING" EFFECT OF A CONSTANT DISCUSSION OF RACIAL MATTERS, CAUSES UNREST AND PROMOTES FEELINGS OF DISCRIMINATION AND FEAR. THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM FACING A LEADER IS DETERMINING WHERE NORMAL AND HEALTHY FRATERNIZATION ENDS AND RACIAL POLARIZATION BEGINS. I HAVE FOUND THAT ON-POST POLARIZATION OF RACIAL GROUPS IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO OFF-POST SEGREGATION OR DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES. IT IS ALSO AFFECTED BY THE ATTITUDES OF WHITES TOWARD

BLACKS; OR MORE IMPORTANTLY, BY WHAT BLACK SOLDIERS PERCEIVE THESE ATTITUDES TO BE.

THE PROBLEM OF RACIAL POLARIZATION IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT AS A PART OF THE BLACK SOLDIERS' NEW AWARENESS AND RACIAL PRIDE THEY HAVE DEVELOPED A DRIVE FOR TOTAL TOGETHERNESS. IF PROPERLY HARNESSSED, HOWEVER, THIS AGGRESSIVENESS CAN BE OF GREAT BENEFIT TO A MILITARY FORCE.

A MAJOR PROBLEM EMERGING FROM RACIAL POLARIZATION HAS BEEN INCREASED GROUP PARTICIPATION IN RACIAL INCIDENTS, BOTH VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT IN NATURE. THIS TREND IS REFLECTED BY PETITIONS RECEIVED AT DA WHICH WERE SIGNED BY LARGE NUMBERS OF BLACK SOLDIERS COMPLAINING OF ALLEGED RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THEIR UNITS; BY MOB RESPONSE TO INTERVENTION BY MILITARY POLICE OR TO THE ARREST OF A BLACK SOLDIER; BY GROUP TYPE ASSAULTS; AND BY ATTEMPTS OF LARGE GROUPS OF BLACK SOLDIERS TO PRESENT THEIR GRIEVANCES VERBALLY TO A LEADER HIGH IN THEIR CHAIN OF COMMAND. WE HAVE ALSO SEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF MEETINGS HELD BY BLACK SOLDIERS IN MANY DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE ARMY.

AS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS PROBLEM, AT ONE INSTALLATION A BLACK NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER RECENTLY REQUESTED PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH A LOCAL CHAPTER OF THE NAACP AS A PRIVATE ASSOCIATION ON-POST AND TO USE POST FACILITIES FOR CHAPTER MEETINGS. AT ANOTHER INSTALLATION, 60 BLACK SOLDIERS HELD A MEMORIAL SERVICE FOR THE LATE DOCTOR MARTIN LUTHER KING; AND AT A LATER DATE, APPROXIMATELY 300 BLACK SERVICEMEN AND DEPENDENTS, AT AN OVERSEAS INSTALLATION, ATTENDED A "BLACK MOTHERS' DAY" CELEBRATION. PROBABLY THE

MOST SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT OF THIS GENERAL NATURE WAS A RECENT OFF-POST MASS MEETING IN AN OVERSEAS COMMAND ATTENDED BY APPROXIMATELY 700 PERSONNEL, 95% OF WHOM WERE BLACK.

AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THIS PROBLEM, A GROUP OF BLACK SOLDIERS AT ONE CONUS INSTALLATION REQUESTED AND RECEIVED PERMISSION TO HOLD A BLACK MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICE IN A POST CHAPEL. SIMILAR TYPE RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY OCCURRED IN AN OVERSEAS COMMAND WHERE BLACK SOLDIERS FOUNDED A RELIGIOUS GROUP CALLED THE "BLACK BAPTISTS"; HELD WEEKLY SERVICES; AND REQUESTED, THROUGH PROPER CHANNELS, TO HAVE THIS RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE ENTERED ON THEIR PERSONNEL RECORDS.

THIS CHART OUTLINES THE RESULTS OF OUR ANALYSIS OF THIS TREND.

MOST OF THESE MEETINGS HAVE BEEN NON-VIOLENT AND FREE OF INCIDENT. NORMALLY, THESE MEETINGS HAVE BEEN HELD TO DISCUSS BLACK HISTORY, HERITAGE AND CULTURE; THE RACIAL SITUATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY; AND THE COMMON COMPLAINTS OF BLACK MILITARY PERSONNEL. IN SOME CASES COMMANDERS HAVE NOT KNOWN ABOUT THESE MEETINGS UNTIL THEY DEVELOPED INTO A MAJOR PROBLEM OR GAINED WIDE-SPREAD SUPPORT FROM SOLDIERS. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT UNDER THE PRESENT TENSE SITUATION IN THE ARMY, THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE INHERENT IN THE UNAUTHORIZED, UNSUPERVISED GATHERINGS OF LARGE NUMBERS OF SOLDIERS FROM ANY ONE PARTICULAR RACIAL GROUP. ADDITIONALLY, MANY OF THESE GROUPS TEND TO BE RACIALLY EXCLUSIVE IN THEIR MEMBERSHIP PRACTICES, AND SERVE AS A FORUM FOR UNDESIRABLE MILITANT AGITATORS WHO EXERT A DISRUPTIVE INFLUENCE ON YOUNG BLACK SOLDIERS. THIS MAY ALSO TEND TO CATALYZE POLARITY BETWEEN THE RACES AND INCREASE RACIAL TENSION.

THERE ARE, HOWEVER, MANY FACTORS PERTAINING TO THESE ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE POSITIVE AND AFFIRMATIVE. THE OPEN COMMUNICATION CHANNEL WHICH MANY OF THESE MEETINGS PROVIDE CAN BE A SAFETY VALVE AND ALLOW THE COMMANDER TO BETTER ASSESS THE EXTENT OF RACIAL PROBLEMS IN HIS UNIT. ADDITIONALLY, OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF LEGITIMATE GROUPS CAN OFTEN EFFECTIVELY DETER THE PROLIFERATION OF UNDERGROUND GROUPS WHICH ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL THEIR EXISTENCE.

OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE IS THE FACT THAT THERE IS VERY LITTLE EVIDENCE, AT THIS TIME, OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE OVER THIS ACTIVITY OF BLACK SOLDIERS.

FINALLY, ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT WE CAN EXPECT AN INCREASE IN THIS TYPE RACIAL ACTIVITY IN THE ARMY UNLESS WE ARE ABLE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE ROOT CAUSES OF RACIAL UNREST.

THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, BOTH VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL, IS THE LARGEST SINGLE OBSTACLE TO THE EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION OF THE RACE PROBLEM IN THE ARMY. IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, COMMUNICATION IN ITS BROAD-EST SENSE IS IMPLICATED IN ALL RACIAL TENSION PROBLEMS.

A KEY ISSUE IN THE COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM IS THE CURRENT CONFUSION OVER THE USE OF THE TERM NEGRO VERSUS BLACK. I THINK THAT THIS BLACK SOLDIER WOULD PREFER THAT WE FIRST UNDERSTAND WHAT HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE CALLED. AMONG OTHER THINGS, HE DOES NOT DESIRE TO BE CALLED: "NIGGER", "SPOOK", "BOY", "COLORED", "NIGRA", "COON", OR "YOU PEOPLE." IF HE IS YOUNG, HE PROBABLY WOULD PREFER BEING REFERRED TO AS A BLACK RATHER THAN AS A NEGRO. BUT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HE WOULD JUST SIMPLY PREFER BEING

CALLED AN AMERICAN SOLDIER; AND TREATED LIKE ONE ALSO. THERE ARE ALSO TERMS OF THIS TYPE USED BY BLACK PERSONNEL WHICH ARE EQUALLY AS OFFENSIVE TO WHITE PERSONNEL. THIS PROBLEM, OF COURSE, AFFECTS ALL OTHER RACIAL, RELIGIOUS OR ETHNIC GROUPS AS WELL.

UNTIL WE BEGIN TO UNDERSTAND AND LEARN THE ETIQUETTE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEOPLE, WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE HAVING RACIAL TROUBLE IN THE ARMY. FINALLY WE MUST ALSO STRIVE, IN OUR EFFORTS FOR IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS, TO COMMUNICATE ACCURATELY CONDITIONS AND FACTS IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE SPREADING OF RUMORS. IN THE PAST, MANY SERIOUS RACIAL INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN TRIGGERED BY RUMORS AND THE PERCEIVED INJUSTICES OF MINORITY GROUPS.

THE NEGRO FEELS THAT HE IS THE VICTIM OF INSTITUTIONALIZED RACISM IN THE ARMY; AND HE COMPLAINS OF MANY THINGS TO PROVE HIS POINT. THE LACK OF VISIBILITY OF THE NEGRO SOLDIER IN TRAINING FILMS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS; AND THE SHORTAGE OF BLACK OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN IN KEY POSITIONS IN TROOP UNITS HAVING A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF BLACK PERSONNEL. HE ALSO COMPLAINS OF THE UNFAIRNESS IN THE DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS OF WHETHER SIMPLY TO WARN A MAN; PUNISH HIM UNDER ARTICLE 15, UCMJ; OR BRING HIM BEFORE A TRIAL BY COURT-MARTIAL. MOST COMPLAINTS OF BLACK SOLDIERS CONCERN THOSE AREAS WHERE DISCRETION WITHOUT COMMANDER REVIEW IS AT A MAXIMUM. IF THE STANDARDS OF TREATMENT ARE NOT CLEARLY DEFINED, IT IS EASY FOR A MAN WHO HAS COME OUT SECOND BEST TO CONCLUDE THAT HE HAS BEEN MISTREATED. IF THE SOLDIER IS BLACK, IT IS NATURAL FOR HIM TO FIND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. MANY LEADERS, OF ALL RACES, NEVER OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF

RACIAL DIFFERENCES, OR EVEN STATE WHAT THEIR POLICIES ON THIS MATTER ARE; THUS PERMITTING TENSIONS TO MOUNT IN THEIR UNITS. MEANWHILE, BLACK SOLDIERS SEE RACIAL SLURS ON LATRINE WALLS; OBSERVE OVERT ACTS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THEIR DAILY LIVES; AND NATURALLY ASSUME THAT THE "SILENT" COMMANDER CONDONES IT ALL. OFTEN THEY COMPLAIN ABOUT THE SAME THINGS WHITE SOLDIERS COMPLAIN ABOUT; BUT THE BLACK SOLDIER BLAMES DISCRIMINATION WHILE THE CAUCASIAN FAULTS THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.

THE YOUNG WHITE SOLDIER ALSO PLAYS A KEY ROLE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF RACIAL HARMONY IN THE ARMY. HE TOO COMPLAINS OF WHAT HE FEELS IS A LACK OF COMMAND RESPONSIVENESS TO THE NEEDS OF THE ENLISTED MAN. LIKE THE YOUNG BLACK SOLDIER, HE IS MUCH MORE ARTICULATE, AGGRESSIVE, AND INTELLIGENT THAN HIS COUNTERPART OF TEN YEARS AGO. UNLIKE THE BLACK SOLDIER, HE ENTERS THE ARMY FROM A BACKGROUND OF UNPRECEDENTED AFFLUENCE AND RISING OPPORTUNITY. HIS CHOICES FOR LIVELIHOOD AND INCOME HAVE BEEN MAXIMIZED AS NEVER BEFORE; AND, ALSO UNLIKE HIS NON WHITE COUNTERPART, HE HAS MOVED FROM THE CENTRAL CITY TO THE NEW SUBURBIA. RACIALLY, NOT ONLY IS HE GEORGRAPHICALLY SEPARATED FROM HIS BLACK COMRADE, BUT EVEN THE OLD KINSHIPS WHICH GREW OUT OF COMMON POVERTY AND NEED HAVE BEEN OVERCOME BY THE INSENSITIVITIES OF SUCCESS.

THUS MANY WHITE SOLDIERS ENTER INTO THEIR FIRST RELATIVELY EQUAL RACIAL ENVIRONMENT UPON INDUCTION; TOTALLY UNAWARE OF THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA; AND, LIKE THEIR BLACK COMRADES, ONLY FAINTLY KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE ARMY'S POLICIES ON EQUAL TREATMENT AND OPPORTUNITY.

GENERALLY SPEAKING, HE GETS ALONG WELL WITH HIS BLACK COUNTERPART DURING DUTY HOURS. IT IS DURING OFF-DUTY HOURS THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP BECOMES STRAINED. THE YOUNG WHITE SOLDIER MAY FEEL PUT OFF BY THE TENDENCY OF BLACK SOLDIERS TO BAND TOGETHER AS A CLOSELY KNIT MINORITY. ALTHOUGH MANY OF THEM SUPPORT THE NEGRO IN HIS DRIVE FOR EQUAL TREATMENT, OTHER WHITE SOLDIERS MAY SEE THIS NEW BLACK AWARENESS AS A THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY AND THEREFORE SEEK THE COMPANIONSHIP OF OTHER WHITE SOLDIERS FOR PROTECTION AND STRENGTH. MANY WHITE SOLDIERS ARE CONFUSED BY THE SIGNS, SYMBOLS, SLOGANS AND LANGUAGE OF THE BLACK SOLDIER; AND ARE FRIGHTENED BY CONTINUING RUMORS OF IMPENDING RACIAL CONFRONTATION.

THE WHITE SOLDIER MAY ALSO BE THE VICTIM OF INTIMIDATION BY THOSE OF HIS OWN RACE WHO HAVE POOR RACIAL ATTITUDES. IN THE RECENT PAST THERE HAVE BEEN TWO INCIDENTS OF KLU KLUX KLAN TYPE CROSS BURNINGS IN ONE OVERSEAS COMMAND. HOWEVER, IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE ARE BIASED BLACKS AS WELL AS BIASED WHITES; AND THE COMMANDER WHO LETS IT BE KNOWN THAT HE WON'T CONDONE ANY TROUBLE FROM EITHER GROUP WILL NEVER HAVE ANY SERIOUS RACIAL PROBLEMS IN HIS UNIT.

SINCE SEPTEMBER 1969, I HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRAVEL THROUGHOUT US ARMY EUROPE, US ARMY PACIFIC AND THE CANAL ZONE TO TALK TO PERSONNEL ABOUT ARMY RACIAL PROBLEMS. AS A RESULT OF THESE VISITS AND OUR ANALYSIS OF RECENT RACIAL INCIDENTS, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED SOME CONDITIONS WHICH WE CALL THE TRIGGER SYMBOLS OF RACIAL UNREST. THESE INDICATIONS ARE LISTED ON THIS CHART.

COMMANDERS NEED NOT BE ASHAMED TO ADMIT TO PROBLEMS WHICH MAY EXIST IN THIS AREA. THE APPROACH TO BE TAKEN IS TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS; AND PREVENT DISORDERS RATHER THAN MAKING ATTEMPTS TO COPE WITH RACIAL INCIDENTS AFTER THE FACT. IT IS MY DEEP CONVICTION THAT TRUE AWARENESS ON THE PART OF OUR LEADERS, PARTICULARLY NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS, CAN CONTRIBUTE MUCH TOWARD ACHIEVING OUR GOAL OF IMPROVED RACE AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS.

BEFORE CLOSING, I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW FOR YOU SOME OF THE MAJOR DA ACTIONS FOR IMPROVED RACE RELATIONS.

ON 2 OCTOBER 1969, GENERAL WESTMORELAND DISPATCHED A MESSAGE FOR DISTRIBUTION TO ALL ARMY PERSONNEL EXPRESSING HIS PERSONAL VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT. IN IT HE STRESSED THE ARMY'S CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND TREATMENT OF ALL PERSONNEL, AND THE NEED FOR OPEN COMMUNICATION BETWEEN COMMANDERS AND SOLDIERS AT ALL LEVELS. THE CHIEF OF STAFF ALSO EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE THAT MAXIMUM USE BE MADE OF THE EXISTING LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE ARMY TO PREVENT INCIDENTS AND IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN RACIAL GROUPS.

DURING THE PERIOD DECEMBER 1969 TO FEBRUARY 1970, THE CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND CONDUCTED A SERIES OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND RACIAL TENSION SEMINARS. THE FINAL PHASE WAS THE HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND SEMINAR HELD AT FORT MONROE IN FEBRUARY 1970. MINIMUM GUIDANCE ON THE CONDUCT OF THESE SEMINARS WAS PROVIDED BY HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND HEADQUARTERS, CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND. COMMANDERS WERE ALLOWED TO DETERMINE THE SIZE, COMPOSITION, LEVEL AND FREQUENCY OF THEIR SEMINARS,

AND CONSEQUENTLY, THE FORM OF THE SEMINARS VARIED FROM INSTALLATION TO INSTALLATION. I WILL NOT DISCUSS THIS PROJECT IN DETAIL SINCE DOCTOR SEGAL WILL SPEAK ON THIS SUBJECT LATER IN THE CONFERENCE.

THE MAJOR CONCLUSIONS ARISING FROM THIS PROJECT WERE ALMOST IDENTICAL TO THOSE DEVELOPED IN THE DA ASSESSMENT OF RACIAL TENSION IN THE ARMY. BRIEFINGS ON THE CURRENT RACIAL PROBLEMS FACING THE ARMY HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO MOST OF THE SENIOR OFFICERS AT HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WHO DEAL IN PERSONNEL MATTERS. I RECENTLY COMPLETED THE THIRD OF A SERIES OF BRIEFING TRIPS TO OVERSEAS COMMANDS.

IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 1969, I TRAVELED THROUGHOUT EUROPE AND PRESENTED THE BRIEFING "AN ASSESSMENT OF RACIAL TENSION IN THE ARMY" TO 20 GROUPS, INCLUDING THE CINCUSAREUR, MOST OF THE SENIOR COMMANDERS IN HIS COMMAND AND OTHER OFFICERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS. A SIMILAR TYPE TRIP WAS MADE THROUGH THE PACIFIC IN JANUARY 1970. DURING THIS TOUR, 34 BRIEFINGS WERE PRESENTED TO SENIOR OFFICERS AND PERSONNEL DOWN TO PLATOON LEVEL IN HAWAII, OKINAWA, JAPAN, KOREA, VIETNAM, AND THAILAND. DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF MAY 1970, A BRIEFING TRIP WAS MADE TO THE CANAL ZONE. DURING ALL OF THESE TOURS, THE BRIEFINGS WERE FOLLOWED BY INFORMAL DISCUSSION PERIODS TO ALLOW FURTHER EXCHANGE OF IDEAS ON THIS SUBJECT. I ALSO HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO A LARGE NUMBER OF ENLISTED MEN AND GAIN A BETTER INSIGHT ON THIS PROBLEM.

ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS ON THE RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY REVEAL MANY AREAS IN WHICH THE ARMY CAN BE JUSTLY PROUD. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE NUMBER

OF NEGRO NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS IN GRADES E6 THROUGH E9 AND THE NUMBER OF NEGRO FIELD GRADE OFFICERS HAVE ALL SHOWN A STEADY INCREASE SINCE 1964. THERE HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN A GRADUAL DECREASE IN NEGRO JUNIOR STRENGTH DURING THIS SAME PERIOD. AT THE END OF 1969, THE ARMY'S NEGRO LIEUTENANT COLONEL AND MAJOR STRENGTH EXCEEDED THE NEGRO STRENGTH IN THE GRADES OF FIRST AND SECOND LIEUTENANT. WE FEEL THAT IF THIS TREND CONTINUES, NEGRO FIELD GRADE OFFICER STRENGTH WILL ALSO DECREASE IN FUTURE YEARS. STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO MINIMIZE THIS DECREASE IN NEGRO JUNIOR OFFICER STRENGTH. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THESE EFFORTS, 45 NEGRO CADETS ENTERED THE U. S. MILITARY ACADEMY IN 1969 AND 40 IN 1970 AS COMPARED TO 9 IN 1968. POSITIVE STEPS ARE ALSO BEING TAKEN TO INCREASE THE PRODUCTIVITY OF THE PREDOMINANTLY NEGRO COLLEGE ROTC PROGRAM AND TO DEVELOP OTHER MEANS OF MAKING OFFICER PRODUCING ACTIVITIES MORE ATTRACTIVE AND AVAILABLE TO MINORITY GROUP PERSONNEL. A LOT OF WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE IN THIS AREA. STEPS HAVE ALSO BEEN TAKEN TO PROCURE AND STOCK BLACK COSMETICS, MAGAZINES AND BOOKS IN POST EXCHANGES WORLD-WIDE, AND TO MAKE THE ENTIRE EXCHANGE SYSTEM MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF ALL OF ITS CUSTOMERS.

IN JANUARY 1970, THE CHIEF OF STAFF DISPATCHED A LETTER ENCOURAGING ALL ARMY COMMANDERS TO UTILIZE AVAILABLE ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE PERSONNEL TO ASSIST IN IDENTIFYING AND SOLVING RACIAL PROBLEMS IN THE MILITARY COMMUNITY. THIS SHOULD GREATLY ASSIST IN CORRECTING SOME OF THE PROBLEMS IN COMMUNICATIONS NOTED IN ARMY INQUIRIES INTO RACIAL INCIDENTS. DA IS ALSO PARTICIPATING IN DOD SPONSORED RESEARCH PROJECTS

TO EXPLORE IN DEPTH ALLEGED INJUSTICES IN ASSIGNMENTS, PROMOTIONS, AND DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS.

THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN MANY OTHER STEPS TAKEN BY HEADQUARTERS, DA AND MAJOR COMMANDS TO IMPROVE THE OVERALL RACIAL SITUATION IN THE ARMY. I HAVE SEEN TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF MANY OF THESE EFFORTS DURING MY STAFF VISITS THROUGHOUT THE ARMY. I THINK IT IS MOST UNFORTUNATE THAT BOTH BLACK AND WHITE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ARE ALMOST TOTALLY UNAWARE OF MOST OF THE GOOD THINGS HAPPENING IN THIS AREA. WE CAN NEVER HOPE TO EFFECTIVELY COME TO GRIPS WITH RACIAL PROBLEMS UNTIL OUR POLICIES AND PROGRAMS ARE FELT AT THE LOWEST LEVEL.

IN SUMMARY, THE ARMY'S RACE PROBLEM IS A MANIFESTATION OF THE TRAUMATIC RACIAL SITUATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY. A DETERMINED EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO IDENTIFY THE ROOT CAUSES OF RACIAL UNREST IN THE ARMY AND TO EMPHASIZE THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN RESOLVING PRESENT PROBLEMS AND PREVENTING FURTHER DETERIORATION OF RACIAL HARMONY. WE WANT TO CONTINUE IN A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THIS AREA BY BOTH PREVENTING OVERT RACIAL DISORDERS AND CORRECTING ALL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES WHICH MAY LEAD TO UNNECESSARY FRICTION. THIS IMPORTANT TASK MUST BE GIVEN THE PERSONAL COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT OF ALL PERSONNEL IN THE ARMY.

VIEWS OF THE ARMY SYSTEM*
AND THE COUNTER CULTURE

Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Thomas, Jr., MSC**

It is obvious based on our previous knowledge and what we have heard this week that the turmoil and discontent that is buffeting our whole social environment is also manifested within the Army system. The Army is being subjected to a diversity and intensity of potentially destructive forces with which it never before has had to contend.

The Army is fighting a war with at best equivocal civilian support. Opinion polls reveal the country greatly divided on the war issue, with existing support rapidly eroding away. The only real question left is how soon our forces will be extracted from active participation in the VN war.

There is great resistance to the draft. Conscientious objection, AWOL, failure to report for the draft, all have increased. Of those individuals drafted, many are highly educated, verbal, articulate and strongly reinforced in their anti-military attitudes. They form a nucleus for dissent in the Army.

Polarity between black and white soldiers exists as it does in the civilian community. Official non-discrimination policies clash with informal discrimination practices. Black soldiers are angered by and suspicious of personnel policies, harassment and lack of redress, and whites are fearful of black symbols and cohesiveness. Both Maillet and White have discussed this in some detail earlier in the week.

Drug usage in the Army has accelerated rapidly as it has in the civilian community. While its impact on military performance has not been adequately determined, military and civilian leaders are extremely anxious about the phenomenon.

*Presented at the Army Social Work Current Trends - Drugs, Race, the Counter Culture and the Soldier, 24 September 1970.

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Internal dissent against military authority is increasing. Hair and clothing styles, underground newspapers, coffee houses, stockade rebellions, Dr. Levy and Jane Fonda (the dissenters' pin up girl) all reflect this restlessness.

Insecurity and doubt has infiltrated the military establishment and its potential members. Many officers have difficulty resolving their conflicting feelings about the Vietnam War. Others seriously question the premises and values upon which their profession is based. West Point cadets question the validity of a career in a field where society does not seem to provide support or prestige.

These and other factors contribute to the perception that the Army is losing civilian support and facing serious threats to its internal structure. A numbing consequence, should these trends continue and intensify and the Army lose its capability of successfully carrying out its mission, could be the eventual destruction or loss of autonomy of this nation. I recognize that this is an acceptable risk to some in our society and perhaps even an objective of a few. But I don't think such an outcome represents the wishes of the vast majority of our citizens. Therefore, the remainder of my paper is based on the following assumptions:

(1) That our society still supports a potent Army in spite of its present belabored state and the unpopularity of this particular war.

(2) That the Army as part of the military establishment, is essential to the survival of our country against external threats.

While we can speculate endlessly on the existence of a counter culture, its etiology, its desirability and its future course, several things seem clear:

(1) The Army cannot tolerate unqualified and infinite dissent within its structure.

(2) The Army cannot tolerate increasing conflict and polarity between racial groups in its organization.

(3) The Army cannot survive a lack of confidence, commitment and dedication on the part of its leaders.

Therefore, I believe that effective measures will have to be taken now to prevent a serious erosion of Army's position as a vital institution in our society.

A fundamental question then arises. What can the Army itself do to arrest the deteriorating trends in its structure? Obviously it cannot take a laissez-faire attitude which allows current trends to be reinforced by their rewarding consequences. Functional autonomy sets in. For example, drug usage and dissent provide their own rewards. The Army cannot overreact to problems in a knee jerk fashion. This further stimulates resistance and increases polarity.

While I can offer no comprehensive alternative to these extreme positions, I can suggest what I think are several reasonable and rational steps to take now which involve the assistance of the behavioral sciences including those in the Army Medical Department.

I would apply a systems type approach to ascertain what behavior patterns are essential, acceptable, tolerable, irrelevant, unacceptable and intolerable in our fighting forces in order to carry out the national objectives of the Army. While this is a deceptively simple suggestion to state, I recognize it is an exquisitely difficult one to carry out. But I believe it needs to be done. Such general questions as the following need to be asked and answered:

(1) What behaviors are crucial to an effective soldier and leader and which are irrelevant to effective military performance?

(2) To what extent can lower ranking men participate in the decision making that affects them? I think is a real and critical issue emerging.

(3) What are the effects of expanding the decision making process in the Army?

(4) What forms of dissent can the Army tolerate?

Having made some assessment of and decision about essential, irrelevant, and intolerable behavior patterns, the Army then has to reinforce, ignore, and extinguish these behavior patterns as appropriate. And finally, some continual assessment should be made of the presence of and change in these behavior patterns.

Let me try to be more explicit about how behavioral scientists, particularly in the Army Medical Department, can help in systems analysis, reinforcement and elimination of behavior patterns, and assessment of changes induced. First behavioral scientists can, as they have done and are doing, assess certain behavior patterns of interest and concern to the Army.

We know something about the extent of drug usage in the Army and in civilian life. Several studies have been done or are underway by Army behavioral scientists. Roffman and Sapol found that about 32% of their sample of soldiers leaving VN in late 1967 had smoked marihuana one or more times in their lives. About 29% had admitted using marihuana during their tour in VN. Casper sampled a group of VN soldiers in 1968 and found a 31% incidence of marihuana smoking sometime in their lives. Postel found about a 35% usage in his sample. Stanton in late 1969 found that 31% of EM coming to VN had used marihuana and 46% of outgoing troops had used it. His study is still being analyzed for variables associated with drug usage. Black, Owens and Wolff found in 1969 at Fort Sill that 29% of their sample admitted drug use. Sweet, Gilchrist, et al at Fort Bliss as you heard earlier are currently running a study there on incidence of drug use.

Thus we have some data on incidence of drug usage in the Army. What we know very little about is the effects of drug usage on military performance. What are the effects of Marihuana, Amphetamines, Barbituates, LSD and Heroin? While we have

accumulated considerable data particularly on the effects on heroin, by contrast we have very little data on the effects of marihuana on human performance. It is very difficult to advise people on the dangers of marihuana when you have very little data. To do so is to risk your credibility. Because of this lack of data, there is a belief on the part of most users and an assumption by many professionals, that marihuana is not a serious problem. In the absence of such data present beliefs and assumptions will eventually be formulated into accepted practice and law. We have only a little more information about the effects on lower animals.

We know something of the attitudes and performance of soldiers in basic training. The Human Resources Research Office has done a lot of work in this area. Datel at Fort Ord tells us that under traditional harassment oriented basic training, the soldier generally completes training as a more hostile, disillusioned individual. He begins basic training with a relatively low level of anxiety and hostility. These feelings increase continually until the 5th or 6th week of training. After that they diminish somewhat. But they stay considerably above their initial level. On the other hand basic training under conditions of positive reinforcement (the merit-reward system) seems to produce a soldier with much higher morale, greater self-respect, and higher training scores. But again what we don't have is a comparison of the effects of these different forms of training on combat performance.

LTC White has told us something of the extent of racial conflict in the Army. What effect does this have on military performance? Should the Army strive for greater integration or develop some forms of segregation based on racial and cultural characteristics? Does the Army encourage cultural differences or minimize them?

What is the effect, if any, of the length of one's hair on military performance? What is the effect or relevancy of the invasion of one's privacy through barracks living, constant inspections, control over off duty activities and the like? These and many other questions need to be answered. I don't think they will go away.

Actually, considerable data has been accumulated on behavior patterns in the Army, probably more than most people are aware. Army R&D Command, Medical R&D Command, HUMRRO, other agencies, and contracted research have tackled, often in piecemeal fashion, innumerable important research questions. Unfortunately much research is done, re-done, lost, buried and forgotten without reaching, in usable form, those people who are responsible for operational decisions. So in addition to gathering useful information about behavior patterns we need to find ways to retrieve and effectively communicate research data. Automatic Data Processing will help. But the delivery of research services is an area that the behavioral sciences need to improve so that an important potential consumer, the decision maker, can and will desire to effectively use them.

Having made some assessment of essential, irrelevant and intolerable behavior patterns, we need to develop, carry out and assess programs that show promise for encouraging and discouraging behavior as appropriate. We can see some work being done in this area by AMEDD personnel.

Several fairly extensive ad hoc alcoholism and drug treatment programs are in operation. For example, at Fort Benning there is a half-way house for alcoholics as part of an overall program to deal with alcoholism. At Fort Bragg there is a broad based, enforcement, education and rehabilitation program including a program for heroin addicts based on operant learning principles. Fort Bliss is developing an educational and rehabilitation program as you have heard. Many more systematic and comprehensive preventive, treatment and rehabilitative programs are needed in this area. A diversity of approaches are desirable so that each approach can be assessed for its effectiveness.

In the area of racial relations much of the effort presently needed probably should be directed toward increasing communication between races and understanding through the command structure. Educational programs have begun through the Army training system.

At Fort Benning the Department of Mental Health Services is participating in an extensive race relations program involving the use of discussion teams at the battalion and brigade level. Maillet has described a seminar approach used in VN. The Army and the Medical Department can do a great deal more in this area. The use of experiential learning principles through human relations training would appear to be one approach with great potential. The National Training Laboratories in Washington, D.C., for example, has developed a program to help organizations overcome racism. Exploration of this kind of approach I would strongly encourage.

As mentioned previously there has been some work done in evaluating the basic training process as a behavioral change agent. It may well be that changing the concept of basic training from an initiation rite to be endured, to a training process based on sound principles of learning, could have a profound effect on morale, motivation and performance. It would appear to be a way to humanize the training process without adversely affecting the desired goal. This kind of approach I think touches on the point Feldman made the other day about the need for policy changes in the military.

In the area of behavior rehabilitation the Provost Marshal has in the past provided support for the use of human relations training in the Correctional Training Facility at Fort Riley, and currently the introduction of operant learning principles into the USDB at Fort Leavenworth.

While much has been done to develop programs of behavioral change, I reiterate, much more needs to be done. Particularly, we need several programs in each problem area and area of interest (e.g., drug abuse, race relations, training techniques, dissent) so that comparisons can be made, programs expanded, modified or dropped and new approaches evolved. We need to build into these programs the capability of assessing their product so that programs do not continue indefinitely on assumptions rather than on identified accomplishments. For example, would it be heresy to ask whether our MHCS treatment programs of the last 20 years have done any good at all?

I know of at least one study (Dattel on the Fort Ord MHCS) which raises a serious question about their effectiveness. Dattel found that the kind and/or amount of service rendered by the MHCS did not influence success in those soldiers returned to duty. The success rate (completed ETS) was consistently less than 50%. The major exception was when a diagnosis was given-- then the failure rate was 95%.

Maillet has pointed out that commanders perceive the functions of the MHCS in very narrow terms - mainly to extrude people from the system. Perhaps they are right!! At least there is little or no published evidence to the contrary.

To conduct and evaluate treatment and related programs you must have practitioners and behavioral scientists to administer them. To do this you must either have people with the training, skills and motivation or you must acquire and train such people. When you train people in the Army I believe you have to provide them with methodology and techniques in settings that are relevant to the problems encountered. Are Walter Reed General Hospital and Letterman General Hospital the most relevant places for training mental health professionals and behavioral scientists to deal with racial problems, dissent, and even drug abuse problems? I seriously question it. Therefore, I think we in the mental health and behavioral science fields must take a serious look at how we train our professional and scientific officers to cope with the very serious social problems in the Army environment.

In the last three years the AMEDD psychology program has attempted to prepare officers to deal more relevantly with the problems extant in the Army system. In our recruiting we are now placing emphasis on academically qualified people who have taken some form of active interest in their communities (e.g., social, political, service oriented, religious). Our applied program is no longer limited to clinical psychologists. In fact the Clinical Psychology MOS has been deleted and replaced by the Psychology MOS. This MOS includes of

course clinical psychologists as well as counseling psychologists, school psychologists, educational psychologists and organizational-industrial psychologists. George Albee, President of APA says clinical psychology is dead. I don't know about that but I know that the white coated, office bound clinical psychologist is disappearing from the Army scene. We now provide at the Fort Sam Houston MHCS at least one month of mental health services orientation to all new Army applied psychologists. This includes an introduction to the kinds of problems found at an Army post, an orientation to military resources for coping with problems, and the visiting of several MHCS's in the southwest to observe different models of operation. Our internships at LGH and WRGH this year will provide two to four months training in an MHCS (e.g., Fort Ord, Fort Meade, Fort Belvoir). We have begun this month a new and innovative internship at Fort Ord with the emphasis on community oriented professional activities. I will work to include in all of our training programs a sensitivity to and methodologies to deal with some of the problems we've been discussing this week: e.g., alcoholism, racism and drug abuse.

In order for military psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers and others to maximize their contribution to the Army's coping with problems in the social environment, coordinated, large scale efforts will be needed. This must involve the integrated efforts of professional services and research resources. And finally a viable system must be developed to clearly and effectively communicate professional insights and scientific findings to the decision makers in the Army system. This is a problem we will explore further at our Current Trends (in December) when we go into the development and delivery of research services. If we cannot do these things, we cannot expect to be taken seriously. I personally believe we have a lot to offer. But we have to believe that and actively and persuasively communicate our findings, insights, and beliefs to higher command. We don't have and cannot obtain fully definitive answers to all the questions that plague us today. But who else is better equipped to try? Therefore, we have an obligation to learn as much as we can and communicate that knowledge as effectively and forcefully as possible. As mental health professionals and behavioral scientists, and above all as human beings, we have no less than that responsibility.

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THE ARMY SYSTEM AND THE COUNTER CULTURE*

by

Colonel Stewart L. Baker, Jr., MC**

I would like to, first of all, thank Major Bevilacqua and Colonel Morgan for inviting me to participate in this important convocation of professional energies. Having only recently reported to my assignment in The Surgeon General's Office, I feel somewhat like the Senator who dreamt he was speaking in the Senate and woke up to find out he was. My physiology is still adjusting to new time zones. Should I look like I'm at the end of a long day, it's because it's 8 hours later in Heidelberg, and my daytime body chemistry is still kicking off at midnight, local time. Nonetheless, I feel it is a particularly happy opportunity for me to get to meet with so many of you so early in my tour, albeit late in my day.

My subject, The Army System and the Counter Culture, will be discussed from three aspects: First, a consideration of recent social determinants of a counter culture; second, discussion of the manifestations or symptoms of counter culture in the U. S. Army today; and finally, a comment on the implications of this for Army social work programs.

1. Social operants which determine a counter culture:

a. The age of Aquarius is a product of the marriage of two themes in our society, technology and affluence. During the sixties we've

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focused on these two value systems with a pleasant sort of brinksmanship, employing Madison Avenue's subliminal advertising as well as the soap box of politics to proclaim that we now look directly across the plains at a final citadel, that of ultimate cause, of life itself, and with seven league boots of science, facilitated by the afterburner of our affluence, all disease and human want are only a matter of programming on the "big machine". Such expectations have whetted diverse appetites, and at the same time have challenged many traditional sets related to the concept of the individual, personal worth, and security.

During the short space of the sixties, young Americans have grown from elementary school age to begin their college years. A world of reasonable, proven truths and practicable traditional symbols has changed, as in a flash.

Ten years ago we were discussing the ominous portent of a population explosion. We read of rat colony studies which indicated infertility and erratic behavior were results of population density. However, in a number of States contraception, abortion, and family planning was still a crime. Today the "pill" is widely respected as of standard benefit, and abortion is being accepted as appropriate in family planning. The last few prohibitions are being struck down by judicial review, reflecting the urgent concern about population control. Public debate on this issue has served to emphasize the temporal nature of man, and to question whether life is always good, and deserving of support. Medicolegal reviews of suicides now propose that the taking of one's

own life need not regularly be evidence of irrational conduct. The implications of these shifts are to question one's own relevance.

Ten years ago we were discussing the implications of parental deprivation and family mobility on child rearing. Margaret Mead had advised us to get comfortable with the babysitter, conceived during World War II and necessitated by the working mother, the moonlighting father, increased family moves which sacrificed extended family supports, and inflation. Today's measurement finds over one in five American families moves each year, ostensibly toward new opportunities, and grade school kids hold pot parties and pop drugs during lunchtime and recess in empty apartments. The role diffusion and regression which parental behavior has undergone has undoubtedly facilitated the sense of estrangement, of disconnectedness, of anomie, often descriptive of our youth today.

Ten years ago we were committed by national policy to leave the earth and explore other planets. To an accompaniment of rapidly succeeding generations in computers,, with automation of data analysis and huge memory banks which far exceeded man's own capacities, we landed on the moon, and brought back evidence of new minerals and whispers of a new history for our earth. We all heard the door close to many of our past practices. The earth and the heavens may never be the same again. Which way is up? What is north and south? In the enlarged dimensions of a space age these are relatives, rather than absolutes, and one's sense of orientation is affected. We've lost more than the green cheese and Santa Claus's

silhouette. Even orientations built into religious symbols, the ups and downs of heaven and hell, have been affected. In such an expanding universe of relevant variables, the significance of the individual pales, and seems constricted. The romance of life and the pursuit of happiness is obscured. Youth shouts out that the game of life is not going well, is not an elevating experience for social man, and provides an unendurable succession of windmills, for sallies by strawmen. Legislative efforts to apply the technical resources and great wealth to the needs of minorities seem impotent and unable to pace the logarithmic progression of need systems such as poverty, race, and health care delivery. The youth of today search frantically for new and existential symbols to replace those lost in a decade of progress. The numbers on campus maintain a sharp rate of increase, aggravated by growing student population density there and a sense of distance from faculty who are now unapproachable through a television set.

b. During the same short decade America has produced a new system of expectations, or derivative needs, within the population. These pertain to both material and symbolic goals. They involve striving for the possession of objects as well as for the attainment of specific social roles and status, life styles, ideals, kinds of recreation, and so forth. In fact, our society charismatically offers an overabundance of attractive options in all of these spheres. However, the net effect of this appears to be an increasing intrapsychic conflict affecting most severely that group of individuals who would be most apt to capitalize on such opportunities,

the younger generation. Why is this so? Perhaps information theory can assist in explaining and understanding this seeming paradox.

Spitz has reported on the pathogenic effects of emotional stimulus overload in infancy. He claims that it prevents the subject from completing actions or responses initiated by him. Accumulation of such unfinished "action cycles", leads, according to Spitz, to maladaptive and asocial behavior, and causes an enduring increase in the tension of new situation readiness in the child. It's characteristic of affluent industrial societies, best exemplified by North American society, that there is an increasing complexity of man's social as well as nonhuman environments. This is accompanied by an increase in the number and diversity of stimuli impinging on the individual's field. Limitations of time, economic means, and relevant psychological resources restrict the number of choices that an individual can make and the goals he can pursue and attain. There is thus a bottleneck between the many appetites stimulated on the one hand, and the available attractive goals on the other. In this situation only some of the interests, or appetites, or socially derived needs, may be realized; that is, be followed by appropriate actions culminating in the approach to the desired goal, and satisfactory consummation. Under these conditions there is strong potential for the simultaneous occurrence of incompatible and competitive interests, or response tendencies within the person, and therefore, for intrapsychic conflict of a specific category, productive of ambivalence. One may characterize this whole situation by the concept of input overload.

An overload of attractive stimuli and alternatives is a form of stimulus (or information input) overload that is most prevalent in affluent industrial societies. It is proposed that this exerts a profound effect on the experience and behavior of individuals. Such an overabundance of attractive alternatives, aided and abetted by an affluent and increasingly complex society, leads to conflict, frustration, unrelieved new situation readiness tension, increased interests in, and approaches toward, such situational opportunities, and more conflict, a vicious cycle. This is a new category of psychosocial stress, that must have far-reaching effects on the mental and physical health of affected individuals. So many of our young people appear "ground to impotence between the rocks of their ambivalence". Conflict behavior, i.e., hesitancy, tension, vacillation or complete social blocking, is easily recognizable in the bright but bored upper middle class high school student who compulsively collects hub caps at night or who attempts to "turn-on" with drugs. There is an audible agony in decision-making when considering life goals, particularly such alternatives as settled life with IBM versus a restless, nomadic one with the Peace Corps; closeness to others through social action agencies versus distance through work in technical labs; security versus adventure; sensual gratification versus renunciation; immediate versus postponed satisfactions.

How many possible choices of career opportunities, living environments, styles of life, and modes of leisure confront the individual! If one adds to this the massive output and variety of available material

objects promoted by aggressive advertising, the picture of stimulus input overload is completed. To make choices in the face of such overabundance must be difficult. It's not easy to establish a personally satisfying hierarchy of goals to be strived for.

The dilemma is not of the hungry and oppressed, but of the difficulty in organizing, assigning meaning, to such a shopping center of multiple opportunities, of coping with one's own ambivalence in such a setting.

To this must be added, as further information input overload, the special influence of what is called the mass communication media, which depict and help to shape the desires of people. The media contribute powerfully to the arousal and formation of all types of socially determined needs, promote the pursuit of related goals, and thus contribute to the eliciting of intrapsychic conflicts.

The implications of such a contemporary society are clear: an overabundance of attractive choices and related intrapsychic conflicts have serious consequences for mental health. They constitute a contribution of the affluent society to psychiatric morbidity. Overstimulated and bewildered parents bring up overstimulated and bewildered children unable to cope with overstimulation, committed to the values of overstimulation by drugs and sex. This operational concept was originally proposed by Dr. Z. J. Lipowski, as the conflict of Buridan's Ass, which starved to death between two stacks of hay, unable to decide which of them to approach.

It is not love, a socially sponsoring emotion facilitating an enlarged identity system, which is proposed by the counter culture, but only one form of affection, self-love, as emergency or symptomatic behavior, in terms of immediate self-gratifications, a limiting concept, which is the practice. The self-destructive bent of the "now" generation's fix on drugs and sex is an example of the mental mechanism "identification with the aggressor".

2. Manifestations of counter culture in the U. S. Army: Since much of the strength of the Army is conscripted, and one tour oriented, only recently separated from the mainstream of American community life, one would predict the additional requirement of rapid social adjustment to a specialized, aggressive community with a somewhat autocratic hierarchy would be quite stressful. There are, indeed, many communications of concern about the system's complacency in the face of needed change. The soldier wrestles with the meaning and the values of requirements for uniformity in behavior and dress. Uniformity as a conditioning practice is intended training, productive of improved predictability of troop behavior in combat. It intends to "control a number of variables out" of the individual's potential for response. The soldier asks, nonetheless, how his personal variations in hairdo affects his grasp of technical role and group membership deleteriously. He wants more information on the "whys", the relevance, the impact of his own behavior. As he's learned to protest the TV tube faculty-surrogate on campus he protests the didactic, one-way communication through command channels under the rubric of orders, command guidance, directives, etc. He's hard at work attempting

to humanize the definition of his own military role and group membership. He criticizes the community's inattentions to the well-documented problem of alcoholism while it so aggressively searches for the marihuana user. He searches for increased depth in experience by joining subrosa or underground clubs or unions, and reads "rap-type" newspapers produced from unclear sources. He brings an expanding definition of civil rights into the service, and writes his representative in Congress more often than did his predecessor. He experiments with marihuana as well as other drugs in quest of an "inner trip", of increased experience with his own capacities, as advertised by the drug trade. He passively licenses or on occasion supports group protest behavior as a manifestation of group-mindedness and group question on military procedures, communicating back up the command chain. He senses this form of behavior, though new, may be appropriate in communities with increasing population density. He wears the peace symbol during off-duty time, obviously in open question, as though to expand or balance the implications of his soldier identity and to retain membership in the larger community. It is his "hope" medal, and has great symbolic security value for him. These are only some of the more frequently measured counter culture behaviors. He, like his civilian cohort, is in search of meaning and replacement of values lost in the dynamics of an expanding geopolitics sponsored by concepts of technology and affluence.

3. Implications for the Army social work program:

To quote Thomas Mann, "Order and simplification are the first

steps toward the mastery of a subject -- the actual enemy is the unknown".

We should be dealing more and more with the effects of stimulus overload, overabundance of choices, of the problems of ambiguity in reasoning, and people's inability to cope with resulting conflicts. The clinical issues of guilt and neurotic inhibition aren't nearly so important as those of role mastery of the "now" environment. Effective consultation will assist the soldier toward organizing his total experience into more useful meaning. Consultation will work to facilitate two-way channels of communication with command, particularly for purpose of review of current procedures and policies in need of modification. It has been informally reported that soon reveille may be deleted from the Army's standard of procedures, as currently irrelevant to the accomplishment of its mission. This follows many questions from the operational level, which were effectively communicated to the policy-making level.

It's possible, of course, to draw the teeth from counter culture, by fiat, through adoption of a number of the popular slogans which are plays on words which only allude to opposites, such as more emphasis on the peace-restoring, roles and goals of the Army. No doubt more attention should be paid to this kind of program, since it would provide a vehicle for other more definitive education about the Army's mission, its internal characteristics, and the nature of military community membership.

To augment and respect the soldier's search for meaning, one may employ innovations in techniques. Such recently reported experiences as non-drug coffee houses, company commanders' Call for drug abuse,

utilizing representative cadre in seminar fashion to discuss racial tension, and evening rap sessions in cosponsorship with the chaplain to discuss drug abuse education, are only a few of the lengthening list of new experiences reported by social workers.

There are many problems in Army policy and procedure which require your active and early intervention. There is a palpable risk that in many units the drug abuse problem is being scapegoated; the problem of the decayed relationship between EMs and NCO's may be the far greater one. The new EM, seen in stereotype as a potential troublemaker, is in sharp contrast with the cadre (NCO's) who are seen in stereotype as "Lifers". In many situations it appears obvious that the NCO's are not sufficiently capable of dealing with questions of role and social values with contemporary draftees. Much attention is needed in this area. Focus should be more on prevention and early case identification in support of the many. The role of consultant to the operational group and its leadership needs equal time with the individual, patient-focused clinical activities. In such an indication of input overload, the consultant's techniques will often be quite directive.

The utilization of administrative discharge (AR 635-212) for alcoholism and drug abuse cases is being challenged as socially irresponsible and unjust; socially irresponsible because it returns a man to civilian society with burdensome problems, and unjust because military service is an increased mental stress for many. We obviously need social research in these areas. Our medical department caseload is quite a sizeable

requirement for both manpower and dollars. One percent of the Army is in the hospital. Three percent of the Army are seen in the outpatient clinics each day. For each two soldiers treated, one dependent or retired person is treated. A budget of over a billion dollars a year is required to support the over 60,000 people providing these services.

In closing, I feel constrained to make one related proposal; that we must review the behavioral science fields in the Army and increase the congruency between programs. Several years ago clinical social work responded to the Army's need for a number of additional services by assisting in the activation of project Transition, by largely staffing and leading the new Army Community services, and several other programs. In addition, the hospital social work services, in many instances, disengaged themselves from the pre-existing matrix of behavioral science personnel and organized separate and independent services toward an increased outreach. In the interim a degree of distance has developed with other mental health professionals. I propose that we should look at our common goals and work together for increased communication and complementarity between programs. Certainly, there's no value in the good old days being revisited. Old models won't handle the pressured and sophisticated problems of today's Army. However, we need to work on our bridges and communications between our related disciplines, to improve the three dimensional perception of the client and to maximize the mileage from the usually limited dollar. Again, it is in the ability to work effectively in close harmony that our true mastery of our separate

disciplines will be measured.

The poignant communications from the social researches of our American youth requires our best in programming. Dr. Alexander Leighton warns that too rapid social change is noxious stress and may produce mental illness. He also counsels against replicating the experience of communities which develop multiples of unrelating, even faintly competitive social programs and measure no constructive impact from these columnar program systems. A stronger amalgam of our disciplines will provide a structure which is broadly insinuated into the Army community fabric, with an intimate operational face turned toward command. Military social work must supply the zeal and community relevance of the ombudsman. At the same time, and in the same process, as a change agent, military social workers must provide education on and interpret an expanding definition of the human operations and need systems of the American soldier to the unit leadership. By coherence and congruency in program developments we can provide persuasive effective consultation to Army community leaders. Perhaps a more descriptive term than "counter culture" is "cataculture", to illustrate the regressive, destructive aims of such behaviors. In any event, such group symptomatology calls for early and major educational efforts, or in any language system, treatment.

Thank you again for the opportunity to join so valuable a conference.

ARMY RESEARCH ENDEAVORS TO
EXPEND KNOWLEDGE ABOUT RACE RELATIONS,
DRUG ABUSE, AND THE IMPACT OF THE
COUNTER CULTURE ¹

Major Paul F. Darnauer²

It is a distinct honor to share this block of time with the psychiatry and psychology consultants. It raises a question, however; Am I talking as a consultant on Army Research? That idea is flattering, but the thought is down right fearsome. My predecessors have the advantage of working daily with areas to which they have spoken. I no longer enjoy such an association with Army Research, more specifically, Army Behavioral and Social Science Research. My credentials are that I was involved in such research for a few months and have surrendered neither my interest nor my contacts in the research community.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and assess the level and nature of research at Department of the Army as that relates to the course theme: Drugs, Race, the Counter Culture and the Soldier.

To preclude a requirement for some introductory remarks with respect to Social Work Research, I want to acknowledge and commend to your attention the presentation made by my predecessor, LTC (Ret.) Les Shellhase, at the Current Trends in Army Social Work course three years ago.³ His assessment of needs, discussion of types of research and comments about funding for research in Army social work (except for a name or two), are not outdated. Some copies of that paper are available here in the room and the paper was reprinted in the proceedings of the current trends course of October 1967.

¹The points of view expressed in this paper are those of the author. They represent neither Department of Defense nor Department of the Army positions.

²The author is currently Staff Analyst, Directorate of Retirement Studies, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower & Reserve Affairs). Prior to May 1970, he held the position of Research Sociologist, Directorate of Personnel Studies and Research, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army.

³Leslie J. Shellhase. "The Design and Funding of Research in Army Social Work," in Army Social Work: Collected Papers of the Advanced Seminar on the Army Family in the American Community. Denver, Colorado: Fitzsimons General Hospital, 1967, p. 8.

THE ARMY RESEARCH SYSTEM

To set the stage for a discussion and assessment of current Army research in the areas of race, drug abuse, and the counter culture, some description of the system for accomplishing research seems important. A feel for the operation of that system at Department of the Army should give you some insight into what gets investigated and, conversely, what does not.¹ The system elements that are most important are: (1) funding, (2) the "idea cycle," (3) research management, and (4) research monitorship. I will only highlight in each area.

Funding

There are two fund sources: first, there are Research and Development funds, managed by the Chief of Research and Development. Some projects can be categorized as research, development, test, or evaluation (RDTE) efforts. The definitions of what is research or development or test or evaluation are essentially those used in hardware-oriented research and development and have been ~~some what~~ expediently applied to the behavioral, social science, and human factors areas. Often it is difficult to apply the terms to what we need to do and we have some difficulty competing for money.

Some of these RDTE funds are managed by the Army Research Office and some by the Medical Research and Development Command. Generally, the Medical R&D interest is with medical problems or potential problems -- in our case socio-psychological and psychiatric or "clinical" phenomenon -- while the Army Research Office is concerned with issues of broader, less specialized concern. Overlap, however, does occur.

A second funding source, is the Operation and Maintenance Account (OMA) which can support "management studies" that will improve a management method or procedure within the Army. For example, the Army Community Service Handbook for Volunteers was produced as a management study since the intention was to adopt it upon completion -- there was no plan to put it through extensive test or evaluation prior to making it generally available.

Neither of these major sources generally provide monies for "little" projects. The Biomedical Stress Division of the U.S. Army Medical R&D Command, however, has provided small grants to support "in house" efforts: several of us have benefitted from these grants as we pursued our dissertation research. At least for the time being, however, this money has "dried up." In times of austerity the lights must be kept burning

¹These remarks pertain specifically to Army level efforts as contrasted with Department of Defense efforts on the one hand and CONARC and overseas command endeavors on the other. Despite serious attempts to identify the extent and nature of manpower and personnel research being conducted within the entirety of Department of Defense, the trite accusation about right and left hands is appropriate.

and the troops need to be fed: research efforts take lower priority.

The "Idea Cycle"

As a means of identifying research needs in the behavior and social area, a 12-month cycle of problem identification and "massage" is followed -- perhaps it is better to say an attempt to follow a 12-month cycle is made. This cycle begins when Department of the Army staff agencies and major commands are asked for research requirements by the Behavioral Sciences Division of the Army Research Office. This request produces rather imprecise statements which identify, justify, and otherwise describe a problem area. After several levels of staff evaluation, including a priority ordering, the research requirements are circulated among research agencies (in-service [the U.S. Army Behavioral Science Research Laboratory - BESRL] and in the federally contacted research centers [for example, Human Resources Research Organization - HUMRRO]). The agencies review the requirements to identify those that have research promise within the capabilities of the specific agency. For example, HUMRRO has for some time concerned itself with training research (for example, simulated trainers for aviators, system analysis and design of training courses [AMMED Basic Course at Fort Sam Houston]) and its stable of researchers are primarily interested and competent in the training area. I might note that it is interesting to see how expertness can be tailored to the economic environment, however. (For example, the Research Advisory Corporation [RAC] essentially restricted itself to operations research until recently when the purse string grew tight -- now it has a behavioral science capability.) In approximately 12 months research agency work programs are finalized and approved by the Chief of Research and Development.

Not all research requirements get incorporated into research work programs. A portion simply dies, others are modified and funding as contractual studies is sought for them, and some are shelved until the next year's requirements are sought.

Research Management

Once a problem area is formalized as a work unit within a research center's work program, it is managed and administered by the center and the Army Research Office or the Medical R&D Command. The originating agency or command retains its interest and can occasionally be briefed about the project's progress.

Another mechanism for influencing a research project is the Study Advisory Group (SAG). SAG's are mandatory for some projects and optional with others. The SAG usually consists of Army staff personnel with interest (direct or indirect) in the project. The SAG has advantages for both staff and research agency personnel: staff has the opportunity to influence an effort's direction as it proceeds and the researcher can determine the "user" perspective and can seek logistical and other assistance as necessary. The ideal outcome is a research product that is understood by the military manager and one that can be practically applied by him.

Research Monitorship

The research effort is monitored by the Congress, DOD, the Army, and staff agencies and commands. Undoubtedly, you are familiar with Congressional hearings on hardware research and development (for example: the C5A and the Main Battle Tank). The Congress is similarly interested in behavioral and social science research, but we haven't had the publicity the hardware group has enjoyed recently. The message, however, was very clear when I first arrived in Washington: the Congress did not want Army research to address domestic problems of the day.

At Army level behavioral and social science (RDTE & OMA) research is monitored by the Army Science Advisory Committee (ASAC) which is an Office of the Chief of Staff activity. The purpose of this committee, which is chaired by the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff (General DePuy), is to review all research and study efforts within the Army. Not only does it monitor effort but it establishes priorities, redirects efforts, and may assist in expediting priority items. In the last year, the ASAC has become a more important link in the research activity of the Army.

The DA agencies and commands monitor those efforts that seem to have implications for them. Monitorship is difficult because of the wide-ranging study efforts going on within the Army. For example, until the budget squeeze tolled the demise of the Directorate of Personnel Studies and Research, it attempted to identify all research and study efforts ongoing within the Army that had manpower or personnel implications. The task was unbelievably difficult and the result, I am convinced, was incomplete.

If these remarks have given you the idea that the personnel and manpower research and study effort -- you will note I have not even attempted to differentiate between research and study -- at Department of the Army level is complex and ponderous, I will have made my point.

CURRENT RESEARCH ON DRUGS, RACE AND THE COUNTER CULTURE

I say without hesitation that research on drugs, race and counter culture in its embryonic stage. Last January both the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) and the Chief of Research and Development (CRD) developed position papers calling for concern and research on the subject "The American Soldier in the 1970's." A variety of problem areas were identified. The result of the concern is that two projects are now approved, funded and under way.

The first will seek to identify situations which create friction between the Army and its personnel by examining the expectations of new personnel and their reactions to early military experiences. The expected goal is to isolate specific tensions and to describe and test changes that might reduce these tensions.

The second effort will attempt to identify incidents related to dissidence that can be anticipated in the next 2 to 4 years. The goal of this inquiry is

to postulate and evaluate alternative methods of handling incidents. One possible alternative is to change selection and training methods for military policemen (MP's).

A third project is approved but the work unit statement is not yet in final form. Basically, it will seek to (a) identify the personal and social characteristics of the 1970-era Army recruit population; (b) review literature and research to identify factors that influence individual performance in combat; and (c) to compare these findings in effort to anticipate the impacts on the Army mission. The ultimate goal is to suggest policy and operational areas that require change or modification.

Four other research and study activities, generally unrelated to the "American Soldier" study also deserve mention.

(1) DCSPER is currently developing a study plan(s) in response to DOD guidance directing the services to explore promotions, disciplinary actions (non-judicial), procedures for selecting individuals for MOS training and assignment, and cultural bias in selection tests (OCS, etc.) from a racial perspective. Probably the result will be several studies involving both in-house and contractor activity.

(2) The activity of the All-Volunteer Army Study Group. This group is primarily concerned with testing under field conditions a variety of means by which Army life can be made more pleasant and, consequently, more attractive as a career option. Some ideas require staff analysis and others require further research.

(3) An unconfirmed report indicates that the Medical R&D Command has contracted for a bibliographic research effort on the state of knowledge on marijuana. While my source of information is reliable my inquiries to the Medical R&D Command have been unproductive.

(4) The current Sample Survey of Military Personnel administered by the Office of Personnel Operations. In this survey attitudes and information about drug abuse is being sought. That data may or may not be synthesized into a report. It is my personal impression that the Sample Survey has a research potential that has never really been realized. In this respect I would recognize the superiority of the comparable Navy effort: it not only collects data but also processes the results so that they can be understood and used in policy and management decision making. I don't know that the impact is greater than that of the Army Sample Survey but the potential for being so is higher.

PROBLEMS IN ARMY RESEARCH

Now let me turn to some problems, as I see them, to making Army Research responsive to our dynamic environment.

I will simply tick off some of the problems -- each could easily be expanded.

(1) The cumbersome research and study system that will normally require a minimum leadtime of two years (research idea to fund proposal to research product).

(2) The politics of research that influence what is appropriate for Army research to consider and what it will not study.

(3) The environment of the day, also largely political, that permits Army research concern with domestic social phenomenon today but did not yesterday.

(4) The legal situation that interferes with research efforts in an area like drug abuse. This, at least, permits rationalizing among the less brash.

(5) The discontinuity between the worlds of Army manager and the researcher with resultant communication difficulties.

Undoubtedly other problem areas could be (should be) added. These, however, provide a springboard for considering some alternatives -- maybe, "end runs."

ALTERNATIVES TO ARMY RESEARCH

I will suggest several alternatives about as they strike me. Before doing so, I think it is important to summarize several attributes of the animal: Army Research.

(1) The system is imperfect, ponderous, and politically influenced and some things will not change. (For example, I believe it unrealistic to expect that research can escape political influence.)

(2) There are limits to what we can expect of research. For example, while we can get some clues from research about how to pursue improved race relations, no research project will give us the ultimate training--sensitizing--system that can be adopted anywhere.

(3) Army level research does provide a service and results which can be identified. For example, training and selection research has been very useful. It, however, will generally not be helpful in dealing with situations in which immediate results are needed.

(4) There is serious question whether an ability exists, except in mythology, to forecast in the manpower and personnel area, under circumstances of the Army bureaucracy, with a goal of researching prospectively. For example, the Army 75 Personnel Concept Study was a significant effort in this area: to my knowledge, except for computer systems development, no research requirement that was identified has been funded.

Having made the above acknowledgements, we can consider several alternatives:

(1) Local research endeavors are the key endeavors in responding to change. The surveys conducted on drug abuse in Vietnam, and Willis Bright's community survey at Fort Belvoir are examples. Les Shellhase contended;

"Indeed, it is in the conduct of practice, and in close and continuing contact with client needs, that research requirements can be perceived most immediately and most accurately." ^{1/}

These bite-size research efforts require less extensive approval, smaller amounts of money (no money?), have a low profile, and can provide the basis for getting bigger interest. You know the old story about the donkey and the 2 x 4: these smaller efforts can be the 2 x 4's which get Department of the Army attention.

(2) Close coordination between researchers and managers throughout the research endeavor -- before, during, and after. Many times the vigorous, continued concern of the researcher seems the only way of achieving change but some management (command) involvement along the way might have been a substitute.

(3) Researchers and managers have to report what they find. The reports have to be available -- we have a newsletter that can be a means of exchange. Without this communication, we duplicate needlessly.

(4) Researchers have to make recommendations about how findings can be implemented. Again the researcher -- manager relationship is important because it permits the researcher to "dry run" his ideas and tailor the recommendations to the "real" world.

This presentation obviously has not been exhaustive. My purpose here has been to give you some insight into the research process at Department of the Army level, to outline what is being done in the areas we have been considering this week, and to suggest some problems and alternatives to "big" research by the Army. If I have stimulated your thinking about the problems of getting research and encouraged you to "think small," our time will have been well spent.

¹ Leslie J. Shellhase. "The Design and Funding of Research in Army Social Work," in Army Social Work: Collected Papers of the Advanced Seminar on the Army Family in the American Community. Denver, Colorado: Fitzsimons General Hospital, 1967, p. 5.

ARMY SOCIAL WORK
IN
THE FIELD OF CORRECTIONS

LTC Joseph Reeves, MSC

A major problem with which Army social workers in the field of corrections are struggling is not only the Army's problem, but one of society. An ongoing cultural revolution within our nation includes de-emphasis of traditional authority and discipline. The war in Vietnam is unpopular. The Army symbolically becomes the target for pent up feelings. A large group of people will not serve in the Army and will do anything to return to civilian life including terms in stockades.

Because of past and present manpower requirements, many poorly motivated individuals have been inducted into the Army. The United States Army correctional system strives to motivate some of these dissenting, problem-plagued soldiers. In varying degrees, all Army prisoners have failed in that they have been unable to adjust to the traditional Army system. Most of them also have a history of failure in the civilian community prior to service, in school, in employment and in their family lives.

Each year thousands of young soldiers are leaving the Army with other-than-honorable discharges. Many of them are pleased with this action; they "want out" and are not particular about the means or character of their separation. They fail to recognize that this type of discharge may stigmatize them for life, and, possibly, thwart their goals and ambitions. Because the Army has the power to stigmatize a young man in this way, which is without close parallel in civilian life, the Army must assume the obligation of insuring his complete understanding of the repercussions before he willingly, and sometimes eagerly, takes this out.

The Army correctional system is one part of a complex interacting social system which relates to the military offender. This system includes a troop unit prior to the commission of an offense, an apprehension system after an offense has been committed, a military justice system which is involved in trial and review, a confinement system, and a troop unit to which the offender is returned for resumption of military duty. All components of the overall system must be functioning cooperatively to assure rehabilitation of the offender.

The quality of leadership the individual receives, the prevailing philosophy of the receiving military installation, and the nature of the assignment given the individual, have been shown to be contributing factors to the quality of sustained military performance. Since these variables function outside the dimensions of the Army correctional system, the ultimate responsibility for successful military performance must be assumed by the

total military environment. In other words, once the individual has been trained and motivated to return to duty, the receiving installation must assume a major portion of the responsibility for that individual's subsequent performance. To attribute his performance, whether successful or unsuccessful, to the influence of the correctional system alone, would be to ignore the progression of experiences that serve to define the total military environment.

The stated mission of Army confinement facilities is to provide for the custody and correctional treatment of military prisoners who are confined in compliance with law and regulations. Policies which are set forth in regulations stress operation and administration of Army confinement facilities on a corrective rather than punitive basis, treatment on the basis of individual needs, dignity of the individual, prohibitions on repressive regimentation and degradation, and selection and training of correctional officers and other personnel assigned to confinement facilities.¹ More specific missions and operating instructions are delineated for stockades (installations, field, and transient), disciplinary barracks, correctional training facilities and hospital prisoner wards.

Control, sometimes referred to as custody or security, and treatment, sometimes referred to as rehabilitation, have received varying degrees of emphasis within different correctional institutions. Major emphasis on, or predominance of the characteristics of, either of these functions produces control-oriented or treatment-oriented correctional settings. The trend in modern corrections has been to change from control-oriented to treatment-oriented institutions.

As the degree of emphasis shifts from control-orientation to a treatment-orientation, the institutions are characterized by empirical referents of both orientations.

As a control-oriented correctional institution evolves, or moves along the continuum toward becoming more treatment-oriented, modifications can be noted in four major areas: (1) reduced mass treatment and reduced depersonalization; (2) development of staff structures to foster cooperation between staff members; (3) increased communication; and (4) increased degree of commitment of custodial personnel to the treatment effort. Changes may be occurring in any one or in all four areas, at different rates, during the same period of time.

The written policies, directives and regulations concerning the Army correctional system are consistent with development of treatment-oriented correctional settings. However, the mere establishment of rules, regulations and

¹U. S. Department of the Army, Military Police, The Army Correction Program, Army Regulation No. 190-1, 12 January 1967.

procedures in written form does not insure that those involved will conform to that which is prescribed. Even Moses had difficulty after the ten commandments were written. Presently, implementation of the written correctional system is in a state of transition.

In support of installation confinement facilities, social work officers of the mental hygiene consultation services are directed to

" . . . render guidance and recommendations to the correctional officer on individual prisoner's correctional treatment requirements and aid in training custodial and security personnel to recognize symptoms of abnormal behavior, to report such behavior and to realize the limitations to be placed on counseling of prisoners by custodial personnel."²

As members of the Directorate of Mental Hygiene at a discipline barracks, social workers are directed to provide data for use in classification, assignment and disposition of prisoners, to provide diagnostic evaluation and short term treatment of prisoners, to recommend hospitalization for emotionally disturbed prisoners, and to provide evaluations, counseling and consultation in connection with the administration, discipline and rehabilitation program of the disciplinary barracks.³

Social workers at correctional training facilities are directed to provide advice, assistance and recommendations regarding professional activities in support of the mission and objectives, and to assist each correctional training unit in the observation, evaluation, counseling and correctional treatment of prisoners.⁴

Hospitalized prisoners receive social work services as part of the overall social work program for in-patients.

As with the written policies which pertain to confinement facilities, these directives do not insure that social workers will adhere to them. Within the Army correctional system, social workers provide professional social work support in varying ways and with an intensity which ranges from enthusiastic participation to expression of overt hostility about the operation of correctional programs.

²U. S. Department of the Army, Military Police, Installation Confinement Facilities, Army Regulation No. 190-2, 9 October 1967.

³U. S. Department of the Army, Installations, United States Disciplinary Barracks, Army Regulation No. 210-170, 10 April 1964.

⁴U. S. Department of the Army, Military Police, Correctional Training Facilities, Army Regulation No. 190-19, 30 September 1968.

The specific behavior exhibited by the individual social worker is influenced by a multitude of actions. Rather than dwell on the causes of the behavior, my remarks will be directed to what that behavior is.

Many modes of functioning have been ascribed to social workers. Studt noted a diversity of roles of social workers in the correctional field. She stated:

"In this fragmented collection of correctional staff groups the social worker's role and particular contribution has been only roughly defined by either the profession or the correctional system. Consequently, most correctional social workers make a somewhat idiosyncratic adjustment to the exigencies of their organizational environment. Many become treators, unrelated to other personnel or, alternatively, lose their professional identity in the performance of a variety of correctional tasks. Some have found it impossible to assume a significant leadership role, encouraging the agency to define a more comprehensive service task that will engage the abilities of many kinds of personnel. But this leadership role is seldom explicitly authorized by the agency and usually emerges only because the individual social worker creates it for himself."⁵

As one looks at contrasting roles, or constellations of behaviors, which have been described by various social workers as appropriate for them in differing settings, many possibilities are raised as to what primary roles might be engaged in by social workers in the correctional field.

As used in this paper, role is a functional concept which refers to a pattern of behavior of an individual within his status as a social worker. The patterns of behavior are assumed to be recurrent and congruent with social work knowledge, values, method, purpose and sanctions.

Social workers in correctional settings have been observed to shift from one social work mode of functioning to another rather than to adhere exclusively to any one role, although many have a proclivity for one particular "modus operandi." This raises the possibility of various combinations of roles existing within social work practice in different correctional settings and that a given social worker may engage in more than one. This provides a way of looking at social workers in action for purpose of comparisons to determine common factors and deviances.

⁵Elliot Studt, A Conceptual Approach to Teaching Materials: Illustrations from the Field of Corrections (Lebanon, Pennsylvania: Sowers Printing Co., 1965). p. 15.

As part of a study on "Social Work Roles in Control-Oriented and Treatment-Oriented Correctional Settings,"⁶ roles, or modes of functioning, were developed. Each role consists of a cluster of social work behaviors which are directed to various individuals and groups within correctional settings, and which have distinct immediate objectives. The roles are viewed as means of achieving the overall social work objective of helping individual and groups of prisoners to achieve their full potential.

Seven roles of social workers were developed which have been observed in correctional institutions; namely, therapist, broker, advocate, screener, researcher, teacher and consultant. In his overall interaction within the correctional setting, over a period of time, the social worker's various behaviors may be found primarily in one role, or in various combinations of the seven roles. When a social worker is exhibiting behavior consistent with a particular role, he is at that time functioning in that role. He might shift from one role to another at any time by exhibiting behavior more consistent with the other role. Within each role, behaviors may be found which represent direct and indirect intervention by social workers. Direct contacts and relationships with the client, or client system, within the correctional setting refer to contacts with individual prisoners or with prisoner groups. Indirect contacts imply intermediacy in the process, or contacts on behalf of the client, for example, contacts with correctional staff or social agencies on behalf of a prisoner.

Briefly, the seven major patterns of behavior are:

1. The therapist who diagnoses and treats prisoners, obtains information facilitating diagnosis and treatment, or discusses progress of a prisoner being seen individually or in a group.
2. The broker who coordinates the use of existing social resources, influences correctional specialists, education and training, family and collateral resources to use special assets to help a prisoner or prisoners, or discusses progress in coordinating special resources.
3. The advocate who changes policy, corrects an inequity, or develops a new resource.
4. The screener who separates or classifies a prisoner or prisoners, obtains information related to possible separation or classification, or, discusses separation or classification of a prisoner or prisoners.

⁶Joseph Reeves, Social Work Roles in Control-Oriented and Treatment-Oriented Settings, Unpublished doctoral dissertation (Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri 1970).

5. The researcher who conducts a research project, or discusses a research project.

6. The teacher who gives formal instruction based on social work knowledge, or discusses a social work instructional program.

7. The consultant who offers guidance about a specific current or potential problem, or assists a correctional staff member in working with a prisoner or prisoners.

These seven patterns of social work behavior were examined in twenty-one stockades and correctional training units. The correctional settings were differentiated in terms of the predominance of control or treatment orientation.

Based on the assumption that as a correctional institution changes from control-oriented to treatment-oriented, major changes are first noted at the administrative level, and the treatment-orientation then gradually extends down through various administrative levels until it reaches the correctional specialists, a questionnaire was administered to measure the degree of commitment of correctional personnel to the written treatment-oriented program in terms of their actual behavior. Ten control-oriented correctional settings and eleven treatment-oriented settings were identified.

Comparison was made between the proportion of the number of acts consistent with each of the seven social work roles over the total acts in all roles by type setting.

Social workers in treatment-oriented correctional settings exhibited more broker and more consultant behavior than social workers in control-oriented settings. Social workers in control-oriented settings exhibited more therapist behavior, more advocate behavior and more screener behavior than social workers in treatment-oriented correctional settings. Social work activity in consonance with the roles of researcher and teacher did not differ significantly between control and treatment correctional settings.

Social workers in treatment-oriented correctional settings appeared to intervene more with groups of prisoners, with individual and groups of correctional specialists, with collateral resources and with social work specialists than did social workers in control-oriented correctional settings. Social workers in control-oriented correctional settings appeared to intervene more with individual prisoners and administrators than did social workers in treatment-oriented correctional institutions. Social worker intervention with education and training personnel and with prisoners' families did not appear to differ significantly between settings.

The services of professional social workers to deal with social and personal problems, family concerns and crisis situations of prisoners within the Army correctional system is compatible with their training and competence. However,

in addition to the therapeutic approach, there are two other points of intervention within prison systems where social workers have been utilized effectively. These activities are essential. The first is guiding prisoners to rehabilitate prisoners and the second, to guide custodial staff and work supervisors to rehabilitate prisoners.

Cressey in his article on "Theoretical Foundations for Using Criminals in the Rehabilitation of Criminals" described the base for the former activity:

"The problem of changing criminals is a problem of insuring that criminals become members of intimate groups whose verbalizations stress that criminal conduct is wrong. The criminals who have rejected pro-criminal verbalizations in favor of anti-crime verbalizations should be more effective in changing the criminal's self conceptions than those unfamiliar with pro-criminal verbalizations. They should also be more efficient in avoiding verbalizations appropriate to a new kind of criminality of deviancy. The ex-criminal is not only effective as an agent of change, but by thus acting, he becomes a target of change sharing the values of the anti-criminal group thus insuring his own rehabilitation."⁷

Dr. Brodsky and LTC Couch described the basis for the second approach in "An Approach to Correctional Consultation" which appeared in the August 1967 issue of the Military Police Journal.

"Glaser, in his recent research study that covered inmate-staff relationships in five federal penitentiaries among over 1,200 inmates, found that by far, the greatest impact on inmates was by the custodial officers and work supervisors and that relatively little impact was made by prison case workers and other mental hygiene personnel. He further reported that when 65 successful releases had been asked which of the prison staff had contributed most to their rehabilitation, 54 percent identified work supervisors, 14 percent chaplains, and only nine percent identified case workers, psychologists, or psychiatrists. Thus, in terms of normal hygiene activities, in these penal institutions, relatively little impact overall was observed."⁸

The findings of the aforementioned study were corroborated by a study conducted by personnel of the Mental Hygiene Directorate at the U.S.D.B., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

⁷Donald R. Cressey, "Theoretical Foundations for Using Criminals in the Rehabilitation of Criminals," 1965.

⁸Stanley Brodsky and Sidney A. Couch, "An Approach to Correctional Consultation," Military Police Journal, August 1967.

With increased involvement of custodial personnel in treatment effort, it seems appropriate to me that social workers should become more involved in guidance of those who work with prisoners rather than placing major effort on individual casework interviews. Another point of view would be to maintain the traditional approach and concentrate on those prisoners who are most disruptive to the system. I consider this approach to be less effective. This judgment is based on my observations as a social worker during two and a half years with the Correctional Training Facility, three years with the Disciplinary Barracks and three years in Mental Hygiene Clinics working with post stockades.

For the future, if one accepts the premise that the modern trend in the field of corrections is changing from control-oriented to treatment-oriented correctional institutions, concentration on acquiring skills to function in consonance with the pattern of role functioning described in association with treatment-oriented settings might be advisable rather than focusing on skills for control-oriented settings which are gradually moving in the direction of treatment-orientations. Those social workers in correctional settings, therefore, might place increased emphasis on acquiring more skills and knowledge congruent with broker and consultant roles. Consultant behavior is frequently thought of as appropriate after a social worker first has obtained basic experience rather than for recent graduates. Findings indicate that recent graduates are actively functioning in this role.

Stress also might be exerted on acquiring additional skills in working with groups of prisoners; with individual and groups of correctional specialists, with collateral resources and in supervision of social work specialists.

The high proportion of social work behaviors in consonance with the therapist role in treatment settings might indicate some difficulty in social workers functioning as a consultant. It was expected that there would be a higher proportion of consultant behavior. A possible explanation might be that social workers, who are trained in casework or group work and feel comfortable in the activities which are encompassed, encapsulate their behavior within these limits.

Likewise, within a control setting, the proportion of therapist behavior is high. This raises the possibility of the social worker isolating himself from the system. The small proportion of advocate behavior seemed to reinforce this possibility.

Of particular significance at the present time is social work support of Army stockades.

In the "Report of the Special Civilian Committee for the Study of the United States Army Confinement System,"⁹ the Secretary of the Army's Blue Ribbon Committee advocated:

⁹Austin H. MacCormick, Chairman, "Report of the Special Civilian Committee for the Study of the United States Army Confinement System" (Department of the Army: Washington, D. C., 1970).

". . . that the Army provide as much psychological and psychiatric clinical service as good professional standards call for in each stockade."

The Committee considered present services to be inadequate.

After examining the Committee's report, AR 190-2, TB PMG 36, the findings of the study on "Social Work Roles in Control-Oriented and Treatment-Oriented Correctional Settings," premises regarding consultation, and after interviews with social workers in twenty-one different correctional settings, I have concluded that:

1. Active involvement of social workers in the operation of Army stockade correctional programs can enrich and enhance the programs. Within the United States Army stockades, social workers can (1) assist prisoners with social and personal problems, family concerns and crisis situations, (2) guide prisoners to rehabilitate other prisoners, (3) guide custodial staff and work supervisors to rehabilitate prisoners, (4) use social resources on behalf of prisoners, (5) intervene with prisoners' families on behalf of prisoners, (6) influence changes within prison systems to enhance rehabilitation of prisoners, (7) screen prisoners who are not amenable to rehabilitation or who disrupt the prison system, (8) teach social work knowledge to cadre and prisoners, and (9) conduct research projects.

2. Social work specialists function best under the direct supervision of a social worker.

3. Within the Army correctional system, emphasis is best placed on returning the greatest number of soldiers to duty with improved attitudes and motivation rather than working intensively with a few individuals who demonstrate the most severe pathology.

4. The trend in Army social work in correctional settings which are treatment rather than control-oriented is in the direction of offering guidance to correctional staff on behalf of prisoners and in utilizing social resources on behalf of prisoners. Additionally, in treatment settings the trend has been moving in the direction of social workers intervening more with groups of prisoners rather than with individual prisoners.

5. Social work specialists who are working in stockade settings at the present time are not being utilized in accordance with current regulations.

6. Most social workers in Mental Hygiene Consultation Services prefer other activities rather than working with stockade personnel and prisoners.

7. Additional social workers and social work specialists are needed to adequately support stockade rehabilitative programs.

8. For the most adequate functioning of social workers in correctional settings, social workers should not be members of the immediate formal organization.

Before mentioning recommendations regarding social work support of stockades, it seems appropriate to first comment on the concept of a correctional command which is being staffed for implementation.

Five basic types of activities are involved:

1. Detention Facilities, located on installations without a stockade, normally will provide for the detention of offenders for periods not to exceed 72 hours. Detention facilities also will be the place of confinement for casual prisoners for whom disposition instructions are pending, or who are en route to a designated place of confinement. The period of confinement in a detention facility will not be authorized to exceed seven days.

2. Stockades, located on installations, will confine those prisoners who are awaiting trial, who have sentences of 30 days or less, and those whose administrative discharges are imminent regardless of sentence length. Prisoners will be occupied primarily in administrative functions necessary to achieve their disposition (e.g., preparation for trial, physical and psychiatric evaluations), and in gainful employment in support of the installation. Counseling and other efforts to assist the prisoner in understanding and solving his problems will be stressed. A formal and extensive rehabilitation program will not be established.

3. Regional Confinement Facilities will be established. These facilities will confine prisoners who were dropped from the rolls of their previous unit prior to their return to military control, and are currently assigned to Special Processing Detachments. (Several Regional Holding Facilities will replace the 26 Special Processing Detachments currently in operation.) Prisoners confined are those who are awaiting trial, who have sentences of 30 days or less, and whose administrative discharges are imminent regardless of sentence. Prisoners will be occupied primarily in administrative functions necessary to achieve their disposition, and in other meaningful work, recreation, or welfare activities. Counseling and other activities to assist the prisoner in understanding and solving his problem will be stressed.

4. Correctional Training Facilities will confine prisoners sentenced to over 30 days of confinement who are not eligible for transfer to a disciplinary barracks and are not being processed for an administrative discharge. These prisoners will receive training to motivate them for honorable military service and military training in accordance with their needs. Three basic military training programs will provide for Basic Combat Training qualification, Military Occupation Specialty qualification, and Military Occupational Specialty refresher training. This training will allow both the individual and the Army to benefit from his period of confinement. Individuals identified as having no potential for further military service will receive training in a civil vocation. Extensive counseling, motivational, and leadership efforts will be continuous during this period of confinement. Every effort will be made to improve the individual's educational level. Those prisoners who are custody problems, recalcitrants, militant, aggressive and unresponsive to correctional treatment

will be separated from the remainder of the prisoner population. Extensive counseling and problem-solving efforts will continue. Provisions will be made to provide for post-release training to enable the individual to complete Basic Combat Training at the installation where he is confined, should the prisoner's sentence expire before he finishes this initial military training. Correctional training facilities in overseas commands will conduct the same programs described above except that they will not conduct Basic Combat Training and Military Occupation Specialty qualification training. Those few individuals in an overseas correctional training facility who have not completed BCT or been awarded an MOS may be transferred to a CONUS correctional training facility.

5. Disciplinary Barracks will confine those prisoners whose sentences include a punitive discharge and/or one year or more confinement. The primary thrust of the correctional treatment program will be to prepare prisoners for return to the civilian community with an employable vocation. Every effort will be made to improve the individual's educational level. Those prisoners who are selected for restoration to duty will be transferred to a correctional training facility for additional training prior to return to duty.

Centralization of command will provide the degree of independent action required to develop and implement standardized operating policy and guidance, and control and distribute resources to meet the specialized and technical nature of the custody and correctional treatment of military prisoners.

Direct and judicious implementation of departmental policies, and centralized direction of Army confinement operations are essential to correct certain undesirable conditions which have and currently exist in the operation of installation stockades.

The scope and applicability of the Army Correctional Program encompasses Army-wide correctional activities. The uniform operation of Army confinement facilities, and efficient processing and transfer of prisoners between stockades, correctional training facilities, and disciplinary barracks necessitate centralized direction and control.

The development of the Correctional Command concept presently is in the planning stage. Seven alternative organizational structures are being considered. The final choice of structure may necessitate minor modifications regarding social work participation in the program, but general recommendations were made regarding social work support.

Within the Correctional Training Facility and Disciplinary Barracks no significant changes in structure of the social work program seem indicated. However, regarding the program in stockades and regional confinement facilities there seems a need for a senior social worker to be designated as Social Services Consultant to the Correctional Command and that social workers and social work specialists be assigned to stockades and regional confinement facilities. Emphasis would be on social work activities consonant with treatment-oriented correctional institutions.

Social work involvement in the Army correctional program has come a long way, but there is still a long way to go to transform theory into practice. Despite resistances which have been encountered, the trend toward treatment-orientations has been continued. The provocative effect of new innovations will inevitably benefit not only the Army of the future, but also the home communities to which ex-prisoners return.

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THE INFLUENCE OF THE
COUNTER CULTURE ON AWOL BEHAVIOR

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Paper Presented
to the Conference on
Current Trends in Army Social Work
Fitzsimons General Hospital
Denver, Colorado
September, 1970

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Within the contemporary military environment, several popular theories have been advanced which attempt to explain the basic causes underlying deviant behavior. It has been proposed, for example, that a somewhat unruly, undisciplined generation of young Americans has rejected the traditional value systems of the military. Another explanation insists that current misbehavior in the Army is simply the reaction to an "unpopular" or "confusing" Asian conflict. The purpose of this paper is to examine still another theory--Theodore Roszak's [1969] concept of the "counter culture"--insofar as it explains military misbehavior.

Since the counter culture was selected as the theme for the present conference, we may reasonably assume the concept has already received serious consideration as a definitive framework by which to analyze deviant behavior in the Army. The approach, here, is to study the 15,000 formerly AWOL personnel sent to the Correctional Training Facility at Fort Riley, Kansas during that program's first two years of operation. Since AWOL offenders create over 80% of the Army's confinement population, the CTF trainee represents a particularly valid subject for the study. Is he, in fact, a product or prototype of Roszak's counter culture? Is his (mis)behavior a symptom of the generation gap which rejects traditional authority and values? Finally, to what extent is this predominant form of military delinquency (AWOL) a conscious opposition to the traditional role of the Army?

Such investigations must necessarily consider the attitudes and value orientations of the delinquent soldier. The nature of

the research is not new, and it should be familiar to the student of military performance. Eli Ginzberg [1959] provided the classic study in *The Ineffective Soldier*, a three-volume work which reflects a comprehensive analysis of military malperformance during World War II. Ginzberg, too, is concerned with various social psychological theories which might explain the causes of failure in the service:

"The theories ranged all the way from blaming the way in which American mothers reared their children to concluding that military discipline was too lax. Many held to the theory...that a high level of emotional instability is inherent in our modern industrial society. Others saw the roots of adult weakness in the deficiencies and handicaps experienced by children who grew up in underprivileged environments.

Ministers found a direct connection between the decline in religious training of youth and the unwillingness of many soldiers to endure hardships when their country was in danger. Others pointed to the hidden toll resulting from the inroads of pacifism which had swept the country after World War I....There were critics of contemporary society who believed that the manpower deficiencies revealed by World War II reflected a general softening of the population. They placed the blame on the long-term rise in the standard of living which had resulted in a situation where men had increasingly lost the capacity for hard work and sacrifice and had become increasingly addicted to creature comforts." [Ginzberg, 1959, p. 5-6]

In formulating a concept of today's counter culture, Roszak is primarily concerned with a conflict of cultural values. The technocratic society, he insists, is increasingly rejected by a very narrow and somewhat exclusive segment of contemporary American youth. They are "forming a culture so radically disaffiliated from the mainstream assumptions of our society that it scarcely looks to many as a culture at all." Roszak suggests that counter culture youth strive to achieve a comprehensive perception of the universe which transcends their stereotyped and predetermined roles in a society which is perpetuated by essentially corrupt institutions. Thus their preoccupation with drugs, pop art and rock music is interpreted by Roszak as a conscious quest for appropriate vehicles through which to expand the "objective consciousness" of contemporary society.

The military, obviously, is once more examining the theoretical potential of social psychology in an attempt to identify causative factors behind the service offender. We can now focus our attention on the AWOL soldier--the trainee at the Correctional Training Facility. After two years' operation, this program offers a profile of the AWOL offender which may serve as a basis for understanding his background, social adjustment, and--to some degree at least--the motivating factors behind his performance. On the average, the CTF trainee is 21 years of age, single, and a high school dropout. The majority are Caucasian, either Protestant or Catholic. In most cases, these young men lived with both parents until at least the age of 16, although a full one-third came from broken homes. Typically, these men *joined* the Army--only the minority are draftees. They have an average GT score of 86.3--well below the Army standard of 100. The combination rehabilitation and retraining program has been successful in restoring approximately 60% of its graduates to constructive, acceptable military duty which eliminates potentially wasted manpower and the stigma of a less than honorable discharge. [CTF Annual Reports 1969-1970]

From only a cursory glance at these very basic data we are nevertheless able to draw some preliminary conclusions concerning the relationship of Roszak's counter culture and the AWOL soldier. First, it is strikingly apparent that the AWOL serviceman lacks the intellectual capacity to assimilate and comprehend the sophisticated philosophical arguments of Marcuse, Ginsberg, Watts, Leary and the rest of the counter culture's spokesmen-predecessors. A full 58% of the CTF trainees failed to continue their formal education beyond the sophomore year of high school, and only one-fifth are high school graduates. It is equally important to recognize their low scores on the military aptitude test; only one-fifth scored at or above the Army norm. Their method of entry into the service is also significant. Sixty-one per cent *joined* the Army, a fact which belies any predisposed opposition to the military as well as their subsequent misconduct in uniform. Thus, by considering only the two basic factors of educational achievement and method of entry into the service, it already seems highly unlikely that these young men represent the counter culture. Such data, however, can provide only a very general description of the AWOL soldier. And, despite the apparent contradiction it suggests, we must further examine the values, motivation and goals of the military delinquent if we are to gain any accurate measure of the influence of the counter culture with respect to this population.

In a recent study of CTF graduates returned to active duty, 200 former trainees were interviewed at thirteen Army installations. [USACTF, 1970] These interviews, conducted and analyzed by CTF's Research and Evaluation Division, provide meaningful insight into the nature of the AWOL offense. It became clear, from this and other studies, that the AWOL soldier is concerned only with himself--his family, his problems in the military, his struggle to find a niche in the society of middle America. AWOL, for many of these men, was a continuation of avoidance reaction patterns previously established. Frustrated and disillusioned, they "quit" their roles in the service in much the same way they left jobs and responsibilities in civilian life. All too often, these were the men who enlisted in the Army primarily as a means of avoiding some unpleasant situation at home. For others, AWOL was an adaptive response mechanism--a kind of problem-solving behavior that appeared to offer the most promising alternative to a variety of stress situations. Time and time again, the determinants of effective or ineffective performance were shown to bear a remarkable similarity to the factors utilized by Ginzberg in his classic analysis. Intelligence, emotional stability, family situation, military assignment, motivation, situational stress--the validity of such factors is as substantial in 1970 as it was in 1944. The prolific volume of research into military delinquency echoes a recurring dilemma throughout the years: men--basically the same individuals, with generally common background characteristics, go AWOL for the same reasons, in identical fashion, in similar situations. This fact, in essence, has not changed. Nor has the impact of cultural values been dismissed. Ginzberg had this to say:

"Some men failed to perform effectively because they did not have a sense of personal responsibility or a feeling of patriotism...Others became ineffective because of a conflict between the basic values which had guided them prior to induction and the conditions of Army life in which they found themselves. They could not change the Army or the demands which the new environment made on them; but neither could they free themselves from a commitment to ingrained values." [Ginzberg, 1969, p. 104]

In the last analysis, the present issue becomes one of these same cultural values. If we are to measure the impact of the counter culture upon contemporary military delinquency, we must

search for the reflection of alienated youth's value systems in the service violator of 1970. In a word, they fail to appear. Nor should we reasonably expect to find them. The accelerated manpower requirements of every major conflict inevitably bring into the service the recurring stereotype of the school dropout, the drifter, the socially maladjusted individual--*The Ineffective Soldier*. Lacking the necessary intelligence, educational training, the maturity and sophistication necessary to even assimilate the complex social issues of the day, the Army AWOL of 1970 is most certainly *not* a product or prototype of the counter culture. Rather, he is by every available criterion a product of contemporary society. If he reflects its failures and shortcomings, he nevertheless continues to reflect its values. A job, a car, independence, time to do what he pleases, money in his pocket--such traditional goals have nothing in common with the sophisticated philosophies of the counter culture.

Perhaps the real issue concerns the validity of superimposing an admittedly nebulous social theory over the surface of military delinquency in an attempt to "explain" the phenomenon. Roszak himself emphasizes that the counter culture movement embraces only a distinct minority of American youth. To these, he applies the relatively few but stringent definitive criteria of intelligent sophistication, hippie culture and a kind of mystic transcendentalism. Further, Roszak emphatically rejects as members of the counter culture the clenched-fist stance of the black pover movement. Thus, if we attempt to "generalize" or "broaden" his concept we run the risk of diluting or distorting the counter culture so that its framework is all too comprehensive, too all-encompassing. In such a guise, the concept of a "counter culture" might be applied to any type of deviant population, any variation from the norm. And, while other counter cultures could exist concurrently, Roszak's concept should not be made so comprehensive that it subsumes all other possible movements.

Finally, there is the real danger of accepting at face value every interpretation Roszak offers. Kenneth Keniston, an eminent Yale psychologist, has this to say:

"Most blacks, chicanos and working-class youths, like the sons and daughters of the lower middle class, view the counter culture with mistrust and hatred. The youth revolt recruits only that minority of the young who are so solidly in technocratic society that they can afford to demand

something more of life than security, affluence and the prospect of political power." [Keniston, 1969, p. 8-9]

And, again:

"It is only after technology has triumphed, and only for those whose lives are glutted with the goodies it provides, that the young can begin to look wistfully at the delights of shamanism." [p. 8-9]

The experience at the Correctional Training Facility, in addition to prior research concerning AWOL personnel, clearly indicates that these young men are anything but "solidly entrenched in the technocratic society." Nor are their lives "glutted with the goodies" such a status implies. The CTF program is effective largely because it provides for crisis intervention through a comprehensive variety of services and resources designed to help resolve immediate stress. A pending divorce, a financial dilemma in the family, a frustrated and confused recruit--these are the constant characteristics associated with AWOL behavior in 1970. The successful restoration to duty of individuals like these is more than mute testimony to the value of the correctional program. It is also an explicit denial of the counter culture theory as an appropriate framework through which to analyze the problem of contemporary military delinquency.

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ARMY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES AND RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS:

TOWARD THE DEFINITION OF POSSIBLE ROLES

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Introduction

The close association between racial tension and emotional illness was brought to the author's attention by a series of events which occurred between the summer of 1967 and the fall of 1968. The first was a suicide attempt by a Negro sergeant. A detailed exploration of the social forces associated with the man's action revealed definite relationships between the oppression of prejudice which he had faced all of his life, and the frustration, despair and rage which led him to the attempt upon his life. The next events were a series of "mini-epidemics" of behavioral disturbances, psychophysiological illnesses, and depressive reactions among Black troops of an infantry brigade.

Several programs were initiated to help broaden our understanding of racial issues, and to attempt to bring about better race-relations where possible. We hoped, by the latter, to be effective in the primary prevention of some forms of educational disturbance. This paper describes the efforts to develop relevant programs, and a preliminary evaluation of their results. An attempt will be made to define possible roles for Army mental health professional and non-professional specialists who might work with command in designing and implementing other programs in the future to enhance constructive interracial attitudes and behaviors.

Racism in the Army

The Army has mirrored general society in its attitude toward the Black man. Black soldiers have fought in all of our wars, but in the two major conflicts of this century segregation was the rule. Negro servicemen in World War I were organized into four entirely segregated regiments. In World War II the 920,000 Negroes who served were also segregated. An exception was in Officer Candidate training, but only 2,484 of 174,000 commissioned officers were Black (1).

President Truman issued an executive order in 1948 which declared that equality of treatment and opportunity must be provided. The Navy and the Air Force became fully-integrated, and the Army lagged behind (1). During the Korean War, under pressure of need for combat troops, the Army also became fully integrated.

The Army has made great strides in the past decade. The legal position of complete equality of treatment and opportunity has been clearly established. Some steps have been taken to influence local, non-military communities to provide desegregated schooling and housing for military dependents. Despite these advances, the effects of de facto segregation and repressive racism are still

very much a part of the military racial climate.

Young Black enlisted men and officers entering the service are products of their environments with consequent educational, social, and economic penalties. They also are products of a new militancy associated with the battles of Watts, Newark, Detroit, etc. They have been concerned about the relationships between the economics of the War on Poverty and the War in Indo-China, and wonder increasingly if legal appeals through "The System" will ever provide redress of their grievances.

The Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army have expressed official concern about race relations. Seminars have been held throughout the world in an attempt to discover specific factors of racial discord in the Army. A number of these have been discovered, defined, and categorized. But racial tension is a dynamic rather than static phenomenon: and major destructive forces affect the duty soldier, the senior non-com, and the company commander. How can the unwieldy, bureaucratic system really begin to resolve existing problems, keep in touch with new social unrest, and prevent the disintegrative effects upon military morale and strength of serious racial discord?

Evolution of a Race Relations Program

A large number of Black soldiers with a variety of emotional and behavioral problems were referred to our mental health service for evaluation and treatment. None of the soldiers initially mentioned racial tension as being the source of their difficulty. When the problems were discussed, however, it seemed that real or perceived racial prejudice seemed to be associated with many of the symptoms which led these men to seek our help. The perceived prejudice seemed to elicit or stimulate intense anger which was handled in a variety of ways. Some men consciously perceived the anger and became involved in a series of hostile-aggressive acts which led to an apparent 'behavior disorder'. Others suppressed or repressed their anger. It often threatened to rise to awareness where it might be acted upon, and this led to anxiety or the production of psychophysiological disorders. The anger was directed inwardly in some, and was associated with depressive reactions of moderate severity.

Most of the men seen during this early period of our awakening awareness were from two companies in the same battalion. We visited one commander who was described as a particularly prejudiced individual so we might understand more fully the 'epidemic' we noted in his unit. He was aware that many Black soldiers in his unit felt that he was prejudiced, but he denied being so. He stated that he was "tough but fair" with all of his men, and blamed unit unrest on a few "troublemakers".

We suggested that he hold a company-size discussion of racial feelings. Although he said he was in favor of such a meeting it never came to pass. He gave many 'realistic' reasons for difficulty in assembling his men. The basic reason for non-action, however, seemed to have been lack of real interest or commitment on his part, and his perception of the mental health workers as

threatening and potentially harmful to him rather than helpful. Among reasons for his lack of interest were the pressures of other and more urgent requirements for his time and energy, and his lack of understanding of the depth of underlying tension felt by his Black troops.

We discussed the problems of racial tension and its effects with the Brigade Commander after our failure in dealing with the company. A model for a Human Relations Council (H.R.C.) was drafted which provided for an experimental approach with one battalion. Each company was to elect several representatives to an H. R. C. 'convention.' At this meeting permanent members of the Council would be selected, and meeting times and format would be established. The Council would be sponsored jointly by the mental health service and the Chaplaincy.

The Council was to discuss issues involving human relations in a broad sense. These might include race relations, A.W.O.L., drug use, and similar matters of importance to the troops. The Council would make recommendations for further action; the themes synthesized by the sponsors would be submitted to Command for their information and possible action. Command might submit issues to the Council for discussion also. It was to be an instrument for improved communications between enlisted men and their commanders. The Brigade Commander agreed to implement the model, but only if the Battalion Commander involved agreed, and only if the convention representatives were selected by the company commanders and first sergeants rather than elected.

Preliminary meetings were held with the Battalion Commander and then with his company commanders and their first sergeants to explain the program. They selected their representatives to the 'Convention' and the first group meeting was an outstanding success. The representatives seemed to be a true cross-section of the troops, including men with histories of involvement in many problem areas (racial, drugs, A.W.O.L., etc.), as well as men with excellent records. But the subsequent meetings were progressively less successful. Attendance dropped, we were never able to elect permanent Council members, and the project was abandoned after major, but totally unsuccessful efforts on our part to keep it alive.

The reasons for failure were unclear. We speculate that they include at least the following: the battalion executive officer and many of the company-level officers and non-commissioned officers felt negatively towards the project, apparently viewing it as an unwarranted intrusion upon their command prerogatives; the men selected as representatives had great reservations, seeing the project either as a 'trick', or feeling that command would sabotage their efforts; and, as with ill-fated effort in the company, realistic pressures of time and other commitments placed great obstacles in the way of regular participation by convention or Council members and command support.

Another project was begun at the same time that this one was failing. Weekly meetings were held with soldiers, newly-returned from Viet Nam, stationed

with another battalion within the same brigade. Issues discussed included race relations in Viet Nam and stateside. Sometimes the group leader initiated discussion about the topic, but often it was brought up or elaborated upon by group members. Black soldiers were concerned that prejudice existed at home, when it seemed not to have been a major problem in 'The Nam'. They were angry at alleged unfairness in assignments and promotions, and angry at the civilian community where they felt they were being treated as second-class citizens.

These experiences broadened our personal understanding of the extent of angry feelings, directly and indirectly expressed, resulting from real or perceived racial prejudice. In the fall of 1969 a fight broke out in a battalion within the brigade in which the mental health team had not been active. The author was approached by a lawyer with the idea of attempting to develop a program which would address itself to the issues of racial disharmony in the unit. They presented their ideas to the battalion and brigade commanders, and several discussions ensued. It became obvious that we needed more information and understanding before any formal intervention could be planned.

We held meetings with a number of Black infantry troops, Black and White social work specialists, White troops, and other interested parties. A plan emerged for a series of discussion groups culminating in a meeting with the entire battalion. Preliminary meetings were held with the company commanders and senior non-commissioned officers. A group of soldiers were invited to attend a discussion session at which panelists for the battalion-wide meeting were to be selected.

The battalion meeting was held early on a Friday afternoon. The initial panel discussion lasted fifty minutes and was followed by a fifty-minute discussion open to all attending. The meeting was adjourned and was re-convened after the evening meal. Attendance at the latter session was voluntary rather than mandatory, as in the earlier one.

These meetings were quite successful. Four or five-hundred men attended the mandatory session, and fifty to seventy attended at least part of the evening one. We felt that this latter attendance was indicative of a high level of interest among the men. Many men at each session left most reluctantly. During the afternoon, men insisted that they have a chance to speak. They were told to return to the evening session if they did not have a chance to be heard during the fifty-minute session in the afternoon. For almost an hour after the formal afternoon meeting, five or six groups of ten to fifteen men continued an active discussion of the issues. We had agreed to keep the evening meeting going as long as there was substantial interest in 'rapping'. This meeting began at 6:00 P.M. and continued until 9:15 P.M. It could very well have continued longer, but fatigue began to set in. This evening discussion was very active, and was enhanced by the fact that the battalion and brigade commanders were present and participated until the very end.

A follow-up battalion meeting was held several weeks later, attended by approximately seven-hundred men. The battalion commander then organized a Battalion Race Relations Advisory Committee to continue talks on a more informal basis.

In October, 1969 the Brigade Commander arranged for a meeting with the Chief of Mental Health Services, the Post Director of Personnel, and the Commanding General. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the extent and impact of race-relations problems on the military community. The chief of mental health services advised, and the General so directed, that an active study be undertaken to examine the extent of underlying racial tension, and to propose possible solutions if such unrest did exist.

Within a very brief period of time an ad hoc committee was formed, chaired by the Equal Employment Opportunity Officer from the Office of the Director of Personnel. A broadly-based membership was selected that included Blacks, Whites, Officers, Enlisted Men, men and women, civilians, and several different branches of Army specialists. Open-ended discussions were held with the goals of defining existing problems and recommending possible continuing courses of action. At their third meeting it was announced that a directive had been sent to each Post from the Department of the Army to establish similar seminars and forward their results through channels to higher headquarters.

The problems that beset the earlier meetings continued to exist. There was great difficulty in coordinating meeting times, and in having the same group present two consecutive meetings. But the group had strong command interest and continued to function. After several months of discussions, members requested an opportunity to discuss race-relations with the Commanding General. A meeting was set up and was expected to last for approximately one hour. The vigor of presentation, the interest felt by all present, and the level of relevance to community needs was such that the meeting continued for three-and-a-half hours. The General apparently cancelled the remainder of his afternoon appointments.

Following this meeting the race-relations committee was asked to recommend a specific program to the General. After a number of meetings it was felt that a minimum program would consist of the establishment of a permanent, full-time Race-Relations Coordinating Committee, the establishment of a broadly-based, post-wide Race-Relations Advisory Council, a series of ongoing race-relations discussion groups at all unit levels, and the formation of a trained group of moderators for discussion groups. When this program was presented to the General for his consideration, all elements were approved and established except for a trained, permanent group of race-relations moderators. Official circulars were published in February and March, 1970 establishing mandatory race-relations seminars, and establishing a race-relations council and a race-relations coordinating group. The latter consisted of five full-time personnel in addition to the Equal Opportunity Officer.

After the first series of battalion and brigade-wide meetings it became obvious that trained moderators were needed. A number of the officers who had been chosen to lead discussion groups were much more accustomed to telling things to other people rather than to listening and encouraging group discussion. The clinical psychologist in the mental health program volunteered to develop a program to train moderators by giving them a combination of didactic and personal experiences with small group process, including having the opportunity to view themselves on video tape for immediate feedback. These moderators were selected by the major unit commanders within whose area a race-relations seminar was to be scheduled.

One of the permanent members of the Race-Relations Coordinating Committee was a sociologist with previous experience in the area of alienation of Black veterans. He was given the task of evaluating the impact of the post-wide program.

Results and Discussion

The author has attempted to define a progressively complex series of interactions between members of the Mental Health Professions, and Command and Staff personnel on an Army post. Specific findings and recommendations of the various committees and groups are beyond the scope of this paper but have been forwarded through channels to become part of a complete Army-wide report. Suffice it to say that among the most notable findings was the fact that virtually all of the Black participants felt that there was a race-relations problem in the Army, and that a great many of the White participants felt initially that there was no problem. This fact alone highlights the difficulty in approaching this complex area. Communications among various racial groups and among the various age groups are inadequate in scope, poorly handled, and subject to great distortion. The majority of older White soldiers (and many senior Black noncommissioned officers) failed to see that tension existed. Their feelings and thoughts must be recognized, understood, and dealt with as well as the angry feelings of the young Black trooper.

Race-relations per se is not a mental health problem. But tensions and conflicts associated with troubled race-relations can contribute directly to emotional and behavioral problems which then clearly enter the province of mental health specialists. It is our impression that if a goal were defined to provide treatment for individuals with such conflicts who develop symptoms, the entire staff of many clinics could devote their entire time to these people alone. Obviously this would be an impossible task.

Treatment for patients suffering from conflicts generated by racial tension would not be sufficient. Some effort at primary prevention had to be made. Continuing attempts, beset with many failures along the way, were needed to reach the current level of involvement with a battalion, a brigade, and the Post. The frustrations and failures were most discouraging at times to the men involved.

Goals must be defined if results are to be evaluated. Our goals must be described on several levels. They consisted of attempts to learn about the impact of racial prejudice on the feelings and function of soldiers at the Post; an attempt to utilize the knowledge gained, together with experience in group dynamics and small group leadership, to develop a comprehensive and ongoing race-relations program; and ultimately, goals of decreasing overt and covert racial prejudice and prejudicial attitudes in our community, enhancing the sense of self-esteem of minority groups, and minimizing the possibility of racially-inspired violence.

We feel that we learned a great deal about how various minority-group representatives felt about racial prejudice. More importantly, this knowledge was shared in the most direct means possible with all leadership elements up to and including the Commanding General of the Post. We also recognize that this knowledge was cross-sectional of a particular time; that feelings and attitudes are not static but change, at times very rapidly and that continuing efforts must be made to maintain the communications networks among the various groups of Blacks, Whites, officers, senior non-coms, duty soldiers, younger men and older.

We met the goal of developing a comprehensive and ongoing program. At least the skeletal structure is present. Grassroots discussion groups, training sessions for moderators, a broadly-based advisory council, a full-time race-relations coordinating committee, and direct access to and meaningful support from the highest command level are all realities.

These have been process goals. The more specific and 'objective' ones dealing with changes in attitudes, changes in the levels of prejudice-directed behavior and enhancement of self-esteem have not yet been measured, but it is our hope to be able to do so.

The major goal of command in these programs was to minimize the possibility of violent confrontations. This is the most difficult area of all in which to assess effectiveness. There is no real baseline or standard of violent confrontations against which we can measure our effectiveness. In this matter, we share the difficulty of all groups engaged in efforts directed towards primary prevention of rare, intermittent, or sporadic pathology. If violence were to occur, would it spring, in part, from the attention focused on race-relations by the program, or would it be of lesser intensity than it might have been without the program? If violence were not to occur was it in part because of the race-relations program, or would it have failed to be a significant problem even if nothing had been done? Obviously one can not answer the latter questions easily, if at all. We have seen some significant changes in individual behavior emerge from the meetings, and feel that they have brought understanding to some. We have seen a White first sergeant from Mississippi become acutely aware of the problems and needs of his Black troops and to show sensitive empathy in addition to awareness. We have noted that

Black and White soldiers who previously adhered to rather strict although informal segregation in their mess hall and off-post social activities, reversed this pattern to seek out companionship by members of the other race, eat together, and go downtown together. We do not yet know how widespread or substantial these changes are.

If mental health professionals hope to become involved with broad issues potentially leading to the primary prevention of emotional illness, they must know, and be known in turn by, the healthy members of their communities as well as the sick. We found that there is no substitute for close professional relationships between the mental health specialist and commanders in a military setting. Although time and staff limitations preclude active involvement with all command and staff personnel, major members of the community must be approached as needs become apparent, and efforts made to be of service to them. If time permits and personality configurations are compatible, effective working relationships may develop.

Throughout the Army today there is great personnel turbulence. Most officers and enlisted men are present in a company for such a short period of time that it is almost impossible to develop effective consultative working relationships. Battalion and brigade staff and command positions are much more stable, and mental health professionals may have the time to develop working relationships with men in these positions which might permit the initiation and development of meaningful programs.

It seemed apparent that long-range programs (i.e., anything longer than two months in duration) could be developed only with the complete support of higher-level command. Company commanders were extremely reluctant or unable to be sufficiently flexible and innovative. Unless higher level support were obtained, necessary commitments of men and resources could not be expected.

Many authors have pointed out the suspicion that laymen often have of mental health professionals. We must be aware of this potential barrier in working with healthy community members. This is especially true in the Army, where a level of cultural paranoia exists even without the addition of our presence. Mental health workers may be seen as intruders, do-gooders, usurpers of command prerogatives, or even spies. If mental health workers are to become meaningfully-involved in programs as complex and noted for potential irrationality as race-relations, they must make special efforts to be seen as human beings with potentially beneficial professional expertise, rather than as jargon-laden and aloof fugitives from ivory towers (or 'insane asylums') who may themselves spread the germs of insanity.

The roles of mental health professionals and para-professionals may take varied forms. They may be epidemiologists who are aware of shifting trends in symptomatic expressions of underlying emotional distress, and who can bring this information, in usable form, to community leaders who are able to re-structure harmful environmental influences. They may provide direct supportive care for the emotional casualties of societal prejudice. They may utilize their knowledge and expertise in dealing with small-group interactions to

provide leadership indiscussion groups, or teach others basic knowledge of small group interaction, and participate with others with leadership experience in training discussion-group leaders. They may initiate and help to implement programs in community organization. And recognizing their limited area of expertise they may be interpreters of community moods and behaviors, and advisors to community leaders.

Grier and Cobbs (2) eloquently point out the underlying frustration and rage which exist in our land today. We found their statements accurate reflections of the feeling-tone and verbal content developed in our contacts with individual Black soldiers and in our group meetings. They describe how White Americans can easily misunderstand Black Americans. Attitudes and behaviors based on deep-seated prejudice, Black or White in origin, must be recognized and dealt with. They must be replaced by more constructive ones, based on empathic understanding of the hopes, wishes and human needs of others. The Army has trained substantial numbers of angry young men to be aggressive and to kill other humans efficiently in a time of war. It must also lead the way in helping these men, and ultimately the rest of our society, to resolve racially-inspired conflicts and to foster constructive relationships among our citizens. Or we may all pay the price of our failure.

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